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ABSTRACT
READING THE QUADERNl DEL CARCERE: THE POLITICAL PROJECT OE
ANTONIO GRAMSCI
FEBRUARY 2006
MANUEL S. ALMEIDA RODRIGUEZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
The present work provides an interpretative key with which to render a consistent
approach to the mature politico-theoretical coipus of Antonio Gramsci, the Quaderni del
carcere, composed from 1929 to 1935 while imprisoned under the fascist regime in Italy.
My contention is that the concern over the relations between leaders and led, governing
and governed, lies as a basic matrix underneath the different groups of thematic notes
contained in his prison notebooks. Thus, in his notes regarding political matters the most
important reflection concerns his notion of hegemony to describe the specificity of the
modern state, which rests in the constant organization of the consent of the subjects and
not in its coercive capacity. In his notes regarding philosophical matters, in interlocution
with Benedetto Croce and N. Bukharin, Gramsci’s thinking centers on the relationship of
Marxism towards common sense and proposing a dialectical relationship between them.
In his notes concerning literature, Gramsci’s approach is equally political in that he
reappraises the committed literary criticism of Francesco De Sanctis in the 19“^ Century
for Marxism, and in addition critiques the lack a ot a national-popular literature in Italy as
well as the paternalistic attitude of some Italian literary figures. Finally, in his notes on
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language, he shows great interest in the relationship between dialects and unitary
language surely out of the social and political problem of the ‘language question’ in Italy.
Gramsci values the progressive effect of the unification of language under standard
Italian for the purpose of international communication, but is extremely sensible to the
dialectal reality of the different regions in the Italian peninsula. My work is both a
theoretical and historico-critical reflection on Gramsci’ s intellectual enterprise while in
prison. I have drawn my interpretations and conclusions from a close reading of the main
texts in their original language and from a detailed analysis of the pertinent secondary
literature.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To create a new culture does not mean only to individually
make “original” discoveries, it means also and especially to
critically promote the truths already discovered, to
“socialize them” in a manner of speaking and thus make
them become a foundation of vital actions, an element of
coordination, and of intellectual and moral order. That a
mass of men be conducted to think coherently and in a
unitary way the real present is a “philosophical” fact much
more important and “original” than the discovery by a
philosophical “genius” of a new truth that remains as
patrimony of small intellectual groups.
Antonio Gramsci, Notebook 1 1, Quaderni del carcere
The present work provides a consistent intei*pretative key with which to interpret
the whole corpus of Gramsci’s Quadenu del carcere, an immense body of politico-
theoretical work that is literally fragmentary on the surface. The elaboration of this
interpretative key is at the same time an inherent incursion into Gramsci’s very rich
political theory. That is, the important elements constitutive of his political theory -the
leitmotifs (to take a word used by Gramsci himself in his notes on methods of
interpretation) of his mature work- are projected back into the materiality ot the prison
writings to convey a common theme underlying what at the suitace is a rough collection
of notes (and for Gramsci the Quadenu were no more than material tor lurther
elaboration with the proper resources).' We propose that Gramsci’s concern with the
relationship between governing and governed or between leaders and led -with a certain
' For a discussion of the fragmentary nature of the Quaderni and the different plans ot
work thought out by Gramsci, before and while writing the notebooks, see Giorgio
Baratta (2()()(): 29-44), Francisco Fernandez Buey (2001: 129-184), and Joseph A.
Buttigieg ( 1992: 1-64).
1
emphasis on the elements of coercion and consent- is present even in his writings of
themes that are not immediately political.^ This means that when reading his notes either
on language and grammar, his critique of Bukharin and Croce, his notes on literature, on
philosophy, on education, on intellectuals, on the political party, on journalism, on the
State, etc., the underlying theme consists in thinking about the articulation of leaders and
led, whether of the dominant social relations or of an alternative. In synthesis,
underneath the supposedly disinterested //Vr ewig (for ever) of his intentions,'^ expressed
very early on in his imprisonment, there still lies a potential outline for a future political
project in his notebooks; a political project, moreover, that takes into account the reality
of defeat of his (or ours for that matter) socio-historical circumstances.'^ As Gramsci
himself writes, one has to get accustomed to being stereo della storia, although without
renouncing the importance of fertilizing the terrain for better prospects of change in the
future. Or, to quote what Gramsci often used as a motto, ‘pessimism of intelligence,
optimism of will’.'^
The bulk of the project is composed of semi-autonomous chapters, each one
putting to the test the interpretative key with a specific group of thematic notes: thus, the
fourth chapter deals with his notes on the State, hegemony, and the political party; the
^ We say “not immediately political” because in Gramsci’s conception ‘everything is
political’. This general contention serves in terms of our project because in a sense it
wants to give filling to that general statement.
^ For the often quoted letter of Gramsci’s intention of working in prison on something /iVr
ewig, see Antonio Gramsci (1996: 54-57). This letter is also important, moreover, in that
in it Gramsci establishes one of the first plans for his studies in prison. We elaborate
further on this matter in the second chapter.
This last remark suggests that one of the reasons why Gramsci is still so widely read
today is that our historical situation is analogous to his; that is, we are still piacticing
critical political theory in a context ot global defeat tor progressive and radical piojects.
Although Gramsci attributed this phrase to French intellectual Romain Rolland, the
exact phrasing in Gramsci’s usage is his own.
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fifth chapter deals with his notes on common sense and philosophy (through the criticism
of Bukharin and Croce); the sixth chapter deals with his notes on literature and language.
The second chapter will provide a brief biographical and intellectual sketch of Gramsci
and vvill deal with the materiality and fragmentary nature of the Qiiaderui del carcere, as
well as propose the interpretative key to render the text as a whole, which in its entirety
conveys a consistent meaning. In addition, we will discuss Gramsci’s own notes on
interpretative methods and his different plans for studying in prison and the
circumstances surrounding his work. Here we will also recur frequently to his Lettere dal
carcere ( 1996) for a broader picture on Gramsci’s state of mind and health. The third
chapter for its part will give a brief incursion into the very first notebook worked on by
Gramsci while in prison in order to show how many of his different thematic concerns
flowed together from the first writing impulse.
Although the chapters will have specific topics throughout the whole dissertation
other important concepts within his ethical-political vocabulary will become illuminated,
such as organic intellectuals, hegemony, philosophy of praxis, passive revolution,
historical bloc, national-popular, mechanic in contrast to organic, normative and
immanent grammar, his metaphoric usage of the Reformation and the Renaissance, as
well as others. We will also engage with the most pertinent secondary literature on the
above topics and at times we will include other authors ot the Marxist tradition for
comparative purposes.
In sum, the work is as much about Gramsci’s political theory as ot how to read
the complex whole ot the Quaderiii. Thus, the dissertation will focus on an immanent
reading of the notebooks in their original language more than on anything else. Our
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interpretation has as a north three basic principles. The first principle concerns the basic
thesis of the work while the second and third principle concern our approach to
Gramsci’s prison writings. The first principle is expressed by Gramsci and is probably
the one key fragment that in a sense inspires our whole reading of the Qiiademi and the
proposal of our interpretative key. In notebook 15 Gramsci states;
It seems proper to say that the first [elements of politics] to be forgotten are the
first elements themselves, the most elemental things; on the other hand, those,
repeating them infinite times, become the pillars of politics and of whichever
collective action. The first element is that there really exist governing and
governed, leaders and led. All of political science and art is based on this
primordial fact, irreducible (in certain general conditions). The origins of this fact
is a problem in itself, that should be studied in itself (at least it could or should be
studied how to attenuate and make disappear this fact, changing certain conditions
identifiable as operative in this sense), but the fact remains that there exists
leaders and led, governing and governed. From this fact it should be seen how to
lead in the way most efficient (given certain ends) and thus how to prepare in the
best way the leaders (and in this most precisely consists the first section of the
political science and art), and how on the other part one knows the lines of least
resistance or the rationalities behind the obedience of the led or governed (1975:
1752).^
The relation between leaders and led thus constitutes for Gramsci the central concern, the
basic cell behind his political theory. The present work, then, wants to flesh out this
concern throughout the different thematic notes.
The second principle constituting our north we find is expressed perfectly in the
comments made by philosopher Julian Marias regarding the most important Spanish
philosopher, Jose Ortega y Gasset:
The thought of Ortega is systematic, although his writings are often not; 1
have compared them to icebergs, of which only one tenth emerges over the
surface, such as that to see its integral reality one has to go diving. It is true that
Ortega gives sufficient indications for this operation to be realized, but it has to be
realized, that is, one cannot read Ortega passively and without effort; without
cooperation. His method was “the involution ol the book towards the dialogue ;
All translations from Italian or Spanish throughout the dissertation are ours.
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he had the reader present, but this obligates one to read with an active and
dialoguing attitude (1976: 13).
As will be seen in the first chapter, due to the fragmentary nature of the Quaderni del
carcere the reader has to remain cautious since we agree with Flavio Capucci (1978: 15-
16) when he states that to understand Gramsci one has to incur in an intense labor of
interpretation, especially if we want to go beyond the tip of the iceberg. We believe, as
Marias thinks of Ortega, that there is certain coherence to Gramsci’s thinking underneath
the fragmentary surface of the notebooks. A clo.se reading of the original text helps us
submerge into it.
Finally, the third principle has to do with a concern expressed by Gramsci himself
in a note present in notebook 6, which states:
“Soliciting texts”
.
That is, making the texts say, for love of the texts, more than
the texts really say. This error of philological method is verified even outside of
philology, in all the analyses and examinations of life’s manifestations (1975:
838).
It is our intention to be fair with the text itself, and we by no means pretend to exhaust all
the possibilities within them. We do contend there is a consistency around the concern
for the relations between leaders and led, but we do not maintain that that exhausts the
whole of the writings. Gramsci himself speculates that many ot the topics touched upon
in his notes would probably have to be changed, eliminated, or elaborated it they were to
see the light of day in a finished form. We find characteristic of this error of ‘soliciting
texts’, for example, Peter Ives’ contention when, after rightly emphasizing the influence
of Gramsci’s studies in linguistics on the Quaderni, he concludes a bit too hastily that
“Gramsci’s preoccupations during his time in prison have their roots twenty years earlier
(2004: 33). This a-historic statement is extremely problematic, for it contends that
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Giamsci s woik is the lealiziition ot what was already potentially present years before
being imprisoned, even before his active participation in the founding of the Communist
Party ot Italy, his participation in the International Communist, his participation in the
workers’ unrest in Turin in 1919-1920, even before the advent of fascism. This type of
position reduces Gramsci’s work as an almost complete individual settling of personal
intellectual accounts ignoring other equally important concerns present in the notebooks.
Moreover it obscures the important and substantial development of Gramsci’s thought
throughout his political life, as we see in the second chapter. In contrast, our approach
wants to be balanced and is sustained by a close reading of the texts in combination with
a historical perspective.
The present work situates itself in the recent trend in Gramscian studies that
revolves around a return to the texts themselves of Gramsci. Gramsci is probably one of
the most cited Italian authors.^ There are hundreds and hundreds of books on Gramsci
and his work has been translated into more than a dozen different languages. However,
Q
most of the books and essays on Gramsci’s mature thought concentrate on particular
aspects or concepts of his thought (for example, Buci-Glucksman 1979; Portelli 1982;
Fontana 1993; Macciochi 1976; Anderson 1977; Betti 1981; Finocchiaro 2002; Crehan
^ In 1987, news came out to the effect that Gramsci was one of the 1,250 authors most
cited in the arts and humanities index (Santucci 1995: XI).
^ By “Gramsci’s mature thought’’ we do not mean to do as the Althusser ol a certain
period did with the thought of Marx, dividing it in a completely un-dialectical manner
into fixed stages of development (1968; 22-30). We use the notion of “mature thought
to characterize Gramsci’s writings in prison in contrast to the pre-prison writings, which
tended to have an immediate urgency of the moment. It should be obvious that thoughts
present in the pre-prison writings are also present in the Qiiaclerui. For a critique ot
Althusser’s position at that point of his theoretical work, see Manuel S. Almeida-
Rodrfguez (2001 ), specially the last two sections.
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2002). By particular aspects we do not mean that these type of studies do not take into
consideration othei aspects ot Giamsci s thought, but rather that they focus primarily on
certain thematic aspects as the key ones in his thought. For example, revolving
Gramsci’s thought around one outstanding element such as his theory of the State, his
notion ol hegemony, his notion of historical bloc, his notion of passive revolution, etc.
Comparatively, there are much fewer works that try to provide a comprehensive^
approach to the totality of the Quaderni. This approach was made more feasible by the
publication of the critical edition ot the Quaderni del carcere under the direction of the
important Gramsci and Marxist scholar, Valentino Gerratana. This critical edition
attempts to provide a faithful but yet accessible version of the Quaderni that reflected the
manuscripts in their original form, thus giving us a better look at Gramsci’s rhythm of
work.'*’ We elaborate on this in the second chapter.
The contribution of this critical edition is better appreciated if we remember that
Gramsci’s prison writings were first edited in various thematic volumes and published
from 1948 through 1951 by Einaudi. This original edition, though prepared with
important didactical intentions, ignored the totality of the Quaderni and transformed them
almost into self-contained monographs on different subjects. This edition consists of the
most revised and finished notes and essays (within what was consciously for Gramsci
only material to be revised with the appropriate resources he lacked in prison) of his
prison writings, but ignored the earlier drafts of important notes and the overall workings
^ We use the notion of comprehensive here in the Weberian sense of verstehen, including
not only the meaning of all encompassing but also the inherent rational or intellectual
action needed to interpret things.
For a brief account of what was attempted by the critical edition, see the preface
(Gerratana 1975, xxxv-xli) and Francisco Fernandez Buey (2001).
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of a collection of writings that were never finished or written with the appropriate
resources.
Without taking the specific merits away from that urgently needed first edition of
the notebooks, the critical edition by Gerratana provides a useful and indispensable tool
with which to construct and convey a comprehensive interpretation of the Quaderni as a
whole without necessarily overstressing some elements as more important than others.
The critical edition makes it easier to appreciate how things, notions, concepts that may
originate in one realm, for example, are then transported and used in others.'^
Through a close reading of the critical edition of the Quaderni,'^ the dissertation
fills a gap in the Gramscian scholarship, especially within the Anglo-American tradition,
in that it embraces the whole of the notebooks not to illuminate specific areas (though it
does in the process), but to convey a particular meaning or a consistent inteipretation that
illustrates how the different areas or topics are interrelated into one project within the
seemingly fragmentary whole of the Quaderni. This approach centered around a
comprehensive and close look at the text of the critical edition of the Quaderni is at the
base of the latest trend in Gramscian studies and is represented by the recent works of
Francisco Fernandez Buey (2001), Giorgio Baratta (2000; 2003), Fabio Frosini (2003),
" For an exposition of the context and situation regarding the Communist Party of Italy
and the process and rationale behind this first thematic edition ot Gramsci’s Quaderni,
see Giuseppe Vacca (1995: 13-41, 89-134).
The English translation of the critical edition of the Quaderni is in the process of being
published. Until now only the first two volumes have been published, edited by Joseph
A. Buttigieg (Gramsci 1992; 1996).
The close reading of the text will also take into consideration social-historical
circumstances that inform some of the insights within it. That is, when necessary, we
will incur into debates surrounding or informing the text, specitically, the importance ot
the debates in the Communist International, the reality ot political deteat at the national
and international level, fascism, etc.
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among others. Another example of this recent trend is the ongoing seminar that is being
held in Italy under the sponsorship of the International Granisci Society Italia and which
is dedicate to the elucidation of the Gramscian lexicon that can be brought out of the
Quaderni del carcere. The first series of the seminar has already been published (Frosini
and Liguori 2004).
As noted above, much has been written on Gramsci’s political thought. Most of
the works, however, have been thematic or biographical in nature, and from a general
perspective most of these can be divided into different areas. Most secondary literature
on Gramsci focuses on what is explicitly political in his work. Very important texts, such
as Portelli’s (1982), Buci-Glucksman’s (1979), Coutinho’s (1986), Anderson’s (1977),
and Macciochi (1976) -to name just a few- would fit in this category.''^ Whereas, Portelli
argues that the most important concept in Gramsci’s prison writings is the notion of
‘historical bloc’, Buci-Glucksman rigorously elaborates on how Gramsci’s conception
enlarges the notion of the State in order to incorporate the typical private realm into it
using notions such as apparatus of hegemony. Her contribution is marked by the
discussion on the relationship between Gramsci and the structuralist approach in
Marxism and it also relates Gramsci’s conception to the debates in the Third
International. Similarly, Carlos Nelson Coutinho -the leading Gramscian scholar in
Brazil- focuses on the political aspect and stresses the importance of Gramsci’s version ol
the philosophy of praxis and of the notion of catharsis'^ found on the Quaderni and ol the
These texts provide wonderful insight on Gramsci’s thought in general -which in an
inclusive sense is completely political-, but the focus primarily on the immediately
political aspects of his thought.
Catharsis in Gramsci’s conception points toward the moment when the subaltern
classes gain political autonomy and sell-consciousness. The cathaitic moment maiks the
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primacy of politics in general. In addition, his work illuminates on the points of
continuity and rupture between Gramsci’s earlier work and the notebooks. Perry
Anderson’s piece constitutes an important contribution in that, besides elaborating on
Gramsci’s different takes on the notion of the State, it pays close attention to the
important relationship between his concept of hegemony, war of position, etc., and the
debates in the Communist International and the historical situation (of defeat) of the
communist movements in Western Europe. Although Anderson’s piece ignores some of
the vital theoretical underpinnings in Gramsci’s own notion of hegemony -such as the
influence of Gramsci’s studies on linguistics and philology- his piece does well in giving
the necessary historical insight underlying Gramsci’s work to new students and readers
who live in a world completely unfamiliar with this vocabulary that was well known
before. Macciochi, for her part, also focuses on Gramsci’s political strategy expounded
in the notebooks around the notion of ‘war of positions’, and also approximates
Gramsci’s work to other communist political leaders such as Mao Zedong.
Another group of texts focus on other specific elements. Among them, a few
should be noted for their importance in advancing the knowledge on Gramsci’s work.
Valentino Gerratana’s (1997) essays provide the key materials in order to understand the
debates and the positions that served as a backdrop to the editorial work involved in the
critical edition of the Qiiaderni published in 1975. It also provides important insight tor a
proper understanding or initial reading ot them. There is the classic study by Franco Lo
Piparo ( 1979) on Gramsci’s work and its relation to his linguistic and philological
passage from an economic-corporatist to a properly political consciousness. The political
party plays a key role in this process. This process will be assessed in the disseitation
when we address Gramsci’s notion ol the Communist Party as a modem Prince .
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background. This work is still the best account
-and still one of the very few on the
subject- on the important linguistic undeipinnings of Gramsci conception of hegemony
and his political project in general. The dissertation will take great consideration of this
work when bridging different areas of Gramsci ’s thought. Lo Piparo’s study, however,
ends up under-stressing some other important theoretical and political influences in
Gramsci political thought.'^ Recently, cultural anthropologist Kate Crehan (2002)
published a book that focuses on Gramsci notion of culture. In Crehan’s account, we find
a good discussion not only of Gramsci’s notion of culture, but also a good critique of
various improper appropriations of Gramsci’s work for other purposes, especially by
anthropologists. Francisco Fernandez Buey’s Leyendo a Gramsci (2001), and Giorgio
Baratta’s Le rose e i qiiaderni: Sciggio sul pensiero dicdogico di Antonio Gramsci (2000,
2003) should also be mentioned in that these texts fully incorporate the rhythm and
structure of Gramsci’s writings in prison in their writings. Baratta’s book provides much
insight into Gramscian concepts such as the ‘national-popular’ and provides a
comprehensive reading of the Quaderni through the theme of Americanism. In his latest
book on Gramsci, Fernandez Buey, one of the leading Gramscian scholars in Spain,
provides a reading that fully incorporates Gramsci’s personal situation as expressed in his
Prison Letters. A particularly important chapter of his book focuses on Gramsci’s
relationship with his wife, Giulia, throughout Gramsci’s imprisonment.
A recent study that takes fully into account Lo Piparo’s text, is Peter Ives’s Gramsci
and the Politics of Language (2003). In fact, the first chapter of Ives’ book is roughly a
summary of Gramsci’s background in linguistics through Lo Piparo s book. The lest of
the book is important in that it analyzes Gramsci’s thought on language and hegemony in
relation to the Bakhtin Circle, Adorno, Benjamin, and Flabermas.
In contrast to most ot the vast scholarship on Granisci, the present work will
attempt to provide a unifying perspective with which to interpret the seemingly separate
preoccupations Gramsci elaborated on in his Qiiaderni. What we will trace is a
comprehensive political project and vocabulary that fully acknowledges the reality of
momentary defeat underneath the notebooks’ fragmentary surface. Although original to
an extent, our work incoiporates important insights provided by Gramscian scholars and
other commentators.
12
CHAPTER II
APPROACHING GRAMSCl AND THE QUADERNI DEL CARCERE
As we propose in the introduction, what lies at the core of the Quadenii del
carcere is Gramsci’s engagement with the political. In this reading of Gramsci, by the
political we understand the main problem of the relationship between leaders and led.
This problematic is analyzed by Gramsci both in terms of the relations of power
maintained by the modern State in contemporary bourgeois society and in terms of the
political strategy and organization needed by a radical socialist movement to overturn the
dominant order of things.'^ Out of this engagement with the political we can trace a
comprehensive political project throughout the Qiiaderni that runs through most of his
analytically distinguishable themes.
Behind this interpretation lies a particular way of approaching the text that we
want to flesh out throughout the present chapter. Due to the fragmentary nature and
incompleteness of the main body of work under discussion, as well as the many debates
over its inteipretation ever since its original publication, in this chapter we will provide
some basic and important information regarding Antonio Gramsci, the political
atmosphere of the times around the Qiiaderni, and the form and materiality of the
writings in prison.
We should begin by giving some biographical information ol Antonio Gramsci
and the surrounding social and political atmosphere ot his formation and experience piioi
Peter Ives (2004: 30-3 1 ) calls these two forms of political power relying on the same
dynamic as ‘regressive hegemony’ and ‘progressive hegemony’.
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to being imprisoned. This will provide an initial entry point as to the subjects and
interests manifested by Gramsci in his prison writings. Antonio Gramsci was born on
January 22, 1891, in Ales, near Cagliari, capital of the island of Sardinia, in the southern
part of Italy. Sardinia was one of the most underdeveloped and rural regions of the
country. Italy had just recently united as the outcome of the complex historical process
known as the Risorgimento during the 1850’s and 1860’s (Duggan 1994; 1 17-142; Davis
2000).'^ From his early years, Gramsci lived a life of poverty and difficulty, his father
being charged in 1897 for administrative cormption and incarcerated for five years. This
situation of poverty obligated even the very young Gramsci to work as a necessary
complement to the maintenance of the household, a situation that ended up postponing
his early studies for some time.
After graduating from secondary school by 1908, he attended the Dettori Lyceum
in Cagliari. It was in this time when Gramsci is living with his brother Gennaro that he
was first introduced to the revolutionary literature of a radical and socialist nature. At the
same time, while at the lyceum Gramsci already develops an initial interest in Italian
intellectuals such as Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Gentile, southern socialist Gaetano
Salvemini, etc. His first reading of Marx dates back to 1910. As early as in a school
essay of 1911 titled Oppressed and Oppressors, Gramsci already spoke in the language
of class struggle and social revolution:
For biographical information we have relied on the classic biography ol Gramsci
written by the late Giuseppe Fiori, translated into English as Antonio Gramsei: Life of a
Revolutionary (1990), on the work of Manuel Sacristan ( 1998), that of Carlos Nelson
CoLitinho (1986), and that of Alastair Davidson ( 1977).
In the Quaderni, Gramsci deals at length with the complexities of the Risorgimento. In
fact, as we will see in the following chapter, it is when writing on Italian history and the
Risorgitnejito that Gramsci initially elaborates many ol his best known concepts.
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The struggle waged by humanity from time immemorial is truly amazing. It is an
incessant struggle, one in which mankind strives to tear off and break the chains
with which the lust for power on the part of a single man, or a single class, or
even of a whole people, attempt to shackle it. [...]
The French revolution abolished many privileges, and rose up many of the
oppressed; but all it did was replace one class in power by another. Yet it did
teach us one great lesson; social privileges and differences, being products of
society and not of nature, can be overcome. Humanity will need another
bloodbath to abolish many of these injustices -and then it will be too late for the
rulers to be sorry they left the hordes in that state of ignorance and savagery they
enjoy today (1990; 3-5).
He then obtained the degree of licenza liceale in 1911 and the next year applies
and wins a small scholarship to attend the University of Turin, enrolling in the Faculty of
Letters. In terms of his academic interests, linguistics and philology stood out, and he
became a student and later a good friend of the important linguist Matteo Bartoli. Bartoli
at this time was the intellectual head of the school known at the time as neoUnguistica
and a known critic of the linguistic school of neo-grammarians. Also while at the
university the influence of Croce and Gentile became stronger. It is important to stress
the very early influence of Croce and Gentile on Gramsci although both (especially
Croce) will be objects of critique before and after being imprisoned.
At this early stage in his intellectual and political formation -and already
considering himself a socialist- both Croce and Gentile’s idealism and anti-positivism
made Gramsci from the very beginning a heterodox thinker in contrast to the dominance
This early university formation in linguistics will prove important in a later chapter
when dealing with Gramsci’s notes on language in the Qiiadenii. For this aspect of
Gramsci’s thought, the definitive work is still Franco Lo Piparo’s (1979).
Although at an earlier stage Gentile attempted to provide a subjectivist interpretation of
Marx (Coutinho 1986; 21-24), he later became one of the main intellectuals of Fascism
and for some time Minister ol Education (Whittam 1995; 67-68).
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ot vulgar scientitic notions and positivism in the Italian intellectual environment of the
time. As Carlos Nelson Coutinho comments:
When enrolling in the University, he [Gramsci] enters into contact with the
idealist cultural movement, led mainly by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile,
two neo-Hegelian philosophers radically opposed to the positivist tradition that
will dominate, late in the XIX Century, in the cultural spaces of northern Italy.
Against vulgar evolutionism, against the positivist and empiricist scientificism,
Croce and Gentile stressed the value of a philosophic, humanist, culture; against
the attraction towards facts, they defended the value of the spirit, of the will, and
of action ( 1986; 16).
Although with heavy ideali.st and subjectivist overtones, this intellectual
background also put Gramsci’s early socialism at odds with the official line of the Second
International, which maintained a very economistic and evolutionist interpretation of
Marxism, under the heavy influence of the German Socialist Party and the theories of
Eduard Bernstein ( 1970) and especially Karl Kautsky.“ Founded in 1892, the Italian
Socialist Party (PSI) was dominated by the same interpretation of historical materialism
as the Second International, stressing the necessity of waiting for the development of
socialism to become a reality out of a natural dynamic of history, mainly using the
mechanism of electoral voting and universal suffrage, and almost rejecting any action
such as general strikes intended to provoke things to accelerate. ' Equally problematic
for Gramsci was the main opposition within the PSI -the ftiassimalisti, a name that came
from wanting to impose at once the maximum program- since it rejected and condemned
For a brief exposition of the main points of Kautsky conception, see Fernando Claudm
(1977).
Within the German context, this political line was criticized very early on by Rosa
Fuxembourg, and was later famously demolished by Lenin in his The Proletarian
Revolution and Renegade Kautsky ( 1934), alter Kautsky becomes one ot the main
opponents within the European lelt ol the Russian revolution denouncing its un-
timeliness due to the lack ot a bourgeois-democratic revolution in the countiy (Claudin
1977).
16
as reformist any action undertaken by the parly to try to advance the cause of socialism
The position of the massimalisti, that of winning all political power once and for all in
one brutal explosion of full revolution, ended up objectively being as much a position of
passivity as the dominant evolutionist line of the party.
This does not mean that Gramsci’s early conception of Marxism was without its
own problems, the main one being the heavily idealistic and subjectivist approach to
political action and under-appreciation of the economic and structural moments
(Coutinho 1986: 27-28). This translated into in overstressing the importance of culture
and cultural struggle as something isolated from the rest of the social relations. A classic
representation ot this early idealistic socialist conception of Gramsci can be read in many
ol his articles of the time. A classic example in which this plays out in terms of both the
theoretical and political content can be found in his famous article on the Russian
revolution, originally of December 24, 1917, ‘The Revolution Against Capital”;
The revolution of the Bolsheviks is constituted more of ideologies than of facts
(That is why, underneath, it matters little to us to know more than what we know).
This is the revolution against Karl Marx’s Capital. In Russia, Marx’s Capital was
more the book of the bourgeoisie than of the proletariat. It was the critical
demonstration of the fatal necessity of the formation of a bourgeoisie in Russia, of
the commencement of a capitalist era, of the installation of a type of western
civilization, before the proletariat could even begin to think of its rebellion, of its
class demands, of its revolution. Facts have overcome ideologies. Facts have
exploded the critical schemes within which the history of Russia should have
evolved according to the canons of historical materialism. The Bolsheviks reject
Karl Marx and with the testimony of explicit action, of victories achieved, affirm
that the canons of historical materialism are not as rigid as could and have been
thought of.
Nonetheless, there is a fatality in these events, and if the Bolsheviks reject
some statements of Capital, they do not reject its invigorating, immanent thought.
They are not “Marxists”, that is all: they have not compiled on top of the works
of the Master an external doctrine, of dogmatic and unquestionable statements.
They live Marxist thought, that which never dies, that is the continuation of
Italian and Gennan idealist thought, and that in Marx had been contaminated by
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positivist and naturalist encrustations. And this thought always puts as a main
tactor of history not the raw economic facts, but man, the society of men, of men
that approach each other, that understand each other, that develop through these
contacts (civilization) a collective, social will, and understand and judge the
economic facts, and they adapt it to their will, until this will becomes the driving
force of the economy, the force that moulds objective reality, that lives, and that
moves, that can be channeled where the will wishes it to be, how the will wishes it
to be ( 1982: 513-514; our italics).
This emphasis on the will, the over-appreciation of the subjective element in
Gramsci’s early conception of Marxism, is still distant from the rich conception of
totality with its complex set of dialectical relations, mediations, and reconfigurations
between the objective and the subjective elements present in the Marx of Capital. More
than a reading of Capital, though, objective experience and political practice will cause
Gramsci to overcome this conception, in part due to the political experience of 1919-1920
and the movement of workers council in Turin. In any case, regardless of the
shortcomings of his early overly subjectivist approach to Marxism, it is this element that
made him assume early on a critical position towards the main line of the PSl and the
Second International. This political line led most of the Socialist parties (the PSI being
the important exception) of the International to fall into the patriotic rhetoric and support
directly or indirectly the First World War, ultimately imploding the Second International
itself.
As has just been advanced, in terms of his political and theoretical maturity
Gramsci’s time in Turin proved to be fundamental. Turin was the most industrialized
region in the northern part ol Italy and the capital of the Italian proletariat, since it was
the center of the newborn automobile industry. Turin is the birthplace ol the automobile
manufacturers Fiat and Lancia. It is here that Gramsci became accjuainted with a gioup
of friends and luture political comrades that includes Palmiro Togliatti, Angelo Tasca,
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Amadeo Bordiga (leader of the massimalisti), among others. It is also here that Gramsci
became a fidl-time militant of the PS I and eventually formed part of the left wing of the
paity that broke away and organized in January of 1921 the Communist Party of Italy
(PCI)."'^
Gramsci quickly distinguished himself within political circles for his intelligent
political journalism, his theater reviews, and political organizing.^'' We should mention
regarding the latter, the importance played by Gramsci and a group of friends and close
collaborators in agitating, supporting, and helping to organize the factory council
movement in Turin during the bienio rosso (red biennium), a period full of worker
resistance and unrest that included massive strikes and occupation of factories.
The period from 1918 to 1920 saw an emergence of revolutionary explosions
throughout Europe inspired in part by the victory of the Russian revolution of 1917 and
the monetary and moral crisis after the First World War. It was a time of constant strikes
and struggles. In Italy, especially in the northern region in Turin, a period of brutal class
struggle opened up in the midst of the weakness of the liberal government and the
progressive parallel strengthening of both socialism and the early elements of fascism.
The bienio rosso proved to be crucial in the development of Gramsci’s politics and his
political theory.
In 1919 the eight-hour working day had been achieved as well as a national
minimum wage. The summer of 1919, however, saw an emergence of massive protests
and strikes due to the high cost of living, especially in the northern region. Gramsci’s
For a conci.se and useful exposition of the political atmosphere of the times in Turin,
see Hoare’s General Introduction to Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1997: xxv-lv).
For a look at the early political and cultural writings, see Gramsci (1980, 1982, 1985,
1990).
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participation in the events was conducted mostly through political organizing and
interventions in a periodical that first came out in May P‘, 1919 called L’Online Nuovo
(The New Order). The L’Ordine Nuovo claimed to be a ‘weekly review of socialist
culture’. Although the original inclination of the periodical (whose original editorial
group consisted of Gramsci, Angelo Tasca, Palmiro Togliatti, and Umberto Terracini)
was still in the vein of raising the moral values and culture of the working class, the
objective political upheaval modified its content and made it much more immediately
political, eventually becoming the main theoretical and intellectual vehicle for the Turin
working class (Sacristan 1998; 129-132). The political program of the L’Online Nuovo -
to promote the creation of workers councils in factories as a way to appropriate the
direction of the workplace- was eventually adopted by the Turin branch of the FIOM
(Italian Federation of Metallurgic Workers) and the Turin section of the PSI, and was in
part realized by the workers of Fiat, Lancia, and others (Bellamy 1994; xix).
The idea behind the factory councils was to transform the already existing worker
organisms of the commissioni interne (‘internal commissions’) within the workplace -
which were originally intended to represent the economic demands of unionized workers
in the factory- into full-blown economic and political mechanisms for worker
appropriation of the means of production and decision-making. The commissioni interne
“accomplished functions of arbitration and discipline’’ (Gramsci 1997a; 64) in order to
mediate with the capitalist elements in the factory. They had a “reformist spirit and the
constitutionalist or legalistic tendencies of labor unions” (Gramsci 1988: 89). As
Gramsci would continue in the report sent to the Executive Committee of the Communist
International in June of 1920, the problem with the commissioni interne was that they
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were practically controlled by candidates chosen by the unions and meant to “not disturb
the employers” (1988: 89), thus fmstrating from the start any revolutionary or important
proposition by the workers. The position advanced by the group of the VOnline Niwvo
was, more than to create completely new organisms, to take over the existing
commissions, transform them, and give them a different direction; to transform the
commissioni interne into consigli di fabhrica (‘factory councils’).
Gramsci and L’Ordine Nnovo wanted to transform the existing commissions -
which represented the narrow economic interests only of the unionized workers of each
factory- into institutions of real workers’ power by making them more autonomous and
incorporating them into the role of direction, administration, and decision-making. Here,
all the workers would have the right to vote or be elected to the council, and not only the
unionized workers. This is an issue that made the movement gain the antipathy of the
leadership of the labor unions. In addition, for Gramsci the council movement was meant
not only as a form of appropriating the productive process, but also proposed that the
consigli di fabhrica constitute the potential basis for the alternative socialist State through
the “articulation of the various Factory Councils in an Executive Central Council, to
which should be added the councils of the peasants” (Coutinho 1986; 35).
At the same time we see that the council movement transforms Gramsci’s early
subjectivist conception of gaining political power in that he does not prescribe tor the
alternative State an external mechanism or apparatus that would be imposed trom above,
but that “the socialist State already potentially exists in the institutions of social life
characteristic of the exploited working class” (1997a: 63). In this conception, the new
State would emerge ‘from below’. Under-appreciating both the importance of the
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autonomous political party representing the working class and the institutional instance of
a state apparatus -an error that Gramsci will learn to correct after the eventual defeat of
the worker council movement- this socialist State would emerge out of the very basie
centers of work.
Regardless of the possible shortcomings of the conception behind the council
movement, it represents a fruitful maturation of Gramsci’s early subjeetivist socialist
ideas. As an example, we could compare the above quote from his article ‘The
Revolution Against Capital” that shows his earlier subjectivist conception to the
following from his article “The Factory Councils”, published in June 5, 1920 in L’Online
Niiovo:
The proletarian revolution is not the arbitrary act of an organization that affirms
itself as revolutionary or of a system of organizations that affirm themselves as
revolutionary. The proletarian revolution is a very long historical process that is
verified in the emergence and development of determined productive forces (that
we summarize in the expression: “proletariat” ) hi a determined historical
environment (that we summarize in the expressions: “mode of individual
property, capitalist mode ofproduction, factory system, mode of organization of
society in the democratic-parliamentary State”). In a determined stage of this
process, the new productive forces cannot develop further and systemize in
autonomous form within the official schemes in which human interaction
develops; in this determined stage emerges the revolutionary act, that consists in
an effort directed towards shattering violently these schemes, directed towards
destroying all of the apparatus of economic and political power, in which the
revolutionary productive forces were oppressively contained, which consists in an
effort directed towards crushing the machine of the bourgeoisie State and
constituting a type of State in which schemes the liberated productive forces find
the adequate form for their ulterior development, tor their ulterior expansion, in
which organization they find the garrison and the necessary and sufficient
weapons for suppressing their adversaries (1997a: 91; our emphasis).
In the quotation above we can appreciate how Gramsci overcomes his earlier
unilateral appreciation of the will in terms of molding the economic sphere for a richer
and dialectical understanding of political struggle with a better sensibility for the
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relationship between the objective (structure/historic process) and the subjective
(party/organization/will) elements.^*" In passing, it is not difficult to note the influence at
some points in the quotation of the phrasing of Marx present in the famous preface to his
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (1992e). In his prison writings Gramsci
regularly refers to Marx’s preface -and also to his theses on Feuerbach (1992d)- to
sustain his interpretation of Marxism.
The Turin experience reflected at the same time the growing influence of the
Russian revolution. In fact, to a great extent the Italian factory council movement was
the form in which L’Ordine Nuovo attempted to translate the Soviet experience into their
own concrete national context. Thus, Gramsci asked that “Italian communists should
view the Russian experience as a treasure and save time and work” (1997a: 66).
We should remember that for Lenin, the soviets “represent[ed] a new form, or
more exactly, a new type of State" ( 1975: 54). The soviets or councils as institutions of
political representation were an original contribution to Marxist theory that gained
standing and influence with the events in Russia of 1917. Prior to that, for Marx, Engels,
Kautsky, and Lenin himself the dictatorship of the proletariat supposed a parliamentary
democratic republic (Claudm 1977: 72).^^ Contrary to the eventual historical experience
especially after 1918 and the intensification of civil war and the emergence of ‘red terror’
(responding to the ‘white terror’ of counterrevolutionary forces), in 1917 Lenin
maintained the supremacy ot the soviets up to the point of proposing that they should
In his prison writings Gramsci attempts to address the relationship between the
subjective and objective elements through his theorizing of the notion of ‘hegemony’ and
‘historic bloc’.
The exception in the work of Marx are his reflections on the Paris commune (19921),
which were taken up by Lenin in his 7 he State and Revolution ( 1973) only after the
objective weight of the revolution imposed itsell in Russia.
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eventually “take care of all public life” (1975: 56). These statements were to be
outgrown pretty quickly by history, which saw the progressive crystallization of a clique
of administrators and bureaucrats who, leading a massive state or war machine, held the
monopoly of political, economic, and police power that suffocated the soviets and civil
society. Regarding the Turin council movement, we should mention that the position in
the national congress of the PSI presented by Gramsci as the representative of the Turin
section was approved and backed by Lenin in the Second Congress of the Communist
International (Cl).
Irrespective of the fact that workers’ councils movement was a translation of the
Russian soviets, this does not reduce its theoretical and practical importance in terms both
of Gramsci’s own socialist thinking and the general Marxist conception of the coming
into being of the new socialist state. Regarding the latter, this conception of socialist
state power -decentralized, emerging from below and articulated throughout the whole of
the social terrain starting from the workplace itself- was innovative and at first glance
more democratic (directly participatory) in comparison with the common notion of the
socialist stage or ‘first phase of communism’ explained by Marx in his Critique of the
Gotha Program ( 1992g: 347). This stage still retained the importance of a centralized
state apparatus that would be used to maintain the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.
For Gramsci, the experience enriched his conception in that he clearly saw the
need to conceive the State as more than an apparatus or purely as an instrument in which
you could sway it over to your side by merely taking possession ot it. Instead, the State
should be approached as a complex order or set ol relations that spread throughout the
entire social terrain. It is later in the Quaderni that we will see a luller theoietical
24
elaboration of this in his writings on the notions of hegemony and the state. We should
also mention, as Valentino Gerratana (1977) correctly notes, that the final political
interventions and writings of Lenin himself were also leading to the complex question of
culture and political power conceived in such a way as to include the organization and
maintenance of consent. All of these elements, as is well known, are vital elements in
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.
In the end, and after a lockout by the employers that produced a general strike that
involved over 200,000 workers, the outburst of revolutionary action ended in defeat. The
defeat was due in part to the alliance between the class of employers and the government.
Also, the movement in Turin was politically isolated from the rest of the country in part
due to the negligence and lack of support from the national PSI and the Confederazione
Genenile del Lavoro (Hoare 1997: xli). The AvantH, the periodical of the PSI, for
example, did not publish the manifesto of the Turin section calling for the solidarity of
workers in the rest of the country. In the end the movement was strangled and isolated by
the PSI and sectors of the labor unions, the final outburst ending in a compromise through
which the power of the internal commissions (which were the original basis for the
factory councils) was greatly diminished. The group of L’Ordine Nuovo had committed
the mistake of under-appreciating the important role that an organized and relatively
independent political party should play in coordination with the labor unions (Coutinho,
Ibid. 40-41). The almost one-sided focus on the factory councils as the cellular
components of the alternative State -common in the published articles of Gramsci during
1919 and up to late 1920- proved hurtful in that the L’Ordine Nuovo did not actively and
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strongly elaborate a coneeption which included the unions and the political party as vital
elements.
After the harsh lesson provided by the political defeat of the council movement
and the strengthening of Fascism, Gramsci dedicated most of his writing towards the
strengthening and development of a communist faction within the PSI.^^ At that moment,
the PSI was divided into three factions; the right consisting of reformists, the center
consisting of moderate massimalisti led by Serrati, and the left consisting of radical
massimalisti and communists led by Amadeo Bordiga. Regardless of the differences
between Gramsci’s conception and that of Bordiga and his followers (who were
hegemonic within the communist faction), Gramsci formed part of the same faction and
worked on strengthening it. In the XVII congress of the PSI, held in Livorno in January
1921, the center faction led by Serrati retained dominance by majority vote and decided
to keep the party formally loyal to the Cl. Serrati, though, decided against changing the
party’s name to a communist party and expelling the reformist minority. These measures
were two of the twenty one conditions prescribed by the Cl for admittance of a national
party into its organization. The PSTs failure to do this provoked the communist faction
to leave the party -with the support of the Cl delegation present in the congress- and, in
January 21, 1921, establish the Communist Party of Italy (PCI).
The foundation of the PCI coincided with the violent advance ot fascism against
leftist organizations and labor unions; fascist violence which, already by April ot 1921,
had been generalized throughout Italy. The initial position ot the PCI —dominated by the
extremist faction under Bordiga- was one ot maintaining a ‘pure and strong, though
For an example, see Gramsci ( 1987; 651-661 ).
26
proportionally small, organization of revolutionaries, unpolluted by reformist or social
democratic elements and rejecting political alliances with other groups on the left. This
isolationist position, expressed in the Rome Theses of January 1922, was out of sync with
the increasing power of fascism and even went against the position adopted by the Cl in
its III Congress that took place in 1921.^^
In the III Congress of the Cl, the strategic line adopted was that of the united
fronts, which called for the political alliance of the communist parties with social
democratic parties and other popular parties.^® These alliances were seen as intermediate
means due to the difficult historical circumstances. The change in strategy took into
consideration the dying down of the revolutionary wave of 1918-1920, the defeat of the
soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria, the fact that the majority of the working class
supported social democratic parties, and the reconsolidation and strengthening of the
right. Furthermore, and very importantly, the change in strategy implied a distinction
between the uniqueness of the historical situation of Russia and that of Western Europe.
The PCI -under Bordiga’s leadership at the time- rejected the position of the Cl. We
want to stress the importance of these debates within the international communist
movement since, as we will see later, Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of positions’ present in
the Quaderni represents to a certain extent a recuperation and a further elaboration of this
type of political strategy in a later context, lacing the same problems and to a more brutal
For an in depth look at the origins of the PCI, see Paolo Spriano (1967) and John H.
Cammed ( 1967).
For a closer look at the early debates of the Communist International, see Gruber
(1967) and Claudm (1975).
Already in his Left-Wing Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality, Lenin
(1974b) had criticized Bordiga’s position as being childish and extremist lor not
considering every means possible towards revolutionary change, such as the use ol
parliament and elections.
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degree due to the consolidation of the fascist regime in Italy. Moreover, when Gramsci
elaborates the notion of ‘war of position’ in prison, his proposition runs contrary to the
political line that had been adopted in 1929 by the Cl.
Gramsci’ s official adhesion to the dominant line of the PCI led by Bordiga
maintained itself until at least 1922. He left for Moscow in May 26, 1922 and became
part of the Executive Committee of the Cl that same year. He became increasingly vocal
and critical of the extremist line of Bordiga’ s leadership. As early as May 1923, in his
letters to Togliatti and other members of the original group of L’Online Nuovo, Gramsci
( 1992) begins denouncing Bordiga’ s line and declares his support of the united front line
of the Cl.”
After moving to Vienna still as a delegate of the Cl, Gramsci returns to Italy and
establishes himself in Rome when, in the elections of April 6, 1924, he is elected to
parliament in representation of Venice. By May of that same year he becomes leader for
all practical purposes of the PCI, steering it away from the extremist position of
Bordiga’ s faction and putting it more in tune with the CL After the Matteotti crisis,”
Gramsci views the possibility of an intermediate phase in which a liberal democratic
Being under medical care for some time in Moscow, Gramsci meets Giulia Schuct,
who will become his wife and mother of his two children, Delio and Guiliano. Gramsci
never had the opportunity personally meeting his second son due to his arrest on
November 8, 1926.
” We should consider that the strategy of the united front made even more sense due to
the fascist conquest of power with the ‘March on Rome’ in October 28, 1922, and the
initial collaboration —accidental and subordinated as it was- from other political groups
such as the Liberals. It is only in 1926 that the fascists fully consolidate their total hold
of government and power. For further details, see Whittam ( 1995) and Moigan ( 1995).
” Giacomo Matteotti, leader of the reformist Socialists, was assassinated, disappearing
June 10, 1924 (his body was found August 16) after denouncing fascist violence and
questioning the legitimacy ot the April elections in parliament on May 30. The
assassination of Matteotti produced a temporary legitimacy crisis for the government ot
Mussolini. For more details, see Whittam (1995: 47-52).
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regime would be established and led by reformist and bourgeois anti-fascist parties
(Coutinho 1986: 59).
Analyzing the concrete situation in Italy, Gramsci argued for the Constituent
Assembly as the local translation of the strategy of the united front suggested by the Cl.
This Constituent Assembly would be composed of all the anti-fascist parties and
organizations and would be the necessary premise of the establishment of the
intermediate liberal democratic regime. This adherence to the principles of the Cl, the
sensibility towards a concrete analysis of the specific national situation in Italy and
towards a politics specific to it, and the opposition to the extremist massimalista line of
Bordiga, are all expressed in the important Lyon Theses (Gramsci 1990a: 340-375),
drafted by Gramsci and Togliatti, and approved by a great majority in the III Congress of
the PCI that took place in January 1926.
The main object that lies at the core of a consistent interpretation of Gramsci’s
Qiiaderni -a focus on the central political problem of the articulation between leaders and
led, governing and governed- can be traced throughout his political militancy prior to
being imprisoned. The debates over which political strategy the party should follow all
ultimately lead to the question of exercising leadership over the subaltern classes. The
question of leadership was also at the core of the debates in the Cl and within the Russian
revolutionary movement. So much so that Lenin’s final writings and public interventions
were all in some way directed towards this problem. Lenin referred to the task at hand
necessary for the advance of revolution as a task of culture. Now that the Bolsheviks had
won the political revolution and conquered the state, Lenin stated in On Cooperation, the
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tcisk WQs thcit ot u cultuiul jnd idcologicul revolution, of progressively winning over the
majority of the rural population:
we have to admit that there has been a radical modification in our whole outlook
on socialism. The radical modification is this: formerly we placed, and had to
place, the main emphasis on the political stmggle, on revolution, on winning
political power, etc. Now the emphasis is changing and shifting to peaceful,
organizational, “cultural” work (1995: 215).
And he continues:
Two main tasks confront us, which constitute the epoch: to reorganize our
machinery of state, which is utterly useless, and which we took over in its entirety
from the preceding epoch. During the past five years of struggles we did not, and
could not drastically reorganize it. Our second task is educational work among
the peasants ( 1 995: 2 1 5-2 1 6).
And furthermore:
in our country the political and social revolution preceded the cultural revolution,
that very cultural revolution which nevertheless now confronts us (1995: 216).
The New Economic Policy (NEP) was, in fact, partly based on this concern. It
strived to gain the alliance of the peasantry through both economic concessions and
cultural and ideological organization. At the same time, also in his final years, Lenin
warned against what was already an excessively big bureaucratic State machine
disconnected from the local base organizations. Lenin’s constant worry about the need
for the proletariat and the revolutionary party to establish greater alliances gives a certain
substance to Gramsci’s repeated claim in the Qnculemi that Lenin was the great theorist
of hegemony.
We should also add that Lenin’s analysis -as will Gramsci’s in the Quaderni, but
already present in some writings ot the last years before being arrested- rests on the
structural differentiation between East and West. The Western world, in this conception
of Lenin, could not blindly imitate the Russian way due to the higher degree of the
development of the productive forces and the social relations. This lesson was learned
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This preoccupation with gaining alliances and the exercise of political leadership
was very much present for Gramsci before being imprisoned, thus making sense that it
ends up being the focus point around which many of the relatively autonomous topics
treated in the Quadenii circulate. We should mention at least two examples in which this
problematic is expressed clearly in his thought prior to him being arrested. The first
example comes from the letter sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party by Gramsci in representation of the Central Committee of the PCI. Written by
Gramsci, on October 14, 1926, we think it is appropriate to use this tetter as an example
as it would be a key document in shaping the suspicious view some within the Soviet
leadership held towards Gramsci and his posthumous works even after his death in 1937.
The letter addressed what was quickly becoming a very ugly conflict within the Russian
party between the majority led by Stalin and Bukharin and the opposition led by
Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky. The main division was between the majority line
within the party that supported the continuation of the NEP policies and the minority line
which argued that the NEP should be pushed aside and that the government should
forcefully expropriate the rural masses and begin plans for forceful collectivization.'
Prophetic from our point of view, after addressing the importance of the unity of the
Russian party in terms of maintaining its prestige over the international communist
movement and explaining the PCI’s adherence to the position ol the majority, Gramsci
writes:
the hard way when the world revolution never came around to help sustain the
revolutionary process in Russia.
Less than two years later Stalin actually appropriated the program ol the minority led
by Trotsky.
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Only a firm unity and a firm discipline in the Party that governs the
workers’ State can secure the proletarian hegemony in the NEP regime, that is, in
the tull development of the contradiction that we have emphasized. But in this
case, unity and discipline cannot be mechanic and forced; they should be sincere
and out of conviction, and not of the type of an enemy detachment that is
imprisoned or assailed and that thinks of escaping or of a surprise exit (1997a-
170).
In addition to its historic value in terms of being an early critique of an attitude
that will end up in the bloody ‘purges’ within the Russian party and the consolidation of
Stalin’s leadership, the letter already announces one of the main themes that will later be
elaborated in the Quademi: the practice of hegemony as a way to configure a specific
type of relationship between leaders and led. It also provides an anticipation of how
Gramsci will elaborate in the Quademi of the political party as a collective intellectual.
In the letter we see that a fruitful practice of hegemony implies an alliance or unity
brought about by willingness and active consent, and not a false leadership through
coercion. In the Quademi Gramsci will continue to use the expression ‘mechanic’ so as
to distinguish a way of dominating or leading in contrast to a consensual and organic type
of relationship between leaders and led.
The practice of hegemony -a consensual mode of relationship between leaders
and led- as a central element in terms of the modes of obtaining the leadership or
ascendancy over a group of social sectors is also present in the second example that
follows. It comes from an essay that Gramsci was never able to complete and on which
he was working on before being arrested in late 1926, titled Alcuui tend della quistione
meridiomde [‘Some Aspects on the Southern Question’]. This essay, as many
commentators correctly argue, contains many ol the themes that are going to be later
elaborated by Gramsci in prison. In it, he argues that in order for the working class to
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become the dominant and governing force, and disrupt the dominant bloc formed by the
industrial bourgeoisie ot the north and the landowning ruling elites in the south, it needs
to win over the support of the rural working mass of the south by advocating a radical
land and agrarian reform. What is at stake in the southern question is the key constitutive
element for the proletariat’s hegemony, or leadership.
In a position that shows a further maturity over Gramsci’s earlier emphasis on the
factories as the national terrain in 1918-1920, he argues against an immediate corporatist
perspective on the part of the industrial proletariat of the north. For it to become truly
dominant it needs to obtain an active alliance, it must include the specific claims and
necessities of the working groups of the rural south:
For it to become capable of governing as a class, the proletariat has to renounce
all corporative residues, all the prejudices and incrustations of syndicalism. What
does that mean? That it not only needs to transcend the distinctions that exist
within the different professions, but also that, in order to gain the trust and
consent of peasants and of some semi-proletarian categories of the cities, it has to
transcend also some prejudices and defeat certain egoisms that could still exist
and do exist in the working class as it is, although in its nucleus the particularities
of a professional nature have already disappeared. The metallurgic, the carpenter,
the construction worker, etc., have to think not only as proletarians, [...] but
should go one step further: they have to think as wage-laborers members of a
class that moves to lead [clirigere] the peasants and intellectuals, as members of a
class that can win and can constitute socialism only if it is helped and followed by
the great majority of those social strata. If that is not achieved, the proletariat
does not become a leading [dirigetite] class, and those strata, which in Italy
represent the majority of the population, will remain under the leadership of the
bourgeoisie and give the state the possibility ot resisting and weakening the
proletarian impetus (1997a: 188).
Moreover, in his analysis of the social structure of the south, Gramsci emphasizes
the important role played by intellectuals —understood not only in their traditional
conception, but including state personnel and social organizers- in providing cohesion to
a particular bloc or configuration of a hegemonic alliance between social groups. The
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importance of the intellectuals as ligament between the dominant class and the subaltern
also requires the co-optation of the potential intellectuals themselves. Gramsci gives
them a special importance in maintaining a specific hegemonic bloc, in this case of
southern Italy:
The society of the south is a big agrarian bloc constituted by three social strata;
the large, amoiphous, and disorganized mass of peasants, the intellectuals of the
petite and middle rural bourgeoisie, the big landowners, and the great intellectuals
(1997a: 194).
The “great intellectuals”, and in the specific social formation of the south Gramsci
(1997a: 199-201) is referring by this to Giustino Fortunato and Benedetto Croce,^^ are
key national intellectuals who provide means for persuading and co-opting the local
intellectual strata of the south. They play an important role in turning the heads of the
southern intellectuals towards an interest in universal culture and away from the social
ground in which they emerged. In that way, Gramsci (1997a: 194-195) continues, the
intellectual strata of the south find their self-interests fulfilled and, satisfied with the
dominant social arrangement, provide the link between the southern peasantry and the big
landowners. At the same time, this consolidation of the dominant southern bloc serves as
a balancing and constitutive element of the northern industry and capital;
the southern peasant is linked to the big landowner through the intellectual. This
type of organization is the one most diffused in all of the continental Mezzogionio
Though idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce will quickly become one of the grand
figures or emblems representing anti-Fascist intellectuals, he gave his initial support and
cooperation to the movement. On top of this in one ot the ironies of history, Croce, who
was widely known among the intellectual and educated sectors around the globe,
provided even in his anti-Fascism a sense ot legitimacy to Mus.solini s regime since it
was seen as being tolerant with such an outspoken intellectual figure. In the Qiiaderni,
and in notebook 10 in particular -an anti-Croce ot sorts-, Croce will provide an important
symbolic interlocutor for Gramsci, in particular for his interpretations ot Marxism. For a
comprehensive account of Benedetto Croce’s complex relationship towards Italian
Fascism, see Fabio Fernando Rizi’s (2003) Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism.
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and in Sicily. It torms a monstrous agrarian bloc that in its totality functions as
intermediary and guardian of northern capitalism and the big banks. Its only goal
is that of maintaining the status quo (1997a: 198).
As we have just seen, the essay never completed by Gramsci introdueed many of
the themes that are going to be important nodes in the Quaderni such as the role of the
intellectuals, the political strategy of hegemony, the phenomenon of trasfonnismo.^^ All
of these specific topics have as their essential underlying matrix the general problem of
the relationship between the governing and the governed, between the leaders and the led.
It is thus enlightening that Gramsci was working on this essay prior to being arrested,
since -though not exhaustingly- it points clearly to what is going to become the central
problem or central theme of the Quaderni. The connection between the themes of this
essay and the prison writings were made explicit in one of Gramsci’s prison letters that
we will comment on in the following part of the present chapter.
In November 8, 1926, as a product of the general elimination by Mussolini of
what was left of democratic liberties -including the suppression of parliament and the
dissolution of all non-fascist parties, etc.-, Gramsci was arrested. He was officially freed
in April of 1937, a few days prior to his death. In the process, in front of the Special
Tribunal that ended with his prison sentence in June 1928, the prosecutor claimed: “For
twenty years we have to impede the functioning of this brain”.
Trasfonnismo implies a co-optation by the dominant group of the potentially
subversive elements of an antagonistic social group. In Gramsci’s essay on ‘the southern
question’ co-optation is emphasized on the intellectual elements that could play a
potential antagonistic role by trying to provide leadership over the subaltern groups
towards movements of resistance or counter-hegemony. As we will see, this emphasis
will persist in the Quaderni, though the notion of intellectual is going to be clearly
enlarged.
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How long
Do works endure? As long
As they are not completed.
Since as long as they demand effort
They do not decay.
Bertolt Brecht, About the Way to
Construct Enduring Works
But “this brain” did not stop working. On the contrary, the 33 notebooks -29 of
original composition and four of mostly exercises in translation- composed in prison prior
to his death attest to the perseverance, richness, and commitment of Gramsci even under
the worst of circumstances. The Quaderni have been compared to hieroglyphics
(Anderson 1977), to a labyrinth (Buttigieg 1992: 26), and to a laboratory. On the one
hand, as Fernandez Buey (2001 ; 142) retorts, it is misleading and almost laughable to call
the Quaderni a laboratory due to the difficult circumstances in which they were written.
On the other, it is somewhat equally misleading to see them as hieroglyphs or as
constituting a labyrinth, since the superficially fragmentary nature of their writing
contrasts to the “totalizing dimension” (Fernandez Buey 2001: 139) underneath. Our
central proposition is that there is an underlying running thread, or leitmotif following
Gramsci, that runs across the Quaderni concerning the relationship between leaders and
led, and more specifically, there is a primary focus on the future construction of a radical
movement within the context of fascism in Italy, the degeneration of communism and the
re-consolidation of capitalism in the Western world.
As will become clear in what follows, because we interpret this guiding thread
throughout the whole of the Quaderni we do not imply that everything in the Quaderni is
related to this specific theme. This would mean that the Quaderni are a finished and
completely coherent work, something that they are obviously not. This would also run
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against Gramsci’s own warnings of such an assumption when contemplating his own
writing in prison ( 1975: 935). The original edition of the Quaderni (edited by Felice
Platone under the direct supervision of Palmiro Togliati) published from 1948 to the 1951
runs close to giving this impression.'*^ Regardless of its specific merits this original
edition gives an impression of completeness and neatness, and as Fernandez Buey puts it,
“one loses what was the tormented process of writing something that is not a book
properly, nor a finished work, nor even a collection of monographic essays” (2001: 131).
The manuscripts of the prison writings constitute a collection of notebooks full of
rough notes, fragments, short elaborations of diverse themes (some more polished than
others), bibliographical annotations, quotations from books or magazines read in prison,
autobiographical reflections, etc."*^* It is because of the fragmentary nature of the notes
and of the diversity of themes present in them that it would be impossible to give an
intei*pretation as if one were dealing with a finished work or book. Thus, the Quaderni
ask of the reader the patience and the rational labor necessary in order for them to acquire
For an account of the genesis of the initial Italian edition of the Quadenii and the key
role played by Togliatti, see Giuseppe Vacca ( 1995: 89-134). For a broader account of
the many debates within the different interpretations and scholarship on Gramsci, see
Guido Liguori (1996).
The incomplete and fragmentary nature of Gramsci’s Quadenii can provoke the
immediate comparison to another fragmentary and incomplete work which might seem at
first formally similar, Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project ( 1999). These comparison
proves to be superficial because although there can be some productive and appropriate
comparisons between Gramsci and Benjamin in terms of certain content, see for example
Ives (2004: 97-133), Benjamin’s incomplete work was conducted with the very basic
appropriate resources of the liberty to do systemic study, have recourse to books and
other materials, etc., while Gramsci did not have such a luxury. At Turi, tor example,
Gramsci was not even permitted to have all of his notebooks available at the same time
and the same thing happened with his books. Add to these the general limited
bibliographical resources, his precariousness ot health, and other such forced limitations
provided by the fact of being imprisoned and under constant surveillance, and any such
formal comparison with Benjamin’s work proves too indeterminate.
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an appropriate meaning beyond their value as a final intellectual testament of Gramsci.
Besides the reconstruction of the notebooks’ genesis and the incursion into the harsh
circumstances under which they were written, Gramsci himself helps the reader by
providing a few fragments directed towards gaining an appropriate method of
interpretation of thinkers such as himself, who are
of a polemical character and lacking a systemic spirit, when it concerns a
personality in which the theoretical and practical activity are indissolubly
interwoven, of an intellect in constant creation and in permanent movement, who
feels self-criticism vigorously in the most consistent and brutal form (1975:
1841).
In effect, the fragments by Gramsci dedicated towards a method of interpretation, mostly
referring to the “founder of the philosophy of praxis” (Marx), prove to be an important
initial way to sustain the reading that we propose. In them, Gramsci prescribes a way of
approaching an un-systemic thinker like himself that includes: “the reconstruction of the
biography in regards with the practical activity but also especially with regards to the
intellectual activity” (1975: 1841),“^' and “the register of all the works, including the most
unimportant, in chronological order, classified according to intrinsic motives: of
intellectual formation, of maturity, of the attainment and application of the new mode of
thinking and of conceiving life and the world” (1975: 1841). In addition, and more
importantly for our way of approaching the Quademi, Gramsci suggests that the
investigation “of the leit-motiv, the rhythm of thought in development, should be more
important than the single casual affirmations and of the separated aphorisms” (1975:
1841-1842). It should be added that Gramsci intends these initial suggestions as
constituting part of a “preliminary effort” (1975: 1842). For our purpose they serve to
That we summarily did in the first half of the present chapter.
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help us sustain a consistent interpretation of the whole Qiuulerni while ultimately
acknowledging the inexhaustion of this rich body of work that continues to interest
political militants and politico-theoretical scholars alike. Tracing the leitmotif is the most
productive and appropriate form to approach the prison writings in a coherent manner if
we do not want to end up with an asymmetric disparate collection of notes.
Fortunately, again, Gramsci himself provides enough material so that the leitmotif
rendered here -the articulation between leaders and led as the central political problem- is
objectively credible. First of all, as we showed above, prior to being imprisoned Gramsci
was both theoretically and practically mostly preoccupied with the question of political
leadership and of obtaining and maintaining alliances with different social classes. That
preoccupation can be credibly assumed to continue with him in prison not only because it
explicitly shows in the prison writings, but because it continues to be one of the central
questions for international communism, as well as a central question for the consolidation
of Mussolini’s totalitarian regime."^^ And second, in both his prison letters and notebooks
we can trace this theme as the main underlying thread behind his various plans for study
and writing in prison.
There has been a constant debate of the appropriate ordering and organization of
the manuscripts of the notebooks, as well as various editorial or interpretative
propositions (Gerratana 1975, 1997; Francioni 1984; Buttigieg 1992; Coutinho 1999;
Fernandez Buey 2001; Frosini 2003). The Gramscian scholar and editor ot the critical
edition of the Quaderui, Valentino Gerratana ( 1975; XXIII-XXIX), divides Gramsci s
process of writing in prison into three distinct phases. Although Gramsci was arrested in
A debate that will produce an eventual isolation in regards to tellow imprisoned
communists when Gramsci’s personal positions ditter from the otlicial line ot the Cl.
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late 1926, he only begins to write in early 1929 due to the fact that it is very early during
that year that he gets permission to write in prison (Gramsci 1996: 231, 234), thus
satisfying his “biggest aspiration as a prisoner” (1996: 232).
According to Gerratana (1975: XXIII-XXIX) the first phase or stage of writing
goes from 1929 to 1931, during which Gramsci writes seven notebooks besides the ones
dedicated to translation exercises. These notebooks are composed mostly of multiple
thematic fragments, miscellaneous notes, bibliographical annotations, and other relatively
short reflections. Many of these separate short notes and reflections will later be revised,
elaborated, or reorganized into a more coherent collection of thematic notebooks. That
they are not a completely chaotic and spontaneous collection of notes is proved first by
the fact that Gramsci had proposed a number of plans for studying and writing (even
prior to having the permission of writing in prison), as we will see in a moment. And
furthermore, even the very first notebook contains a sustained presentation and initial
elaboration of a conceptual framework that will continue to appear and be further
developed in the rest of the notebooks.
The second phase goes from late 1931 until late 1933, when he is moved to a
prison clinic in Formia. This second phase is marked by a number of different things.
First, Gramsci had already been marginalized among most of the other communist
prisoners due to his insistence on the strategy of the constituent assembly. This type of
strategy, including alliances with other political groups such as the social demociats, had
already been condemned by the Cl (proposing the theory of social-fascism) in 1929 with
the support of most members of the Italian party. Gramsci did not adhere to this position
and it provoked his further isolation in pri.son (Spriano 1979: 67-70; Vacca 1995: 68-73).
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It IS also taking into consideration the official political strategy of the Cl and the Russian
party at the time that the reader can better appreciate the particular significance and
heterodoxy of his writings in prison towards elaborating a political strategy based on a
war of position and a politics emphasizing the practice of hegemony, of an alternative
articulation of alliances between leaders and led towards a socialist project. Second, this
phase is also marked by the first very serious health problems of Gramsci in prison, when
in August of 1931 he gets transferred to a prison clinic. It should be remembered that
Gramsci was always a sickly fellow, something that the brutal conditions of prison
combined with the lack of proper treatment of his ailments only made worse and would
eventually kill him in early April of 1937. In this second phase, Gramsci wrote ten more
notebooks, some comprised of miscellaneous notes but including many of the most
important ‘special notebooks’, which contained a better elaboration and reorganization of
previous notes. At times, he mechanically rewrote exactly what he had written before but
this time in notebooks dedicated specifically to particular themes (Gerratana Ibid. XXIX).
Among them notebook 10 (on Croce, philosophy and historiography), notebook 1 1 (on
philosophy and the critique of Bukharin’s Saggio popolare^^), notebook 12 (on the
intellectuals), and notebook 13 (on Machiavelli and politics) stand out.
The third phase goes from 1934 to 1935, in which Gramsci writes in 12 more
notebooks (although in most cases not writing much in each one), most of them of the
type of special notebooks just commented upon above. The important exception is
notebook 29, which is composed in its entirety by nine original notes directed ‘towards
We are referring to Bukharin’s Historical Materialism. A System of Sociology (1969).
In its original Russian edition, the book was subtitled A Popular Textbook of Marxist
Sociology, and Gramsci refers to it as the saggio popolare, or ‘popular manual’.
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the introduction of the study of grunimcir
. The reasons tor not adding new inquiries
respond to a number of things. One of them is Gramsci’s self-critical attitude and the
need to revise what he had already written, regardless of how provisional a work he
considered his prison writings to be at different times (Gramsci 1975; 438, 935, 1365).
And more importantly, another reason is Gramsci’s increasingly worsening state of
health. In June of 1935 he suffers another great health crisis and in late August he is
transferred to the Quisisana clinic in Rome. This precarious state of health interrupts
forever the continuation of the writing of the Quaclerni.
The immediate impression that the Quaderni are at the surface a collection of
fragmentary notes should not be a cause for despair, though it is true that the raw nature
of the writings makes for a more difficult labor of inteipretation. Luckily, Gramsci
himself lends a hand through the different plans of study and work he elaborates for
himself and which he communicates in some of his letters and in the notebooks.
As early as in a letter of December 9, 1926, imprisoned at the penal island of
Ustica, Gramsci writes to his sister-in-law Tatiana:
Here I have established this plan: 1*' being alright in order to always be of better
health; 2"^ study the German and Russian language with a method and continuity;
3*^^
study economics and history ( 1996: 10).
We must bear in mind that this initial plan, more comprehensive in nature, is expressed
only about a month after Gramsci’s initial arrest. Moreover, as recorded in his letters
during his stay at Ustica, his emotional and physical health are still relatively stable at
We will deal with notebook 29 in the sixth chapter when we touch upon Gramsci’s
concern with linguistics. This last notebook completes a sort ot circle. Giamsci s initial
studies in prison were mostly on languages, and he ends in his last notebook taking up the
debate with which he most concerned himself as a university student in Turin and which
he comments on at various times throughout the notebooks and prison letters.
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this point. The second and third points in his plan are not surprising, merely expressing
Gramsci’s constant interest in languages and linguistics, as well as in economics and
history. The first point, though, should be emphasized since it expresses explicitly what
the Quadenii are in a very real and important sense; a mode of individual and personal
resistance to the increasingly deteriorating condition Gramsci will find himself in for the
rest of his life. In addition, as Fernandez Buey (2001: 168) reminds us, the prison
writings are also the place where Gramsci finds refuge from his miscommunication with
Giulia.'^"’ This first plan predates Gramsci’s later devouring of books and journals, and
also predates the obtainment of permission to write in prison.
We find a second plan in his letter of March 19, 1927 addressed to Tatiana. At
the judicial prison of San Vittore in Milan, he writes that his life passes “always equally
monotonous. Even studying is much more difficult than it seems” (1996: 55). In spite of
this, he continues, he is reading more than one volume per day plus various periodicals.
He is obsessed with doing something/iir ewig (forever). This much commented on fiir
ewig, taken from a “complex conception of Goethe” (1996; 55) and later used by the poet
Pascoli, implies a number of things. First, according to Gramsci’s continuing comments
in the letter, he implies that “according to a pre-established plan” he wishes to occupy
himself “intensely and systematically of a subject that” absorbs and centralizes his
“interior life” (1996: 55). We see again the use of writing and studying as a mode of
resistance to the deterioration in prison (to centralize his interior life).'*^ Second, this/nr
The problems in Gramsci’s communication with Giulia are dealt at length in Fernandez
Buey (2001; 15-82). See also on this subject but with a focus on Gramsci’s
understanding of Freud and psychoanalysis, Jennifer Stone (1984).
As Gerratana (1975: XVII) and Fernandez Buey (2001: 149-150) comment, this/nr
ewig also implies Gramsci’s own thoughts on his mortality and the piogiessive
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ewi^ signifies a level of relative objectivity and endurance missing in Gramsci’s political
writings before being arrested; “disinterested” (1996: 56) he would later say. His
political writings prior to being arrested were, according to Gramsci himself, written for
the day and died after addressing the problem of the moment at hand. This implication of
the///r ewig is sustained by a shift in Gramsci’s prison writings where, after initially
developing some key concepts through the direct study of the past, he abstracts from the
initial historical exposition and gives them a greater sense of analytically relative
objectivity towards a construction of a sort of political sociology.
After briefly expressing his intentions of working on something/nr ewig, Gramsci
proposes to Tatiana his plan of study, which we need to closely analyze:
I have thought of four subjects until now, and already this is an indicator that I
don’t manage to collect myself, and those are: an investigation on the
formation of the public spirit in Italy in the previous century; in other words, an
inve.stigation on the Italian intellectuals, their origins, their groupings according to
the currents of culture, their diverse modes of thinking, etc., etc. [...] 2"^^ A study
of comparative linguistics! Nothing less. It would consist, naturally of treating
only the methodological and purely theoretical part of the subject, which has
never been dealt with completely and systematically from the new point of view
of the neolinguists against the neogrammarians. (I will horrify you, dear Tania,
with this letter!). [...] A study on the theater of Pirandello and on the
transformation of taste in Italian theater that Pirandello has represented and
contributed in determining. [...] 4"’ An essay on serialized novels and popular
taste in literature (1996: 55-56).
After which he adds.
Underneath, if one observes well, between these four arguments exists
homogeneity: the creative popular spirit, in its diverse phases and degrees ot
development, is at the bottom of them in equal measure (1996: 57).
realization ol the possibilities ot his death in prison. In the Conti de Ccistelvccthio,
Pascoli wrote, “You are a girl and do not know forever [per sempre] means.
Forever means dying...” (Fernandez Buey 2001: 150).
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Besides the elements of self-irony in acknowledging the immense feat of conducting such
grand investigations under the worst possible of conditions and with the poorest of
resources (he had not as of yet even gotten the permission to write in prison), the first
thing to note is that in this initial plan Gramsci himself sees a common totalizing topic or
thread -a leitmotif- underlying the particular themes he wishes to study (“the creative
popular spirit”).'^^ We contend here that the development of this “creative popular spirit”
implies the many stages in the configuration between leaders and led, or between
intellectuals and people, within diverse fields of inquiry or action. Moreover, this
underlying thread runs throughout the Quaderni, including the subjects of a more
political immediacy, as well as in the later plans of study described below. The notion of
popular here thus contains an inner tension in meaning at the same time in a general
sense a people, which points to a collective population, and in a particular sense, popular
as in the subaltern working class (Baratta 2003: 52).
This theme of the configuration or relationship between leaders and led or
between intellectuals and people is seen in the first point regarding the formation of
Italian intellectuals. Although at first it might seem that this point focuses only on one
side of the relationship (the intellectuals), Gramsci’ s comments following that first point
show otherwise. After expressing his concern for the formation ot Italian intellectuals, he
goes on to say in the letter;
Remember my very quick and very superticial writing on southern Italy and on
the importance of B. Croce? Well, I would like to amply unfold the thesis that I
had outlined then, from a “disinterested” point of view, “fiir ewig” (1996: 56).
For an in-depth examination of the use of “creative popular spirit” by Gramsci at this
point, see Giorgio Baratta (2000; 2003) and Lea Durante (2004).
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The “superficial writing on southern Italy” refers to his essay on the southern question
that we commented on towards the end of the first part of this chapter. With this
reference the apparent one-sidedness of the first topic in his study plan breaks up since
the main concern with Croce in that 1926 essay was precisely his role in ideologically
cementing a particular social bloc and helping to maintain its dominance: that is, to help
maintain a the dominant configuration between leaders and led. Furthermore, his
intentions are to develop this focus from a “disinterested” point of view, to develop and
transform this insight into a conceptual framework with which to analyze the relations of
power in other settings and other contexts. As we previously mentioned, Gramsci
develops concepts from a concrete and particular historic analysis, and later develops out
of those concepts a non-exhausting but more general political sociology with which to
better comprehend another particular situation (from the particular to the general to the
particular).
Gramsci ’s second point in this plan concerns his interest in his linguistic and
philological studies, mainly focusing on the debate that was developing during this time
between the school of neo-linguists (later spatial linguistics), founded by his university
professor and friend Matteo Bartoli, and the neo-grammarians (Lo Piparo 1979; Ives
2004; Boothman 2004). Although this theme will be developed later, suffice it to say for
now that Gramsci sided with the neo-linguistic school by writing in prison on this topic
through his own Marxist politico-theoretical interpretation and his general notes on
language, common sense, and philosophy. The neo-linguists emphasized the
comprehensive historicity ot language by tocusing on the relationship between language
and other forms of human activity that developed according to the social relations
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between different groups that come into contact. According to this framework the
dominant group’s form of speech is established by the prestige it exercises over other
subordinate groups or communities. In contrast, the neo-grammarians maintained that
languages developed not out of social and historic change but out of the evolution of the
physiological components that produce speech. For neo-grammarians, linguistic change
occurs out of an internal and spontaneous evolution (parthenogenesis). As we will see
later, Gramsci’s reflections on language are situated in a concern for the relationship
between leaders and led in the context of the unification of a national language and its
relations to popular regional dialects, as well as in the context of the need to construct a
collective radical movement. Furthermore, this concern for language and language
policies reflects a concern for language instruction included in the educational reforms of
the Fascist regime (the initial one led by Giovanni Gentile), and the still prevalent
queslione della lingua at the time.
The third and fourth points of the plan also emphasize the two sides of each
problem. Gramsci had previously written much on Pirandello in various reviews of his
comedies (1985: 77-86). In prison his intentions of writing on Pirandello’s work are
more focused on how it was publicly received and its influence in changing and
determining the “taste” of the public rather than on the work of Pirandello as such.
Again, he transforms the focus on the intellectual or writer into the focus on the
relationship between the writer and his or her audience or public. His interest in
serialized novels and other forms of popular literature (or on literature in general),
although strengthened by the fact that Gramsci gets to reread many samples in prison, is
continually directed towards a critique ot their relationship towards their audience.
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Popular literature, as Gramsci critiques and much later Umberto Eco (1995: 20) affirms,
was typically paternalistic, populist, and conservative in its attitude towards the common
readers. Gramsci’s notes on other writers, such as the “little grandchildren of father
Bresciani”, are also directed against their politically conservative ideological attitude -
including its historical revisionism and backward positions- that may affect the reader.
Out of the four topics only one of them was left barely untouched in the Quaderni: the
study on Pirandello.
After being denied permission to write in prison Gramsci decides to study as
systematically as possible various languages (1996: 87). Nonetheless, he continues to
make readings of a varied nature. On January of 1929 he finally gets permission to write
in prison. He thus begins writing the first notebook on February 8, 1929, a date he
himself places on the very first page. The first thing he does, as if to gather his thoughts
after so much effort to get the permission to write, is to outline another plan or number of
topics he wishes to address. This new and more detailed plan consists of 16 points (1975:
5):
Principal arguments:
1 ) Theory of history and of historiography.
2) Development of the Italian bourgeoisie until 1870.
3) Formation of Italian intellectual groups: development, attitudes,
4) Popular literature of the “romanzi d’appendice” and the reasons of their
persistentfortune.
5) Cavalcante Cavalcanti: his position in the structure and in the art of the
Divine Comedy.
6) Origins and development of Catholic Action in Italy and in Europe.
I) The concept offolklore.
8) E.xperiences of life in prison.
9) The “southern question" and the question of the islands.
10) Observations on the Italian population: its composition, lunction ot
emigration.
I
I
) Americanism andfordism.
12)
The question of language in Italy: Manzoni and G. 1. Ascoli.
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13) “Common sense”{cfr. 7).
14) Types ofperiodicals: theoretical, historical-critical, of general culture
(dissemination).
\5) Neo-grammarians and neo-linguists (“this round table is squared”).
16) The little grandchildren offather Bresciani.
Although basically re-stating the previous plan he advanced to Tatiana in March
1927 from Milan (Fernandez Buey 2001: 155), this plan written on the first page of the
first notebook adds a couple of new topics. However, his concern for Pirandello is left
out. Notwithstanding the fact that this plan numbers 16 different themes, most of them
can be put together in subgroups and are not isolated topics. Accordingly, this can be
somewhat implied in Gramsci’s letter of March 29 of that same year to Tatiana:
I have decided to occupy myself mainly of taking notes on these three arguments:
-P' Italian history in the XIX Century, with a special focus on the formation and
development of intellectual groups; -2^^ the theory of history and of
historiography; 3*^^^ Americanism and fordisiV^ ( 1996: 248).
Consequently, in the Quaderni, under “the theory of history and of historiography”
Gramsci reflects on philosophy, Marx, Bukharin’s book on historical materialism (which
in turn redirects Gramsci to consider the notions of philosophy, ideology, common sense,
etc.), Croce, Labriola, Marxism as a philosophy of praxis, and other such topics. In
addition, Gramsci’s notes on language contain reflections on philosophy, common sense,
and folklore. And the study of Italian history during the XIX Century serves as testing
Part of this relatively new and central interest in Americanism in the part of Gramsci
comes from his reading of the issue of October 14, 1927 of the German magazine Die
Literarische Welt, which was dedicated to the literature ot the United States. It also
comes from his readings ot Henry Ford. In the first notebook dedicated to exeicises in
translation (Notebook A, according to Gerratana) Gramsci translates the special issue of
Die Literarische Welt. See Gerratana’ s description ot this and the other four translation
notebooks in Gramsci (1975: 2430-2442). For Gramsci’s treatment of Americanism and
fordism, see Giorgio Baratta (2003: 169-194; 2004)
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ground tor many important concepts that will later reappear in his reOeetions on other
concerns. This is why the Quaderni have, in a certain sense, a transversal logic.
The restatement of the topics at the beginning of the eighth notebook that Gramsci
(1975: 935-936) began writing in 1931, basically repeats the topics numbered in the first
page of the first notebook, though adding others. Among these explicit additions, some
important ones concern his interest in Machiavelli, the cosmopolitan function of Italian
intellectuals of the XVIII Century, his specifie coneern with Croce, “Lorianism” (from
Achilles Loria), and journalism. Some of these topics are confirmed in a letter to Tatiana
on November 17, 1930:
I have fixated myself on three or four prineipal arguments, one of which is that of
the cosmopolitan function that Italian intellectuals have had until the Seventeen
Hundreds, that later divides itself in so many sections: the Renaissance and
Machiavelli, etc. (1996: 364).
These new topics also contain a concern regarding the articulation between leaders and
led. For example, his reflections on Machiavelli contribute to his understanding of the
Florentine as one of the first political proponents of the attitude that Gramsci will later
describe as the ‘national-popular’ as well as providing an intei-pretative framework for
proposing a revolutionary national-popular collective will for the present. To use another
example, Gramsci’ s work on the Renaissance will emphasize how it was mostly a
cosmopolitan movement composed of intellectuals completely disconnected Irom the
people. It lacked, in that sense, the popular aspiration of the Reformation to which he
compares and contrasts the Renaissance. If used as metaphors, however, as Gramsci
does, Marxism as a comprehensive worldview will be seen as a combination or necessary
dialectical articulation between Renaissance and Reformation.
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So far we have traced Gramsci’s various work plans and throughout them this
ovei arching concern with the correlation of forces between leaders and led, governing
and governed, and intellectuals and people. It is in this vein that we argue Gramsci’s
individual themes are never isolated from the broader social relations and ramifications in
which they take place. In other words, Gramsci focuses on particular aspects without
losing the perspective of the overarching totality. Accordingly, Gramscian scholar
Joseph A. Buttigieg (1992; 29) considers the question of the intellectuals as the central
concern in Gramsci’s prison writings while admitting Gramsci’s awareness of the
subject’s “multifarious ramifications’’. His inquiry on intellectuals, Buttigieg argues,
“does not limit itself to a study of discursive formations as such; it also deals with the
impact which this discourse and the individuals empowered by it have had on the
material political, social, and cultural history of Italy’’ (1992: 47). We would add that this
applies to many different themes treated by Gramsci in the Quadenii, not just that of the
intellectuals, central as it is. In this sense, we are in full agreement with Coutinho (1986:
77-78) when he claims that Gramsci proposes as “first element”, as “cell” of the political,
“the existence of governing and governed, of leaders and led”. Furthermore, Coutinho
continues:
That cell -for its abstract and point of departure character, by requiring to be
made dialectically and historically explicit (concretization)- has an analogous
methodological function to the commodity in Marx’s Capital. Just as Marx
begins from the commodity and its determinations in order to elaborate the more
complex and richer categories of his critique of political economy, among which
is that of capital as a social relation, Gramsci also begins from his “first element
(the distinction governing-governed) to explain the most important determinations
of his critical theory of politics (1986: 77-78).
We would include, however, that this point of departure is found -though variously
mediated- even throughout the topics written about by Gramsci that are not immediately
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political. Furthermore, we contend this “abstract”^^ point of departure is not only a
beginning, but also more like an abstract running concern that gains flesh of a different
kind when Gramsci treats different topics throughout the Quaderni.^'^
We must add that Gramsci’s thought and writing in his prison writings is
extremely dialogic. He claims so himself in his correspondence. Giorgio Baratta (2003:
101-104) has stressed the importance of this element for the proper calibration of
Gramsci’s method of thinking and writing. Due to the nature of his situation at the
moment, the conversation is held mostly with arguments and positions of a number
intellectuals and groups of intellectuals: for example, Croce, Marx, Bukharin, Lenin, ‘the
little grandchildren of father Bresciani’, Achilles Loria and lorkmesimo, the neo-
grammarians, etc. Reading the Quademi, thus, is always in a sense a form of
participating in what could not but be an unconcluded dialogue.
Abstract here, of course, understood in Hegelian and Marxist fashion, not meaning
untrue or unreal, but indeterminate, lacking further determinations and characterizations.
Maurice Finocchiaro (1999) also stresses the centrality of this concern between leaders
and led in the political theory of Gramsci, though tracing a parallel with the theory of
elites in Gaetano Mosca in order to say that they both form part of a tradition of
“democratic elitism”. The problem with this is that it in Gramsci the concern tor the
relations between leaders and led can also be traced to the debates over the language
question in which the dichotomy ot intellectuals and people was popular in the debate
over language since the 19"^ Century. This concern was, moreover, also central to the
debates of the Cl and touched upon in the Quademi. As we saw in the first pai1 ot this
chapter, this concern was central to the latter writings of Lenin as well, which Giamsci
knew well.
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CHAPTER III
FIRST STEPS: READING THE FIRST NOTEBOOK
Let us go back to Gramsci’s self-critical comments on his prison writings at the
beginning of the eighth notebook in 1931. Referring to his writings in prison dedicated to
the study of Italian intellectuals, he comments;
Provisional character -of pro-memory- of such notes and writings;
From them could result some independent essays, not a complete and organic
work; 3"^^ There is still no distinction between the main part and the secondary
ones of exposition, between what would be the “text” and what should be the
“notes”; They are often uncontrolled affirmations, that could be called of “first
approximation”: any one of them in ulterior researches could be abandoned and
maybe the opposite affirmation could be demonstrated to be the exact one; S"’ The
vastness and the uncertainty of the limits of the theme should not cause the wrong
impression, for the things above said: do not have the least intention of compiling
a muddled melange on the intellectuals, a encyclopedic compilation that wishes to
fill all the possible and unimaginable “lacunae” (1975; 935).
The comment is important in its entirety in that it shows Gramsci’s acknowledgement of
the roughness and incompleteness of his notes. They are “uncontrolled” up to the point
that Gramsci cannot even have in his prison cell all of the notebooks at once and only a
limited number of books at the same time.
We want to emphasize two other things from the citation above. The first one that
deserves a brief mention is that of Gramsci’s comments on the vastness of the notes
written and compiled. His concern, which further supports our interpretation, is not to
collect multiple notes on the subject as to pretend any sense of completeness. Due to the
rough nature of the work, the reader should go beyond the multiplicity ot notes and
attempt to grasp the main thread or concern underlying it. Taking into account the
dialogic mode of Gramsci’s thought mentioned towards the end ot the tirst chapter, we
could say that the Qimdemi cannot but be completed or assembled by the reader, though
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using certain objective measures ot interpretation. Thus, even in his writing itself there is
an impulse towards the construction of a collective experience. His writing would not
only be incomplete and provisional due to a lack of proper resources and controls but also
because they are ultimately meant to provoke a productive collective dialogue. In this
sense, and referring especially to the Socrates of the ‘earlier’ dialogues,'^' we could say
that Gramsci’s method and mode of writing is not only plainly dialogic but also of a
Socratic nature. Giorgio Baratta (2003: 101-104) has already briefly made this claim.
This constant concern with communication especially towards the construction of a
collective ethico-political project is pervasive to the whole of the Quaderni and is made
explicit when Gramsci writes on the questions of language, translation (literal and
comprehensively), the issue of communication between the ‘old’ and the ‘young’, the
issue of leadership, the modes of public political discourse, the forms of literary criticism,
etc.‘’^
The second thing we want to emphasize from the citation provided above is
Gramsci’s observation to the effect that the prison writings are at a stage in which the
distinction cannot be yet made between the moment of initial elaboration and the moment
of exposition. In this sense, remembering the remarks made by Marx in the first volume
of Capital (1990) regarding the distinction between ‘method of investigation’ and
‘method of exposition’, we could say that the Quaderni are at a stage which does not
We refer here to the interpretative distinction of the Platonic dialogues provided by
Gregory Vlastos ( 1991 ) in his Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher.
We cannot but refer the reader to the important essay in Fernandez Buey (2001 : 185-
208) that in part inspires the main interpretative key we propose in the present work.
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even come close to the drafting of Marx’s Grwulrisse (1993).“^'^ As Giorgio Baratta
comments:
injact we find ourselves in front of a work in which the “method of investigation”
and the “method of exposition” do not
-yet- appear separated the one from the
other. We have the results of an investigation within the investigation, not after,
as polished sediment from it (2003: 103).
This notwithstanding, we can argue that there are at least one or two moments of revision
or of pre-editorial work. The first one is the repetition and passage of many notes from a
first to a second dratt (or using Gerratana’s key to the critical edition, the passage from a
text A to a text C). The second one -which is done most times simultaneously to the first
one- is the reorganization of already written material into the thematic ‘special
notebooks’. These ‘special notebooks’ attempt to compile the many notes around a
single subject that Gramsci presumes can form the potential basis for a number of related
yet self-contained monographs or essays if done with the proper resources. It is in large
part the passage from the complex and mixed collection of notes in previous notebooks to
a number of thematically contained special notebooks that make the Quaderni not be a
zihaldone, but something that transparently shows the important and constant underlying
concerns of the author. This concern is the ethico-political impulse that wants to analyze
the dominant forms of power relations and that also wants to establish the premises for a
radical articulation between leaders and led into a collective movement for change.' The
reader, thus, should grasp the constant underlying concern while at the same time
Baratta (2003: 102-103) analyzes the possibility of a tentative analogy between
Gramsci’s prison writings and Marx’s work in the Grundrisse in comparison to Capital.
As we shall see in the following chapter, this twofold manilestation ol his concern lor
the dynamics between leaders and led -in both the sense ot the dominant modern state
and towards the construction of a radical collective movement- is expressed in his notion
of hegemony, which is important for theoretical endeavors.
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appreciating the particular critical inquiries Gramsci conducts on a number of relatively
autonomous subjects. We cannot but quote Gramsci himself when he suggests in the first
notebook (fragment 43) a general outline for critical inquiry, as well as what seems to be
the way that we have been suggesting that the Quaderni should be approached:
The same luminous ray passes through diverse prisms and gives diverse
refractions of light; if one wants the same refraction there needs to be a whole
series of rectifications of the single prisms. The patient and systematic
“repetition” is the fundamental methodic principle. But a non-mechanic, material,
repetition: the adaptation of every principle to the diverse peculiarities, presenting
and re-presenting in all its positive aspects and in its traditional negations, always
organizing every partial aspect in the totality. Finding the real identity under the
apparent differentiation and contradiction andfinding the substantial diversity
under the apparent identity, here lies the most essential quality of the critic of
ideas and of the historian of social development (1975: 33-34; our emphasis).'”'”’
There is a clear qualitative difference -though maintaining the inherent
continuities in the act of reorganization and repetition- in the passage from the initial
notebooks to the special notebooks that one can plainly assess by approaching the former
and comparing them to the latter.'”’^ This is the case especially with the first notebook,
whose close approach concerns us in the present chapter.
The first notebook, containing 100 pages, was fully filled by Gramsci on both
sides of each page making it a rich 200 page manuscript. It contains a number of notes
covering diverse topics, most of them later worked on in subsequent notebooks. The first
page of the notebook -dated February 8, 1929 by Gramsci’s own hand- contains the
This is repeated later on, although with slight modifications, in the notebook 24
(Gramsci, 1975: 2268).
It is in part this reorganization in special notebooks that which made plausible and
possible the first published version of the Quaderni, which was thematic in nature. This
first edition came out from 1948 through 195 1 from the publisher Einaudi under the
following titles: II materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, Gli intellettuali
e I’organizazione della cultura, 11 Risorginiento, Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politico e
sulk) Stato moderno, Letteratura e vita nazionale, and Passato e Presente.
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projected outline of work quoted in the previous chapter. The first notes following that
tirst page, though, as Gerratana comments in the critical apparatus to the critical edition
of the notebooks, were not written until June or July of that year according to the sources
written on by Gramsci in those notes. This means that between the first page in which
Gramsci outlines a plan of study and the proper drafting of notes there was a period of
around four months. Gramsci explains this hiatus to Tatiana in a letter dated February 9,
1929:
You know? I already write in my cell. For now I just make translations, to re-
accustom the hand: meanwhile I put my thoughts in order (1996: 236).
In these four months Gramsci translated much, especially from German. As he
tells his wife (1996: 244), at this point he is reading less but working more. It is only
natural that Gramsci feels insecure about beginning to write extensively on any topic,
especially after having thought out such ambitious projects as the ones numbered in the
first page of the first notebook. On top of that he had been denied the use of writing
material in his prison cell for the previous two and a half years. Most of his writing prior
to that had been limited to writing letters.
The first notebook introduces the reader to most of the important topics later
elaborated in the rest of the Quaderni. The complexity of the first notebook, as well as of
the other initial notebooks, lies in that it contains many notes on a great number of varied
themes including on Italian history, the church, literature, Americanism, journal types,
method, etc. Intercalated among the different elaborations are bibliographical
annotations and brief comments meant as personal reminders. As we shall see in what
follows, many of the important keywords for which Gramsci is well known are already
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advanced in his initial reflections in the first notebook, especially in the notes related to
Italian history. Moreover, most of his important topics are also presented for the first
time in this notebook. In the present chapter we want to briefly approach and analyze
some of these important notes due to their objective value in that the keywords or
arguments advanced in them will be featured and elaborated later on in subsequent
notebooks.
Already in the first notebook Gramsci (1975: 8-9) mentions Machiavelli.
Throughout the Quadenii Gramsci maintains a sustained discussion of various topics in
the work of Machiavelli. Although with its own value in terms of the specific
interpretation provided,”*^ Gramsci’s reflections on Machiavelli will later serve as a
historical analogy with which to approach the specific political juncture when Gramsci
coins the name the “modern Prince” to refer to the communist party. This is a constant in
Gramsci’s theoretico-political sensibility: the need to confront the past in order to make it
work for the present; that is, the past is important in that it helps inform the present
juncture and the present course of action rowards working for the future.'”'^
This first note on Machiavelli (later included in notebook 13) is addressed at
providing the proper approach to the Florentine’s work. For this, Gramsci (1975: 9)
expresses the necessity of situating Machiavelli in his own historical context that includes
the internal struggles of the Florentine republic, the struggles between the Italian states,
and the struggles in the part of the Italian states for a European equilibrium. In his own
Appreciated and calibrated by other important theorists. See for example, Louis
Althusser (1999).
Gramsci works in the same vein when he writes on the significance ot the Renaissance
and the Reformation. Flis formulation of a radical moral and intellectual relorm wants to
combine the intellectual element behind his metaphorization ot the Renaissance with the
mass element of the Reformation.
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historical context, according to Gramsci, Machiavelli represents within the Italian
peninsula a progressive position reflecting the “the political philosophy of the time that
leads to the national absolute monarchy, the form that can permit a bourgeois
development and organization” ( 1975: 9). For Machiavelli the prince would play the
necessary unifying force with the support of the mass of peasants, merchants, and the
emergent bourgeoisie against the “feudal anarchy”. This figure of the prince as a leading
and unifying agent will later be taken up in Gramsci’s reflections on the political party as
the ‘modern Prince’ with the task of conjuring a national-popular movement, though this
time with the mass base of the working class of the north, the mass of peasants from the
south, and other elements of the subaltern groups.
This early and very brief note on Machiavelli renders Gramsci’s main concern in
the Quadenii: the centrality of the relationship between leaders and led. The prince,
according to Gram.sci’s interpretation, is unimportant by himself. His importance lies in
his ability to unify, to lead a progressive alliance, to build a collective movement, in order
to keep the “barbarians” out.'*’^ It is in this role that Gramsci will later take up the image
of the prince to describe the party.
Another important group of notes that initiates a constant theme of Gramsci in the
Qiiadenii are the ones on the The little grandchildren of Father Bresciani (1975: 18-20,
30, 80-81, 92). Gramsci uses the name ‘little grandchildren of Father Bresciani’ to refer
to a number of Italian narrative writers -or a literary current- whose literature he
Thus, in Gramsci’s treatment of Machiavelli it seems that the debate over which are the
‘real’ positions or intentions of Machiavelli -whether his republican vein as seen in his
Discourses on Titus Livy or his monarchical vein in The Prince- is somewhat
inconsequential since Gramsci’s Machiavelli would seem to favor the progressive
element realistically possible at hand.
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considered superficial and empty. He characterized the literature of the nipotini as being
propagandistic (1975: 18), historically revisionist and reactionary.
Some of the authors targeted under this heading include Ugo Ojetti, Alfredo
Panzini (whose Vita di Cawnr Gramsci critiques so much in later notebooks), Salvator
Gotta, Margheritta Sarfatti, Mario Sobrero (whose novel Pietro e Paolo of 1924 contains
a character that is a caricature of the militant Gramsci), Francesco Perri (who Gramsci
critiques for writing in a realist style but without any proper historical insight), Leonida
Repaci, Umberto Fracchia, etc. According to Gramsci, symptomatic of this literature is a
lack ot historicity, a taste for tolkloric common places, an emphasis on errors of
vocabulary and a certain preference for a conscious use of complex vocabulary. Also,
there is a certain condescending attitude by some towards the common people, assuming
their inferiority (1975; 30). It should be noted that the folkloric or folklore for Gramsci
(1975: 89-90, 231 1-2314) is a ‘conception of the world and life’ implicit in the subaltern
groups which is disorganized and heterogeneous due to these groups’ subordinated,
exploited, and unorganized positions. Gramsci denounces the position -such as that of
some whom he calls the grandchildren of Bresciani- that values the folkloric as positive
and ‘picturesque’ phenomena. This view explicitly or implicitly sustains the permanence
of such subordinate and unorganized social position. Gramsci’s suggestion is to
approach folklore, a disorganized and heterogeneous popular worldview, not to
appreciate it as a good or neutral thing in itself but in order to purify, demystify, organize,
and elevate it to a conscious and centralized conception of the world.
It is transparent in his concern for and his critique of the type ot literature
produced by ‘brescianists’ that for Gramsci it a radical and total moral and intellectual
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retorm is to take place the struggle has to be unleashed on every front, including the
literary one. As Buttigieg (1992: 44-45) argues, the ‘grandchildren of Father Bresciani’,
were “reactionaries whether they set themselves up as protectors of high culture or as
exponents of a nationalistic and nostalgic populism”. Moreover, he continues:
many of the figures associated with both Brescianism and Lorianism [on which
we will comment in a moment] contributed to the intellectual, or better the
cultural atmosphere that prepared the ground for and helped su.stain fascism
(1992: 45).
The epithet itself of ‘the little grandchildren of Father Bresciani’ makes reference
to Jesuit father Antonio Bresciani (1792-1892), a reactionary historical novelist.
Bresciani is remembered not only by his work in itself, but by the brutal critique of his
novel L’Ehreo di Verona (‘The Jew of Verona’) made by Francesco De Sanctis in 1855
and that Gramsci knew well. De Sanctis (1965: 50-79) denounces Bresciani’s
reactionary revision of history by portraying the 1848 revolution as a product of fanatics,
extremists, and secret societies: “And who makes the revolution? -It is Mazzini, it is the
secret societies the ones who have done all this, -responds father Bresciani” (1965: 52).
De Sanctis also denounces Bresciani’s expropriation of the language of the
revolutionaries for the cause of reaction and Catholicism. True liberty for Bresciani was
only present in Catholicism, while the revolutionaries were libertines. De Sanctis states:
The revolution has been accomplished, according to you [Bresciani], by
irreligiousness, disrespect of the principles and the treaties, false liberty; it has
nothing positive in itself: as a science it is a negation, as a fact it is an anarchy
(1965: 53).
In term of formal criteria, De Sanctis critiques what he sees as a superficial
rhetoric, full of flowery language but lacking any substance ( 1965: 76, 78). He also
mentions Bresciani’s poor development of characters (1965: 68). In terms of the
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narrative, De Sanctis critiques what he sees as collection of facts and detailed
descriptions lacking any real underlying motor or idea making it move (1965; 73, 75).
We have to add his critique of Bresciani’s ideological and stupefying characterization of
the plebeian element (1965: 74).
As David Forgacs comments in his brief introduction to the section on ‘Father
Bresciani’s Progeny’ in his edited volume of Gramsci’s cultural writings, Gramsci’s
“point was to draw a parallel between Bresciani’s reaction to 1848 and that of the
bourgeois press to the Bolshevik revolution” (Gramsci 1985: 298). This reaction also
permeated the cultural ambience that explicitly or implicitly later on promoted Fascism.
Using the theme of Father Bresciani, Gramsci sometimes calls Jesuits the intellectuals
who assume a reactionary attitude towards radical change and that promote Fascism. As
he had already aftirmed after the ‘Red Years’ of 1919-1920, referring to the anti-socialist
reaction in Italy:
Every historical period of struggle and profound social transformation has its
Jesuits; this seems to be a law of human development. The liberals and
Mazzinians had Father Antonio Bresciani; the communists have the renegades
from socialism who have installed themselves in the editorial offices of the
bourgeois press (Gramsci 1985: 298).
Similar to what Gramsci does with literary intellectuals under the loose critical
name of ‘Brescianism’, he does with a group of intellectuals related to the social sciences
under the heading of ‘Lorianism’. This is also already presented in the first notebook.
‘Lorianism’ -coined after economist Achille Loria- is a name used by Gramsci in the
prison notebooks to refer to a group of intellectuals in the field ot the social sciences
“whose crude positivism, opportunism, perverse thinking, and careless scholarship (and
hilariously, were it not for their widespread influence) exemplified in the work and career
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of the professor of economics Achille Loria” (Buttigieg 1992: 43). Furthermore, Loria
himsell was seen by many of his contemporaries as being an important representative of
socialist thought and representing a strong challenge to many claims made by Marx. As
in the case of Bresciani, Achille Loria is remembered more by the brutal attacks directed
against him by Engels (and in Italy by Croce) in his preface to the third volume of Marx’s
Capital than by his own work.
Although the extension of Loria to “Lorianism” as a handy and clever label with
which to address a group of intellectuals is Gramsci’s creation, many of the basic
characteristics attributed to Loria or “Lorianism” Gramsci takes up from the critique of
Loria done by Benedetto Croce (1907: 35-71) in his essay Le teorie stohche del Prof,
Loria, originally published in 1896 but later collected in his Materialismo storico eel
economia marxistica^'^^ In his essay, Croce defends the work of Marx and historical
materialism -as a canon of historical interpretation ( 1907: 53-54)- against the vulgar and
dishone.st interpretations made by Loria. Among them, Croce (1907: 56-58) critiques
Loria’ s interpretation according to which for Marx the final cause underlying economic
development is the gradual development of the stromento tecnico (‘technical
instrument’). Croce shows how Loria, while using parts of Marx’s famous preface to
supposedly sustain his claim, arbitrarily substitutes the words “technical instrument” for
“material forces of production” changing the whole meaning of Marx’s argument. As
Croce (1907: 58) argues, when Marx talks about the material conditions underlying
economic development he does not reduce “all of those to the sole “metamorphosis of the
Again, with the case of Gramsci’s notes on “Brescianism” and his productive use ol De
Sanctis’ critique, and his notes on “Lorianism” and his u.se ol Croce’s critique, we see the
dialogic nature of Gramsci’s writing.
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technical instrument” Moreover, for Croce at this point in his intellectual life,^' Marx
was not in the business of searching for final causes.
A second critique, which follows from the first one, made by Croce (1907: 63-64)
is directed toward Loria’s lack of understanding of how it is that in Marx’s conception
the coincidence of the subjective and objective elements takes place to produce a
revolutionary crisis and change. It is mystifying for Loria how it is that a change in the
“instrument” of production produces a “volcanic explosion of the passions”. We quote
trom Croce extensively due to the appropriateness of his response:
Loria has not comprehended that Marx does not make out of history something
automatic. The capitalist organism produces the proletarianization and social and
world anarchy: they are factual conditions; and such conditions make possible the
proletarian action for a new social a.scension. “Humanity does not propose itself
those problems which it cannot resolve”. Here is the obvious connection between
the economic fact and revolutionary action, that seems for Loria a mystical
concept ( 1907: 64).
Besides these two substantial critiques, Croce repeatedly slams Loria for his
unjustified intellectual arrogance and pompousness. For example, Croce (1907: 38)
accuses Loria of merely plagiarizing -though in a distorted way- from Marx. He
denounces his false pretensions to originality, and for unjustly pretending to comprehend
and transcend the work of Marx while simply elaborating a crude version of
economicism.
In Gramsci’s first note concerning Loria he refers to Croce’s essay on Loria. He
accepts his criticisms of Loria concerning his pretensions to intellectual originality while
Croce had a ‘change of heart’ concerning Marxism. Gramsci notes this in his
Qnadenii. Later on he attacked Marxism for pretending to be a philosophy ot history and
a science of history while only really being a political ideology. He even accused Marx
and Engels of merely substituting the economy for Hegel’s Spirit or God. For example,
see Benedetto Croce (1966).
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at the same time enlarging the subject. Thus, for Gramsci, Loria represents a current of
public opinion of certain repute that he deals with because he sees it as pretending to
better Marxism. We quote Gramsci:
Loria is not a teratological individual case: he is the most complete and finished
exemplar of a series of representatives of a certain intellectual stratum of a certain
period; of the positivist intellectuals in general that occupy themselves of the
worker question and that more or less believe in deepening, or correcting, or
surpassing Marxism. Enrico Ferri -Arturo Labriola- Turati himself could provide
a harvest of observations and anecdotes (1975:22).
And he concludes the note pointing to the real underlying problem behind intellectuals
like Loria: “Thus, in general terms, Lorianism is a characteristic of a certain type of
literary and scientific production in our country [...] connected to the poor organization
of culture and, hence, to the absence of control and critique” (1975: 22). The importance
of Loria and ‘Lorianism’ for Gramsci, as is clearly seen even by his very first note on the
subject, lies in an overall pre-political critique of competing forms of comprehensive
worldviews. We have to remember in particular Gramsci’s own workings on Marxism
and his critique of its positivistic and economist interpretations. Gramsci already argued
against such interpretations prior to being imprisoned and this will continue in the
Qiuiderni both in his attacks against ‘Lorianism’ as well as in his critique of Bukharin’s
‘Popular Manual’. Moreover, it is not just what ‘Lorianism’ represents as an intellectual
attitude or current, but what it says of the condition of a society that produces such a
phenomenon. This approach towards intellectuals and intellectual attitudes or trends is
symptomatic of Gramsci’s perspective. As will be seen when dealing with Gramsci’s
concern for the lack of a national-popular literature in Italy at the time, his approach is
the same.
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Another group ot topics already advanced in the first notebook include the ones
tor which Gramsci is best known: the notions of the intellectuals, hegemony, forms of
political struggle, the state, as well as others. All of these subjects reflect the concern for
the relationship between leaders and led in various capacities.
Gerratana (1997: 122) is completely right in arguing that in Gramsci’s richest
elaborations of the notion of hegemony in the notebooks he saw the need of constructing
a comprehensive theory of hegemony that strived to understand “the proletarian
hegemony as well as the bourgeoisie hegemony, like, in general, every relation of
hegemony”. Before arriving at this point of analytical abstraction and level of generality,
though, Gramsci expressed the first observations on the notion of hegemony and of its
multiple constitutive elements (notions of intellectuals, state, etc.) in various fragments in
the first notebook. Many of them were contained in his comments on Italian history, and
especially on the Risorgimento.
For example, in fragment 43 Gramsci initiates a differential analysis of the
composition of intellectuals in the North compared to the South of the Italian peninsula.
In this fragment, Gramsci is taking what he had already advanced in his 1926 essay on
the ‘southern question’. He was interested in analyzing intellectuals in their capacity to
cement a social bloc, that is, to connect the dominant group with the dominated one. He
wanted to analyze the role of the intellectuals in their capacity to help sustain a particular
power relation or a specific set of social relations. On the one hand, in the South,
Gramsci ( 1975: 35) argues, the reigning type of intellectual is the “the type of the
lawyer”, that puts into contact the peasant mass with that of the landowners and with the
state apparatus”. On the other, in the North, the main type is that “of the office technician
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that serves as connection between the mass of workers and the capitalist class; the
connection between mass of workers and State was achieved by the union organizers and
by the political parties, that is, by an entirely new an intellectual group ” (1975; 35).
Some brief remarks on this initial explorations on the notion of the intellectual.
The first thing to note is that intellectual does not mean in Gramsci’s analysis what is
commonly known or referred to by that label, namely; a cultured and well-educated
person well-versed in the arts and other forms of what is commonly known as high
culture. Second, which follows from the first, the defining element of a type of
intellectual is not to be looked for in any intrinsic and unrealized value or capacity, but in
his ability to help sustain a specific complex of social and power relations; their
importance lies in the ability to help maintain (or potentially subvert) a particular
articulation between leaders and led. Thus, due to the unequal social development
between the Italian North and South, the name or role of the intellectual is applied to
different types of individual groups. The importance of the intellectuals lies in their
capacity to cement, connect, to organize. Gramsci states;
By intellectuals we have to understand not [only] those groups commonly
designated with this denomination, but in general all the social mass that exercises
organizing functions in a lax sense, in the camp of production, as in the cultural
one, as well as in the politico-administrative one (1975: 103).
In his later development, especially in notebook 12, he will distinguish more
properly between traditional and organic intellectuals. Organic intellectuals will refer to
this enlargement of the notion of intellectuals as social organizers. As will be seen in the
next chapter, the notion of organic intellectual applies both to a politics of the right as
well as of the left, both to dominant groups and subordinated groups. Each class, he will
argue, creates its own group of intellectuals.
67
Together with the importance given to intellectuals as social organizers comes the
importance given by Gramsci to the notion of trasfonuismo, which formed part of the
vocabulary of Italian politics, especially in the 1870s and 1880s. In its original usage, it
referred to the alliances forming cross-bench parliamentary majorities on the basis of
promised favors and patronage. In Gramsci’s ( 1975: 42) analysis, every social class not
only creates its own group of organic intellectuals but if it wants to become truly
dominant it must also have the capacity or ability to co-opt intellectuals from the
opposing social classes or sectors. The co-optation of intellectuals of other social groups
lor Gramsci is characteristic of what he means by trasformismo.
The notion of hegemony for its part in its own particular Gramscian flavor is
present in Gramsci’s reflections in the initial draft of some notes on the Risorgimento in
fragment 44. In this fragment, Gramsci (1975: 40-41 ) argues that the reason that the
moderates were stronger than the Party of Action was due to the fact that its social base
was more homogeneous and, hence, stronger. The moderate forces, he continues,
managed to lead the Party of Action even after 1870 through trasfonnismo, since “the
absorption of the elites of the enemy classes leads to their decapitation and their
impotence” ( 1975: 41). In the middle of this reflection, Gramsci comments:
The historic-political criterion on which the research should be based is this: that
a class is dominant in two ways, that is, it is “leading” [dirigeute] and
“dominant”. It is leading of the allied classes, it is dominant of the adversary
classes. Because of this, before ascending to power a class can be “leading” (and
should be): when it is in power it becomes dominant but also continues to be
“leading” (1975:41).
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And he continues, “There can and there should exist a “political hegemony” even before
arriving to Government and one should not only rely on power and the material force that
this gives for exercising leadership [direzione] or political hegemony” (1975; 41).
The concept and thematic of hegemony [egemonia], as will be seen in the next
chapter, will be further elaborated and made richer in the special notebooks (especially
notebooks 12 and 13) as an analytical category in relation to the understanding of the
modern state. But already here, in the first draft of a reflection on the Risorgimento
(which will be later rewritten in notebook 19) we see some of the key constitutive
elements of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. Hegemony here already presents itself
as a form of exercising power opposed to the use of explicit or transparent force. The
practice of hegemony rests on the ability of a social class assuming or intending to
assume power to gain the allegiance, the active or passive consent of other social classes
or at least of its most active components. Hegemony, moreover, moral and intellectual
leadership, is exercised both by a class already in power as well as by a class that wants
to gain power. This two-way form of hegemony (hegemony/counter-hegemony) will be
key for Gramsci later in that it is practiced both by the modern State in the capitalist
mode of production and must be practiced by the working class if it wants to overturn the
order of things. As should be more than clear, in terms of explicit political matters, what
lies at the core of the practice of hegemony is the configuration or form with which a
specific mode of relationship between leaders and led is maintained. Again, the concept
will be enriched in Gramsci’s further elaborations but what is important to note at this
point is that it already figures in his initial writings in the first notebook.
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Another typical Gramscian thematic also presented initially in the first notebook
concerns the forms of political struggle. Talking about the political struggle of India
against the English, according to Gramsci (1975; 122), in fragment 134, there are three
forms of warfare: “of movement, of positions and underground”. Though later elaborated
more extensively and including a differential politico-strategic analysis, in this fragment
he distinguishes among the three forms. War of movement will imply a frontal political
attack (for example, massive strikes). A war of positions will imply a less frontal, more
passive and gradual approach to political struggle. The historic example provided at this
point by Gramsci to illuminate the war of positions is the passive resistance of Gandhi.^^
Finally, an underground war implies the clandestine armed assault form of struggle. As
also happens with the notion of hegemony, in subsequent elaboration these notions will
gain a richer analytical content and will be developed more abstractly as conceptual tools
in Gramsci’
s
political thought.
The brief exposition above of some of the diverse themes present in Gramsci’s
Quadenii that constitute the substance of this chapter was meant to show how in their
first and original appearance many of the distinct topics worked on by Gramsci formed
part of a collection of thoughts that were all part of an initial single act of intellectual
reflection and disentanglement. They were all part of the initial brainstorming. We
focused on the first notebook because it shows how there is a difference between the
An approach to Indian resistance movements, specifically regarding peasant
insurgency, which takes much inspiration from Gramsci’s prison writings is Ranajit
Guha’s (1999). The earlier work of some of the scholars associated with the Subaltern
Studies group productively used many of Gramsci’s tentative propositions and
suggestions in their historical pieces. Foucault will later displace Gramsci in the work of
some of the people of the Subaltern Studies group.
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work in the early notebooks and the reorganized work in the special notebooks written
afterwards. There are fragments in the first number of notebooks which will later be
exactly repeated, reorganized, modified, or even cancelled in posterior drafts. This
clearly gives hermeneutic importance to the special notebooks, since they represent
Gramsci’s own very early work of revision and reorganization. Why, then, approach the
first notebook? Because it shows how in Gramsci’s totalizing conception the various
topics are not unrelated between each other. The first notebook shows this explicitly
even in its own literal materiality since we see a number of different focus points and
particular reflections flowing from the first writing impulse.
Gramsci’s conception of Marxism is one that is totalizing, without losing the
necessary respect for the particulars and the distinct. If there is to be a moral and
intellectual reform, Marxism should be able contend in every front. In this sense, the
critique of ‘Lorianism’, ‘Brescianism’, the philosophy of Benedetto Croce, Americanism,
etc., are not concerns distant from the explicit writings on political strategy and analysis.
They all form part of a totalizing impulse to work against the dominant hegemony in the
status quo in every front, and to contribute towards a revolutionary counter-hegemony.
Having taken a look at the first notebook, in the following chapter we will
concern ourselves with Gramsci’s insight on different topics. We will use the special
notebooks as main points of reference, while referring to other passages throughout the
whole of the Quaderni when pertinent.
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CHAPTER IV
GRAMSCrS THEORY OE HEGEMONY, THE STATE, AND POLITICAE
STRATEGY
Marxism, taken as a more or less eoherent corpus of politieal theory, philosophy,
and revolutionary polities that stems from or originate in the thinking of Karl Marx, has
been notoriously and typically reproached for lacking a proper theory of the alternative
socialist or communist state (Bobbio 1987: 47-64). Such a search for an isolated,
indeterminate, ‘abstract’, and formulaic alternative to the present order of things misses
in part the whole point of a conception of the world, and so including politics, that strives
to be materialistic and strives to never lose sight of the necessary dialectical
correspondence between theory and practice, between names and things, between subject
and object. With good reason Antonio Negri, in reply to Norberto Bobbio, claims:
It is never possible to specify how alternatives to capitalism would work in
practice and the discussion of them never moves beyond the realm of sophistry.
The only true answer lies in criticism, struggle, the radical alternative: it is only in
movement that the nature of the motion reveals itself. In short, in the words of
‘The critique ot the Gotha Programme’, ‘as long as capitalism exists there is no
freedom’ (1987: 127).
To be sure, what is maintained in such an answer to the typical reproach is not that
Marxist political theorizing should keep away from analyzing, critiquing, struggling, and
strategizing towards “the radical alternative”, but rather that any theory which claims to
be materialistic and dialectical cannot propose any ready-made solution for the future.
The radical alternative has to come out of the object in the course of theorizing and
struggling. The new is born out of the old; it is not something mechanically imposed as if
it were a separate reality. In this sense, the only telos (end, goal) is the proposed
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objective
-the mobilizing ideology- of the elimination of class exploitation. As Gramsci
comments in his Qiiaderni, the only categorical imperative in the work of Marx are the
lamoLis last words of the Manifesto of the Communist Party {1993: 98): “WORKING
MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!”
Marxism, on the other hand, has contributed probably like no other body of theory
towards the critical analysis and comprehension not only of capitalism as a distinct mode
of production but also of the nature of the state, especially the modern state. Whether or
not people or intellectuals accept its claims does not subtract from its influence.
Nowadays, in the present configuration of global and neo-liberal capitalism, one does not
have to be a Marxist to see the fundamental and even symbiotic relationship between the
domain ol politics and the analytically specific economic domain. In the United States,
for example, the immense amount of money spent in lobbying by big corporations like
pharmaceuticals has been well documented even by mainstream newspapers and
magazines and has come to form part of common knowledge. For example Sheldon
Wolin, prominent political theorist and by no means a Marxist, when analyzing the
contemporary political juncture claims, “The political world of contemporary capitalism
is the bittersweet vindication of his [Marx] insight into the political primacy of economic
formations” (2004: 565).
Of the early theorists of Marxism, Antonio Gramsci is undoubtedly the person
who furthered most the understanding of the state and especially the modern state. Part
of it is due to theoretical ingenuity though working within a tradition of thought, part of it
due to the real changes and unprecedented innovations that were not historically present
to be analyzed by previous people like Marx himsell, or even probably Lenin. Grarnsci’s
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prominence in regards to his theorizing on the state is recognized by his widely
commented notion of hegemony, used and abused by Marxists and non-Marxists alike.
As It may seem obvious due to the nature of the themes, nowhere as in his notes on the
state, the exercise of power, and political strategy is it more transparent the concern for
the underlying matrix of the relationship between leaders and led in Gramsci’s
conception. In the process of undertaking such an inquiry, Gramsci boldly defines and
redefines such common notions in the tradition of political theory as the state, civil
society, consent, etc.
Historically speaking, Gramsci’s conception of the relationship between the state
or political society (as government) and civil society is enriched by the actual existence
ot multiple mass political parties, the legalization of working class organizations, the
proliferation ol print media (especially newspapers), and other modern elements that
were not -at least not to the same extent- operating factors in the political life of 19"’
Century Europe, much less in Russia for example. Add to that the recent initiatives,
analyzed by Gramsci (1975: 2137-2181), of entrepreneurs like Henry Ford involving
themselves in the private lives of the work force through different means, the role of civil
society institutions and organizations such as the Church and their relief agencies and
political parties, the trade unions, newspapers, professional clubs and associations, etc.,
and you have a social terrain that is much more mediated by numerable elements and
instances than ever before. In this sense, as we shall see in what follows, although
working within a particular tradition of thought (that of Hegel and Marx), Gramsci’s
conception of the State as the sum of political and civil society is also inlormed by the
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real developments in the political life ot the countries of the West.^'^ Although what has
just been stressed might seem obvious to the common reader, it is important to emphasize
since for example Norberto Bobbio’s (1979: 21-47) well-known account of Gramsci’s
notion of civil society treats the subject-matter from the perspective of intellectual history
and misses the important historical import underlying the subject’s understanding.
Gramsci s conception, in which the State is ultimately widened to incorporate the
different instances through which the dominant relationship of leaders and led is
maintained in the capitalist mode of production, responds not only to how the political is
spilled onto the rest of the social terrain but also to how instances that were considered
part of civil society spill over to the political realm. It is this, for example, one of the •
themes that Gram.sci (1975: 2079-2103) emphasizes when he treats Catholic Action, the
Church’s main lay organization. He sees the origin of this organization in the need of the
Church to compete in the secular realm with other lay organizations and political parties
after the victory of liberalism. He goes on to say:
alter 1848 Catholicism and the Church “need” to have their own party to defend
themselves, and to retreat as little possible, they cannot talk anymore (though not
officially, because the Church will never confess the irrevocability of such state of
things) as if they knew themselves the necessary and universal premise of every
mode of thinking and operating (1975: 2081-2082).
Catholic Action, as well as the Popular Party (PPI) and the Confederation of
Labor, were seen by Gramsci (1975: 2083) as incursions of the Church into the secular
terrain due to political and practical requirements for it to continue to be a powerful
We use here the notion of the West conscious of the great debates around it because
Gramsci in his Quademi uses the West/East distinction to calibrate the dillerent types of
relationship between government and civil society according to the degree ol
development in different social formations.
For a fuller account of Gramsci’s thinking towards Catholicism and the religious
question in general, see Rafael Diaz Salazar ( 1990) and Hugues Portelli (1971).
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centei ot influence in the new arrangement under the recently emergent liberal order.
Moreover, the Catholic Church at least partly participated in giving legitimacy to
Mussolini’s totalitarian regime, especially after the government settled the Roman
question in 1929, conceding sovereignty to the Vatican and giving a large amount of
money to compensate for the loss of what used to be papal territories the 1860’s and
1 870’s. In addition, with the signing of the Concordat in 1929, the regime extended
religious education to primary and secondary schooling and provided autonomy to
Catholic Action conditioned on it not meddling in politics (Duggan 1994: 226).^^ With
this, as historian Christopher Duggan (1994: 226-227) comments, Mussolini
-‘the man
sent by providence’, as the pope called him- managed not only to give his regime locally
and internationally a better sense of legitimacy and prestige, but also used the Church “as
an instrument for securing mass political consent”. All of this, as shall be seen in the
present chapter, resembles Gramsci notes on the element of hegemony in the state. In
sum, what we want to emphasize with this brief and superficial detour on the relationship
between church and state in Fascist Italy is that when Gramsci elaborates on hegemony as
a central component of the practice of power in the part of the state, his thinking is as
theoretical innovative as historically and empirically minded.
Theoretically speaking, Gramsci’s thought on hegemony, the state, and civil
society can be contextualized within the conceptual tradition of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin.
Gramsci’s relationship with this theoretical tradition is dialectical in that it confronts and
innovates upon it while retaining some of its basic elements or insights in the sense ot the
German notion of anjhehimg (so prized by Hegel, and then Marx) according to which
For a brief but indepth look at the relationship between the Catholic Church and the
government in Fascist Italy, see Alice A. Kelikian (2002: 44-61 ).
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there is an overcoming or transcendent synthesis which still retains
-though changed-
previous elements (thesis > < antithesis - synthesis). To calibrate Gramsci’s contribution
to the understanding of some of the important concepts of the tradition of political theory,
we shall now turn brietly to how Hegel, Marx, and Lenin understood the notions of the
state and civil society.
* * ^ >1= >1:
In the first notebook, Gramsci comments approvingly on Hegel’s notion of the
state and civil society:
Hegel’s doctrine of the parties and associations as “private” design of the State. It
derived historically from the political experiences of the French Revolution and
should have served in giving constitutionalism a superior concretion.
Government with the consent of the governed, but with the consent organized, not
generic and vague that is affirmed in the instant of the elections: the State has and
asks for consent, but also “educates” this consent with the political and trade-
union associations, that are regardless private organisms, left to the private
initiative of the leading [dirigente] class. With this Hegel, in a certain sense,
already surpasses the pure constitutionalism and theorizes the parliamentary State
with its party regime. His conception of association could not have been more
than vague and primitive, between the political and the economical, according to
the historical experience of the times, that was limited and gave only one
complete example of organization, the “corporative” one (politics grafted in the
economy) (1975: 56-57).
Despite Gramsci’s possible shortcomings in his appreciation to the effect of
seeing Hegel’s theory advancing the notion of a parliamentary system with parties
(political parties in the modern sense were nonexistent in Hegel’s time), rightly criticized
by Bobbio (1979: 32), this fragment is important for a number of reasons. First, it
contextualizes philosophically speaking the conception of the state that he will spell out,
further in the fragment adding Marx to the insight emphasized in the fragment. Second,
in the comment on Hegel’s conception of the state and civil society we see clearly the
traces of his own conception, elements ol which are already present in his first notes on
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the first notebook as seen in the previous chapter. We do not maintain, as Bobbio does,
that Gramsci in the case ot his theory ot state and the importance given to civil society is
more Hegelian than Marxist, but that he understood that the Marxist notion of the state
contains much influence and fundamental insight from Hegel’s conception. In the
fragment from which we quoted above Gramsci does not posit Hegel in opposition to
Marx; he only makes a distinction in the differences of the historical reality of the latter
in comparison to the one of the former.
In Hegel’s conception, civil society is the intermediate moment between the
family and the state. For Hegel (1967: 122), in this stage individuals act out of their own
particular wants and desires. But in the course of attaining their “selfish ends”, the
individuals form “a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood,
happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and
rights of all” (1967; 123). This attainment of the selfish wants and desires is done
through the “form of universality”. Civil society for Hegel (1967: 122) is “the world of
ethical appearance” because the universal -the unity of all- plays a ciucial part but still
out of selfish and particular aims. In this regard, referring to the stage of civil society, he
comments:
But in developing itself independently to totality, the principle of particularity
passes over into universality, and only there does it attain its truth and the right to
which its positive actuality is entitled. This unity is not the identity which the
ethiccd order requires, because at this level, that of division, both principles are
self-subsistent. It follows that this unity is present here not as freedom but as
necessity, since it is by compulsion that the particular rises to the form of
universality and seeks and gains its stability in that form (1967; 124; our
emphasis).
The unity between particular and universality that Hegel is talking about can only
achieve itself in his conception with the lull development ol the state. Only in the state
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can the particular achieve freedom and leave the world of necessity behind. For Hegel
civil society includes not only the sphere of individual-based economic and commercial
relations but also the regulatory institutions like the administration of justice
-law and the
court of justice- (1967: 134-145), the police (1967: 146-152), and the corporations ( 1967:
152-155) meant to contain the potential problems presented by the inevitable misery,
inequalities, and clashes in a stage (of civil society) still dominated by private interests.
As Hegel comments: “Control is also necessary to diminish the danger of upheavals
arising from the clashing interests and to abbreviate the period in which their tension
should be eased through the working of a necessity of which they themselves know
nothing” (1967: 148). Hegel was well aware of the division of society in classes due to
the inherent inequalities contained in the workings of civil society (1967: 149-150).
Although Hegel admires the political economists for dealing with laws pertaining to the
essence of the merely apparent, he critiques them for ignoring the disparity and
inequalities behind abstract economic laws.
Hegel’s state, on the other hand, “the actuality of concrete freedom” (1967: 160),
is meant to be beyond the limited sphere of civil society:
In contrast with the sphere of private rights and private welfare (the family and
civil society), the state is from one point of view an external necessity and their
higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to
it and dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end immanent within
them, and its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the
particular interest of individuals, in the fact that individuals have duties to the
state in proportion as they have rights against it (1967: 161).
The state, “the actuality of the ethical Idea” according to Hegel (1967: 155),
unites particular and universal interests. The state is seen as government (excluding the
administration of justice and the police that are part ot his notion ot civil society). The
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state for Hegel includes the constitution, the legislature, the Executive, and the Crown,
forming a constitutional monarchy, in which the Crown is the ultimate and overarching
determining decision bearer: “The personal majesty of the monarch, on the other hand, as
the final subjectivity of decision, is above all answerability for acts of government”
(1967: 187).^^
What Gramsci points to in the fragment cited above is the fact that in Hegel’s
conception
-in which civil society includes the economic relations and its regulatory
mechanisms or institutions and the state includes the various instances of government
under the ultimate authority of the monarch- the state is seen as a synthesis of different
instances that go beyond what is commonly understood as mere government. The state
presupposes civil society as a necessary moment and instance for its existence. For
Hegel, the state, which is again what Gramsci wishes to emphasize, is not something
existent ‘up there’, disconnected from civil society, but forms an indissoluble unity. The
positions within the coiporations in civil society for example, meant to regulate the
private interests of particular economic agents and to serve as a mediation between civil
society and state, will be filled “by a mixture of popular election by those interested with
appointment and ratification by higher authority” (Hegel 1967: 189).
Now, as a Marxist, Gramsci would not subscribe to Hegel’s idealism, something
that as we will see in a moment is Marx’s main critique. Hegel’s idealism ultimately lies
in that although in his conception the state (identity of particular and universal, private
and public intere.st) presupposes the development of the family and civil society, it is the
It is not our intention here to calibrate on the concessions given by Hegel to the
censorship present in his time. For a take on the possible inlluence played by censorship
on Hegel’s writing in the Philosophy oj Right, see Domenico Fosurdo (2004: 1-31).
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actualization of the ethical Idea that for Hegel is present from the beginning of the
process as the main mover of history (1967: 156). The ethical Idea in the state is only the
actualization of what was already contained in the intrinsic potentiality of the Idea from
the very beginning. Thus, Hegel’s conception of the family, civil society, and the state is
situated within his philosophy of world history, according to which history is the
expression of the development of the Spirit (Geist) whereby the Spirit negates itself by
becoming objective reality in order to know itself, and only to overcome this negation by
coming back to itself, constituting the ‘identity of identity and non-identity’ (Hegel
1998).
This last claim, and its consequence for understanding the relationship between
civil society and the state, Marx cannot buy. As early as in the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1992c: 382-400) critiqued and rejected
Hegel’s conception of history according to which the consummation of history implies
the return of the Idea to itself overcoming objective reality.^^ Prior to that, in 1843, in his
Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, Marx claimed:
The idea is subjectivized and the real relationship of the family and civil society
to the state is conceived as their inner, imaginary activity. The family and civil
society are the preconditions of the state; they are the true agents; but in
speculative philosophy it is the reverse. When the Idea is subjectivized the real
subjects -civil society, the family, ‘circumstances, caprice etc.’- are all
transformed into unreal, objective moments of the Idea referring to different
things (1992a: 62).
Still influenced at this time by Feuerbach’s philosophical anthropology and his critique of
Hegel, Marx assumes the same critique by denouncing that Hegel overturns the proper
relation between subject and predicate. For Hegel, according to Marx, the subject
For a closer look at Marx’s critique of Hegel and other related matters in the
manuscripts of 1844, see Manuel S. Almeida (2001:67-80).
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(human beings) is not the creator of the predicate (ideas, social institutions, etc.), but the
othei way around: “Reality is not deemed to be itself but another reality instead. The
ordinary empirical world is not governed by its own mind but by a mind alien to it”
(1992a: 62).
Even though without the overarching idealist scheme, Marx follows Hegel in
seeing civil society as the economic realm where the self-interested individuals reign
supreme. For example, in On the Jewish Question, Marx claims civil society to be “the
sphere of egoism and of the helium omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of
community but the essence of dijference" (1992b: 221). In this same work, Marx claims
that the state in fact represents the unity of human beings hut only in abstraction. More
explicit and plainly expressed, Marx and Engels define civil society in The German
Ideology:
Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a
definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole
commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the state
and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its external
relations as nationality and internally must organize itself as state. [...] Civil
society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization
evolving directly out of production and intercourse, which in all ages forms the
basis of the state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, however,
always been designated by the same name (1998: 98).
Different from Hegel, the state for Marx is not the actualization of any ethical
Idea but a facade, an abstract equality, which exists over the real differences and
inequalities of the real life of individuals in civil society. Civil society constitutes the real
anatomy of society, “the true focus and theater of all history” as Marx and Engels (1993:
57) call it in The German Ideology. This does not mean that the state tor Marx is
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something neutral. The state as government is enmeshed within the class struggles of
modern society. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels argue that:
The bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the
world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive
political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (1993; 69).
The state is the institution that legalizes, legitimizes, and oversees the domination of one
class over the other. As Marx and Engels (1998: 52-53) argue in The German Ideology,
with the state a class represents its particular interests as if they were the general interests
of all .social classes.
With this last exposition of Marx’s notion of civil society and the state we do not
intend to convey a simplistic model where civil society or the realm of economic
relations is the real mover of history whereas the state and the political sphere in general
end up being secondary, accidental, and superficial realities. This is another notorious
critique directed at early Marxism, but with scarce evidence. The intention of Marx was
to understand reality as a structured totality that is mediated by various semi-autonomous
instances. Still, for Marx the mode of production is the primary defining characteristic of
a society (or of a concrete social-economic formation, to use Marxist parlance);
nevertheless, he never lost sight -and in this he was very much faithful to his early
Hegelian formation- of the fact that reality was a totality of instances variously mediated.
Just as brief evidence let us compare two different fragments separated by almost 12
years. The first from The German Ideology, in which Marx and Engels summarize their
materialistic conception of history:
This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of
production -starting from the material production of life itself- and
comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode
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of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history;
describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all the different
theoretical products and torms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality,
etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their formation from that basis;
thus the whole thing can, of course, be depicted in its totality {and therefore, too,
the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another) (1998: 61 ; our
emphasis).
It is worth noting that besides the fact that the explicit intention in the text is to depict
reality “in its totality”, the parenthetical comment that follows emphasizing the mediated
character ot this totality was added later on by hand on a further revision by Marx
himself. It is clear that what Marx intended was not to expound a one-sided or simplistic
conception. The next fragment, from the manuscript of 1857-1858 commonly known as
the Grimdrisse, makes the same point;
The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and
consumption are identical, but that they allform the members ofa totality,
distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself in the
antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well. The
process always returns to production to begin anew. That exchange and
consumption cannot be predominant is self-evident. Likewise, distribution as
distribution of products; while as distribution of the agents it is itself a moment of
production. A definite production thus determines a definite consumption,
distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these different
moments. Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is itself
determined by other moments. For example if the market, i.e. the sphere of
exchange, expands, then production grows in quantity and the divisions between
its different branches become deeper. A change in distribution changes
production, e.g. concentration of capital, different distribution of the population
between town and country, etc. Finally the needs of consumption determine
production. Mutual interaction takes place between the different moments. This
is the case with every organic whole (1993: 99-100).
We see in this extract again the importance in the last instance of understanding the
different spheres as parts of one totality, “distinctions within a unity”. These two
different passages cited above, 12 years apart from one another, are included here to
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dispel any possibility of vulgarizing Marx’s conception of reality into a simplistic view
based on the metaphoric image of the base and superstructure.
In any case, for Marx the state is a bureaucratic apparatus or tool of the ruling
class used for its self-maintenance in power. This conception formed part of the basic
theoretical legacy of early Marxism. For example, in The State ami Revolution Lenin
(1973. 16) claimed that the State is an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression
of one class by another, it is the creation of the ‘order’ that legalizes and supports this
oppression, minimizing the conflicts between classes”. Moreover, for Lenin the state is
essentially composed of the police forces, the permanent army, and an administrative
bureaucracy. He emphasizes the element of explicit force in his definition of the state:
“the permanent army and the police are the fundamental instruments of the force of state
Power” ( 1973: 18). After this emphasis on direct and explicit force, Lenin asks: “But,
can it possibly be any other way?”. Gramsci’s contribution to the understanding of the
state constitutes an affirmative answer to Lenin’s question.
For Gramsci, the state is the most important instance in determining and
maintaining a particular relationship between leaders and led. His contribution to state
theory and to the theories of power lies in reading the different ways a social class can
exercise its domination and its leadership over the subordinated classes, emphasizing the
moment of consent and ideological leadership over the moment of force in the
functioning of the modern state. Concepts such as hegemony that will be illuminated in
what follows are entwined with Gramsci’s general understanding ot the state and civil
society.
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Before properly entering into Gramsci’s understanding of the state, civil society,
and the maintenance of power, a brief remark on his understanding of the political in
Marx is in order. Gramsci has been commonly referred to by many as contributing to the
rectification of economistic, simplistic and mechanical versions of Marxism by giving
emphasis on the importance to the role played by ideologies in a social formation. It is
important to note that Gramsci himself did not think Marx’s conception was simplistic or
mechanical. He could not have present texts from Marx such as The German Ideology
and the Gnmdrisse. The latter was only published after Gramsci’s death while the
tormer was only scarcely and Iragmentarily known just before his being imprisoned. But
he did give a rich reading to a number of famous passages of various of Marx’s works to
indicate what he saw as a firm basis upon which he constructed his own insight. Of these
texts, one ot the most often cited —and translated by Gramsci from the German in prison-
in the Quaderni is Marx’s famous preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, particularly the part that states:
The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation
of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is
always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the
economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of
natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic -in short,
ideologicalforms in which men become conscious of this conflict andfight it out
(1992e: 426; our italics).
Gramsci in his Quaderni emphasizes the last part of Marx’s fragment to point towards the
real unity of form and content -aside from the abstract analytical distinction between
spheres- and the importance of the political and ideological moments. For Gramsci the
development of a social clas.s towards ascendancy usually takes place on every front and
in parallel fashion. For example in the sixth notebook, he states:
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In the development of a national class, beside the process of its formation
in the economic terrain, it is necessary to take into account the parallel
development in the ideological, juridical, religious, intellectual, philosophical
terrains, etc., indeed it should he said that there is no economic development,
without these other parallel developments ( 1975: 839-840; our emphasis).
Even more explicitly, in notebook 10, rejecting Croce’s simplification of Marxism as
supposedly providing a metaphysical view of society where the economy is “god” and
the superstructure is mere appearance, Gramsci states:
Croce’s affirmation that the philosophy of praxis^^ separates the structure from
the superstructure, rehabilitating the theological dualism and enthroning an
“unknown god” (structure), not only is not exact, but only a poor invention. The
accusation of theological dualism and of dismemberment of the process of the real
is empty and superficial. It is strange that such accusation comes precisely from
Croce, who has introduced the concept of the dialectic of the distinct and that
because of that is continually accused by the gentilians of having dismembered
the real process. But, on the other hand, it is not true that the Philosophy of
praxis separates the structure from the superstructure, when, on the contrary, it
conceives its development as intimately connected and necessarily interrelated
and submitted to processes of reciprocal influences. Neither is the structure, not
even metaphorically, an “unknown god”, but better it is conceived in an ultra-
realistic form in such a way that it can be studied with the methods of the natural
and exact science (1975: 1300; our emphasis).
Texier (1975) and Vargas-Machuca ( 1982) are correct in criticizing Bobbio’s piece in
that he mounts his argument on Gramsci’ s conception of civil society upon a separated
and dualistic view of civil society and political society and of structure and
superstructure, instead of focusing on Gramsci’s persistent focus on the integrality of the
real process. Let us now pass onto Gramsci’s conception of the state and civil society,
which is at the same time an approximation to his concept of hegemony.
When Gramsci in the Quaderni talks about ‘the philosophy of praxis’, ‘modern
philosophy’, ‘absolute historicism’, and other such forms, he is referring most ot the time
to Marxism. It is well known that Gramsci engaged in different forms ot selt-censorship
so as to mislead the prison censors, for example writing ‘M.’ for Marx, Ilich for Lenin,
Bronstein for Trotski, etc.
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The Gramscian conception builds upon and transcends the definitions of State and
civd society provided by Hegel and Marx. Besides the fragment quoted above from the
Qiiadenii regarding Hegel, Gramsci (1975: 703) recognizes explicitly again in another
fragment the impoit of Hegel s (and of Marx’s) influence in his own conception, but it
will be seen in a moment how it is explicitly different in one particular respect. It will
also be seen that to understand Gramsci’s concept of the state and civil society is at the
same time to understand how power is exercised in order to maintain a particular
relationship between leaders and led, especially in the context of a failed revolutionary
wave and the subsequent re-accommodation of capitalism. This same understanding of
how the functioning of power works will also inform his ideas for a revolutionary
movement and practice.
The Quaderni is a rich but fragmented and very incomplete body of work. This
makes the rendering of important insights within them a bit problematic in that the reader
has to search for insights on important themes or concepts in fragments sometimes even
on different subjects. This unevenness and undetermined character of the Quaderni,
caused by the real social and physical situation in which they were written, is the main
reason why Gramsci at times seems inconsistent with the way he uses concepts or how he
defines them. This is why Perry Anderson (1977: 25) has talked about a “persistent
slippage'" in the way Gramsci has managed the concepts of state and civil society. And
Perry Anderson is certainly correct in underlining the ambiguities in the Quaderni even
on such important themes as his political vocabulary. This is also why we have from
time to time in the present work repeatedly emphasized the incomplete, unedited, and
fragmentary nature of the notebooks. Taking note of the ambiguities and inconsistencies
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in some of the writing, we think that the only way out of only showing the contradictions
and lacunae in his text is to follow Gramsci’s methodological insight presented in the
second chapter, especially concerning the importance given to the leitmotif of the work.
Let us be clear about something: we do not intend to resolve conclusively any
contradictions or ambiguities, but they have to be overcome if we are to value the
Quadenii as something more than a heroic testament of political integrity.
Taking into consideration the guiding threads of his reflection, scholars agree that
Gramsci’s work conveys an enlargement of what is usually understood by the state (Buci-
Glucksmann 1977: 92-142; Femia 1987; Showstack Sassoon 1987: 109-119). As Femia
( 1987: 27-28) argues, tor Gramsci the distinction between political society (or what is
usually understood by state, meaning government, juridical and police apparatus) and
civil society (as the private realm of individual) is essentially analytical and is a
distinction subsumed in the real manifestation of the exercise of power of a ruling class.
In its broadest sense Gramsci enlarges the notion of the state to include both political and
civil society. The enlargement of the notion of the state is seen in some of his definitions,
for example:
State in an organic and most extensive sense (State properly named and civil
society) (1975: 763).
it is to be noted that in the general notion of State there enter elements that are to
be attributed to the notion of civil society (in the sense, it could be said, that State
= political society -i- civil society, that is hegemony armored by coercion) (1975:
763-764).
by State it should be understood, beyond the governing apparatus, also the
“private” apparatus of hegemony or civil society (1975: 801).
In the last two definitions just cited the reader can appreciate Gramsci’s
perspective in that his definition is less intended to show what these analytically distinct
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spheres are as static and fixed entities than to show two different dynamics intended to
exercise power and maintain a particular set of social and power relations (hegemony and
coercion). In another fragment, Gramsci calls this broad notion the State “in the integral
meaning: dictatorship + hegemony” ( 1975: 810-811). Gramsci’s self-consciousness of
his contribution to state theory is expressed in a letter of September 7 of 193 1 sent to his
sister-in-law Tatiana:
On the other hand I extend very much the notion of intellectual and I do not limit
myself to the current notion that refers to the grand intellectuals. This study
brings also certain determinations of the concept of State that is usually
understood as political Society (or dictatorship, or coercive apparatus to conform
the popular mass according to the type of production and the economy of a given
moment) and not as an equilibrium of political Society with civil Society (or
hegemony of a social group over the entire national society exercised through the
organisms so-called private, like the church, the labor unions, the schools, etc.)
and precisely in civil society the intellectuals especially operate (Ben. Croce, for
ex., is a sort ot laic pope and is a very efficient instrument of hegemony even if
from time to time he finds himself in contrast to this or that government, etc.)
(1996: 458-459).^^
The importance is not so much how original or not is his understanding of the
State by including civil society as part of it -different as it is not only from the way Marx
and Lenin understood it, but also as to the way it was understood by someone like Weber
for whom the state constitutes the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence- but to
analyze the different forms or guises the exercise of power assumes to maintain fixed the
dominance of a social class. Only by calibrating how power is exercised in his specific
historic juncture, can one then propose a political strategy for an alternative.
For Gramsci the state in the integral sense is constituted both by political society
and civil society. By political society he understood the government, the juridical
This letter is important in that it also shows Gramsci’s sell-conscious extension ot the
notion of intellectual, and of his appreciation of Benedetto Croce that we will deal with
later.
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apparatus, and the armed forces. By civil society he understood the sphere in which
private organizations and institutions operate, such as the church, the labor unions, the
schools and universities, the newspapers and editorial houses, and other such cultural
instances that help produce or reproduce the ideologies, values, and power of the ruling
class. This private realm of civil society in Gramsci, though, is different to that
understood by both Hegel and Marx in an important respect. For both Hegel and Marx,
civil society included the economic relations of production. That is not the case in
Gramsci’s conception.
Gramsci uses the image of Marx’s preface of base and superstructure to illustrate
his conception. In the very important notebook 12 where he elaborates on his notion of
the intellectuals, he states:
We can, lor now, establish two major superstructural “planes”, that which can be
called of “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms vulgarly called
“private”, and that of “political society or State” and that corresponds to the
function of “hegemony” that the dominant group exercises in all of society and
that of “direct dominance” or of command that is expressed in the State and in the
“juridical” government (1975: 1518-1519).
We have then that for Gramsci civil society forms together with political society part of
the superstructure of society. This is a major distinction from Hegel and from Marx for
whom civil society represents especially the relations of production and the economic
structure in general. Gramsci is also quite explicit in another passage in situating civil
society above the economic structure of society: “Between the economic structure and the
State with its legislation and its coercion lies civil society” (1975: 1253). Thus civil
society for Gramsci is not only part of the State in a broad sense, but in a limited sense it
is a semi-autonomous intermediary instance or sphere of society which further cements
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the totality of society connecting the economic structure with the government apparatus.^®
It IS our contention that this difference from both Hegel and Marx’s conception
specifically in regards to the notion of civil society is not only due to theoretical or
conceptual innovation, but to the real coming into being in society of private
organizations and institutions that were not present in their time, such as political parties
in the more modern sense, legalized labor unions and professional organizations, the
proliferation of newspapers and journals, benefic societies, etc.
This enlargement of the notion of the state, we must add, is also influenced at
least in part and certainly in the language Gramsci uses by the work of Benedetto Croce.
For example, in 1924 Croce wrote:
in reality, force and consent are in politics correlative terms, and where one is
present the other can never be absent (1985: 573).
In this elevation of mere politics to ethics even the word “State” gains new
meaning: not any more simple utilitarian relation, synthesis of force and consent,
of authority and liberty, but embodiment of the human ethos and because of that,
ethical State or State of culture, as it is called (1985: 580).
For Gramsci, then, the state is the sum of political society and civil society, the
spheres of the function of coercion and hegemony respectively. What defines and
differentiates the two instances of this enlarged notion of the state is the form in which
power is exercised in order to maintain a particular set of soeial relations between classes,
a particular configuration between leaders and led.
On the one hand, being one face of the State, political society includes the
government apparatus, the laws, and the armed forces constituting the moment of force.
For Gramsci ( 1975: 1055), the sum of the economic structure and the superstructures
of political society and civil society form what he calls a ‘historic bloc’. For an
interpretation that situates the notion of ‘historic bloc’ as the central element in the
Quadenii, see Hugues Portelli ( 1982).
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coercion, or ‘dictatorship’. This is the element of the state that can, in the last instance,
obligate the subordinate groups to comply to the prescribed rules of the status quo. On
the other hand, the practice of hegemony provides the distinctive mode in which power is
exercised by the dominant class through the realm of civil society in a modern liberal-
democratic society.
The notion of hegemony was commonly used in the discussions of the Second
and Third International (Anderson 1977: 10; Buci-Glucksmann 1979: 19). Hugues
Portelli (1983: 65-74) discusses how in Lenin’s work there is a certain anticipation of the
conception of hegemony, but mostly in a strategic conception for a revolutionary
alternative where the proletariat must gain and lead the alliance with the peasants.
Nonetheless, it gains a specific meaning and importance for Gramsci in his Quaderni in
relation to his analysis of how power functions in the modern state. For Gramsci, the
achievement of hegemony by a social class is the ultimate stabilizing element in its
maintenance in power:
The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two modes, as “domination”
and as “intellectual and moral leadership [direzioueY'. A social group is dominant
of the adversary groups that it tends to “liquidate” or to submit even with armed
force and is leading [dirigente] of the akin and allied groups. A social group can
and indeed should already be leading before obtaining government power (this is
one of the main conditions for the conquest of power itself); then, when it
exercises power and also has it strongly on hand, it becomes dominant but should
also continue to be “leading” (1975: 2010-201 1).
Hegemony, in his understanding, means the moral and ideological leadership
over the subordinated groups in such a way that the dominant class convinces them that
its project is also theirs. It means that the ruling class manages to appear as if
representing the interests of the collective and not only its own particular interests. It
represents for Gramsci the passage of a class from a pure economic and corporative
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perspective to a universal and hegemonic perspective forming an equilibrium between
leaders and led which permits the maintenance in power of that class:
This IS the phase most plainly political, that signals the net passage from the
structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures, it is the phase in which the
ideologies previously germinated become a “party”, confront each other and enter
in a struggle until only one of them or at least only one combination of them,
tends to prevail, to impose itself, to spread itself on all of the social area,
determining, beyond the unification of the economic and political ends, also the
intellectual and moral unity, putting all the questions around which blazes the
struggle not on the coiporative plane but on a “universal” plane and thus creating
the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinated groups.
the dominant group comes coordinated concretely with the general interests
ot the subordinated groups and state life is conceived as a continuous forming and
surpassing of unstable equilibriums (in the area of law) between the interests of
the tundamental group and those of the subordinated groups, equilibriums in
which the interests of the dominant groups prevail but up to a certain point, that is
not up to the petty economic-corporative interest (1975: 1584).
Power, exercised through hegemony, is maintained through the consent obtained
trom the subordinated groups. As Femia ( 1987: 45-50) remarks, this consent -different
from the implicit and momentary consent of the modern social contract tradition- can be
of varied degrees, from active to passive. Moreover, the consent obtained through the
practice of hegemony is organized and achieved through material and institutional means.
This brings us to an important qualification. That hegemony means obtaining the active
or passive consent of the subordinated groups, but it is not only a matter of pure
ideological influence. Con.sent can be achieved by real and economic means, that is, for
Gramsci hegemony can be as ideological as economic:
The fact of hegemony presupposes without a doubt that the interests and the
tendencies of the groups over which the hegemony will be exercised will be taken
into account, that a certain equilibrium of compromise forms, that is, that the
leading group makes sacrifices of an economic-corporative order, but it is also
without a doubt that such sacrifices and such compromise cannot concern the
essentials, because if the hegemony is ethico-political, if cannot but also he
economic, it cannot but have its fonmlation in the decisivefunction that the
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leading group exercises in the decisive nucleus ofeconomic activity {1915: 1591 •
our emphasis)/
In order to maintain hegemony, the leading elass can even concede benefits of an
economic nature but without subverting or changing “the essentials”. We can
immediately think of the welfare state, for example, which consists of government
incurring social spending and providing public assistance programs of various kinds to
lessen the hardship of the subordinated classes and also reducing the possibility of
subversion; benefits trickle down but the essential social relations of production of
capitalism remain untouched. In fact, there is something of an anticipation of the practice
of the welfare state in Gramsci’s analysis of Americanism and Fordism (1975: 2137-
2181), when he discusses the practice of Henry Ford of paying high salaries to his work
force in order for it to remain minimally content with the new aggressive work routine
needed with the introduction of the assembly line in the factories.
Nevertheless, when talking about hegemony Gramsci always stresses the
ideological element that helps reproduce the reigning social relations by giving the
prestige and moral standing to the leading class in order for it to gain the consent of the
subaltern groups. We say ideological or cultural element but, as Vargas-Machuca ( 1982)
argues, it is important to note that Gramsci persistently tries to present the institutional
and material elements that produce and reproduce the ideological and moral element;
Kate Crehan (2002) especially critiques the ‘culturalist’ appropriation of Gramsci, or
what she calls a Gramsci lite, in which Gramsci’s notions of culture and hegemony are
separated from their original comprehensive meaning to apply only to the realm of
ideologies as a separate sphere of reality. Although no fault of Williams, Crehan argues
that the what lies at the heart of this misreading of Gramsci is the discussion ol hegemony
provided by the eminent cultural theorist, Raymond Williams, in his Marxism and
Literature (1977: 108-1 14). We say “although no fault of Williams”, because Raymond
Williams is explicit in understanding culture as the “whole social process”, and not as a
separate sphere.
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hence, Gramsci’s focus on distinct realms of social life in order to trace the power
relations underlying them, for example his emphasis on “the so called organs of public
opinion
-newspapers and associations- which, because of that [the exercise of
hegemony], in certain situations, are artificially multiplied” (1975; 1638).
In essence, Gramsci’s argument on hegemony is directed towards showing that in
modern societies, the relations between leaders and led are produced and maintain all
across the social terrain. The ruling class is properly stable when it is not only dominant,
but also leading {dirigente). Moreover, this conception of power through hegemony
implies necessarily that the equilibrium maintaining a certain power relation has to be
worked at constantly and is constantly renegotiated between the leading class and the
subaltern groups.
This emphasis of Gramsci in the ideological and moral components of the
functioning of power by a dominant group towards maintaining a particular relationship
between leaders and led predates the more sophisticated though different analyses of
similar types of power of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. In his essay Ideology
and the Ideological Apparatuses of the State, Althusser (1986: 97-141) proposes to
expand upon the Marxist theory of the state by elaborating on what he calls the
ideological apparatuses of the state. According to Althusser, these ideological
apparatuses are key in supplementing the state -understood in its politico-juridical and
repressive instance- by helping in the general reproduction of the conditions of
production. Among those ideological apparatuses he includes those within the realms of
religion, schooling, culture, public opinion, political parties, information, and others. He
places most of these ideological apparatuses in the private realm while the state lies in the
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public realm. Although at first it seems that Althusser’s argument does not go farther
than Gramsci’s it is important to note that Althusser understood ideology in its negative
sense, as false consciousness.
Foucault, for his part, developed the notion of governmentality. By
governmentality he understood the government of “things”;
I think this is not a matter of opposing things to men but, rather, of showing that
what government has to do with is not territory but, rather, a sort of complex
composed of men and things. The things, in this sense, with which government is
to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their
imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the
territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in
their relation to those other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and
thinking, and so on; and finally men in their relation to those still other things that
might be accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, and so on
(2000: 208-209).
Government, thus understood, is a “general form of management” (2000: 209). Although
the treatment Foucault gives to the notion of governmentality is possibly more extensive
than Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, what interests us is underlining the attempt made by
the former in constructing a notion of power that goes beyond pure repressive and
coercive power:
“he must have patience rather than wrath, and it is not the right to kill, to employ
force, that forms the essence of the figure of the governor. And what positive
content accompanies this absence of sting? Wisdom and diligence. Wisdom,
understood no longer in the traditional sense as knowledge of divine and human
laws, of justice and equality, but, rather, as the knowledge of things, of the
objectives that can and should be attained, and the disposition of things required
to reach them: it is this knowledge that is to constitute the wisdom of the
sovereign (2000: 212).
It is not only the extensiveness of Foucault’s notion that differentiates it from
Gramsci’s notes on hegemony. The more important differences are of substance. For
Foucault, among the specificities of the type of power under the form of governmentality
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lies the development of not only a whole array of new government apparatuses but also
of “a whole complex of knowledges [savoirs]" (2000: 220). More importantly, in
Foucault’s (2000: 213) conception, the state has a rationality of its own, “rational
principles that are intrinsic to it”. Most important in his conception is the analysis of the
positive exercise of government as a technology of power. Being a Marxist, in Gramsci’s
conception the functioning of power in any modality, through force or through consent, is
always intrinsically linked to the upholding and management of a particular set of class
interests over those of other classes.
The differences among them aside, this brief mention of parts of Althusser’s and
Foucault’s contributions to the understanding of power is meant to show how later lines
of thought have tried to grapple with similar problems pertaining to a form of power that
is exercised not necessarily in a nakedly repressive way. Althusser’s ideological
apparatuses of the state and Foucault’s governmentality are different theoretical
incursions into understanding how power functions in modern societies outside of the
public realm associated to what is commonly understood as the state.
In a hegemonic relationship between leaders and led, consent -active or passive in
nature- is many times obtained through the “prestige”^^ of the dominant class (Gramsci
1975: 1519). There are many cultural and ideological elements that help constitute and
reconstitute this prestige. Together with this extension of the notion of state through the
exercise of power through consent and ideological and moral leadership obtained mainly
through what is commonly associated to the private realm, Gramsci equally expands the
As we shall see in the fifth chapter when dealing with Gramsci’s notes on language, the
notion of prestige is not accidental in Gramsci’s vocabulary but is instead central to the
influence in his thinking of his studies in linguistics and philology as a university student
under the direction of Italian linguist Matteo Bartoli.
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notion of intellectuals. He focuses on intellectuals since they will play a key role,
according to Gramsci in the constant organization of the hegemony, of the prestige, of a
class.
There are two main concerns directing Gramsci’ s inquiry on intellectuals. The
first is expressed in the question that opens notebook 12, which is dedicated specifically
to the matter of the intellectuals: “Are the intellectuals an autonomous and independent
social group, or does each social group have its own proper specialized category of
intellectuals?” (1975: 1513). The second, expressed shortly after in the same notebook,
establishes Gramsci’s methodological approach or perspective on the subject of
characterizing the diverse activities pertaining to the category of intellectuals:
The methodic error most common seems to me to be that of having looked for this
criterion for distinction intrinsically in the intellectual activities and not instead in
the ensemble of the system of relations in which those (and so of the groups who
personify them) come to find themselves in the general complex of social
relations” (1975: 1516).
Gramsci himself will answer the first concern posed in the question quoted, as we shall
see in a moment. The second concern, not unrelated to the first, repeats his perspective
of understanding the role of intellectuals not in an isolated fashion but in a particular
ensemble of social relations which are in his perspective undermined through and through
with power relations between classes. This perspective holds continuity with the one
presented in the letter of March 19, 1927 to Tatiana, which we quoted from and
commented on in the first chapter.
For Gramsci there are two main types of intellectuals, traditional intellectuals and
organic intellectuals. Before going into the characteristics ot these two types, let us state
that underlying both types is Gramsci’s broadened notion ol what is an intellectual. II lor
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the reigning common sense an intellectual is a specialist well educated in matters
typically associated to what is usually understood as high culture, Gramsci’s conception
goes in the opposite direction. As is seen in the quotation above, for him what defines an
intellectual is not to be searched for “intrinsically to the intellectual activities”, but on the
role played within “the ensemble of the system of relations” in which they find
themselves (Showstack 1987: 136). This system of relations is not neutral since, as
Gramsci (1975: 1752) remarks explicitly, every society until now has as the very basic
element a particular relationship between leaders and led, between governing and
governed. This emphasis of the role or function of the intellectual rather than on the
being itself of an intellectual is what makes Gramsci state: “All men are intellectuals
[...); but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (1975: 1516). This is
also tied to Gramsci’s conception that even the most physical of labors -and especially
with the new technologies and strategies under a capitalist mode of production- contains
at least a minimum of “creative intellectual activity” (Gramsci 1975: 1516; Showstack
1987: 136-137; Pihon 1989: 268; Crehan 2002: 132). Gramsci goes on to say:
When one distinguishes between intellectual and non-intellectual in reality one
refers only to the immediate social function of the professional category of
intellectuals, that is, one takes into account the direction in which afflicts the
higher weight of the specific professional activity, if in the intellectual elaboration
or in the muscular-nervous effort. That means that if one can speak of
intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do
not exist (1975: 1550).
With reason, Anne Showstack Sassoon (1987: 134-135) argues that in Gramsci’s
understanding, intellectuals in a broad organizational sense play a role in all spheres of
society. We agree with her assessment in seeing the Gramscian intellectuals as the
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connecting fibers within and between areas of social reality”, especially providing the
unity of what is commonly understood by base and superstructure.
Gramsci divides the category of intellectuals into two different sub-categories,
that of organic and traditional. Organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals are
categories dialectically and intimately related in the real social process of a concrete
social formation or historic bloc. A precise analysis of the types and role of intellectuals
requires a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. Gramsci is explicit about this and,
after some general thoughts on the notion of intellectuals in notebook 12, he outlines a
specific analysis of the roles of different types of intellectuals in the Italy of his time.
Let us first go into Gramsci’ s notion of organic intellectuals. Contrary to popular
opinion animated in part by the conscious projection of some intellectuals themselves,
according to Gramsci intellectuals are not an autonomous group, especially what he calls
organic intellectuals. We quote extensively from notebook 12;
Every social, being born on the originating terrain of an essential function
in the world of economic production, creates with itself, organically, one or more
strata of intellectuals that give it homogeneity and consciousness of its own
function not only in the economic camp, hut also in the social and political one:
the capitalist entrepreneur creates with himself the industrial technician, the
scientist of political economy, the organizer of a new culture, of a new right, etc.,
etc.
[...] If not the entrepreneurs, at least an elite of them should have a
capacity as an organizer of society in general, in all the complex organism of
services, up to the state organism, due to the necessity of creating the conditions
most favorable to the expansion of its own class', or should possess at least the
capacity of selecting the “assistants” [commessi] (specialized employees) to
which entrust this organizational activity of the general relations external to the
business. It can be observed that the “organic” intellectuals that every new class
creates with itselfand elaborates in its progressive development, are mostly
“specializations” of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type
that the new class has brought forth (1975: 1513-1514; our italics).
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Let us try to disentangle what is a complex bunch of statements in the preceding
quotation. The first thing to note is that organic intellectuals are ‘organic’ in the sense
that they are tied to, they are a spawn of, an emerging “fundamental” social class. It is a
group or groups of agents, commessij^ with the task of providing coherence,
“homogeneity and consciousness”, to a new fundamental class. With this the reader
might think of Marx’s analysis in Capital and the distinction between capital in general
and the individual capitalists. At least in one level of analysis one could say that organic
intellectuals help in cementing the collective subject of capital beyond the particular
interests of individual capitalists. They provide the stability of the arrangement at the
different spheres of social reality and all throughout the social relations. We say the
different sphere of social reality because it is to be noted that, although it is unmistakable
that Gramsci’s accent at least in terms of the outline of analysis of organic intellectuals
within capitalism is on their role pertaining to political and civil society, his notion of
organic intellectual in its broadest sense as organizers (Gramsci 1997a: 97), as connecting
elements, also occupies a role within the workplace (Simon 1988: 94). Technicians,
engineers, managers, supervisors, are all at some point considered by Gramsci as organic
intellectuals of the capitalist entrepreneur. The emphasis, even at the level of the
economic sphere, is that of connecting leaders and led, in this specific case connecting or
cementing the entrepreneur and the work force.
As Roger Simon (1988: 96-97) points out, Grasmci uses commessi from Sorel’s use of
the French commis. Sorel used that neutral word due to his anti-intellectualism and his
rejection of political parties as cliques looking for their own privileged interests.
Although somewhat influenced by Sorel in terms ot the vocabulary used as also in the
case of the use of ‘bloc’, Gramsci does not share Sorel’s anti-intellectualism or trade
unionism.
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Despite what has just been stated, Gramsci’s emphasis is on the role played by
organic intellectuals in the spheres of the political, the social, and the cultural. In this
case, for Gramsci, most organic intellectuals operate in political and civil society, and
thus their lelationship with “the world of production is not immediate, but “mediated”, in
different degrees, by all the social fabric, by the ensemble of the superstructures, of which
precisely intellectuals are the functionaries"' (1975: 1518; our emphasis). In that same
fragment Gramsci goes on to distinguish
-in a text we quoted earlier in this same chapter-
the “two big superstructural planes”, political society or the State in the limited sense of
government and civil society as the “ensemble of organisms vulgarly called private”.
According to Gramsci, these two superstructural planes correspond to two forms of
exercising power and maintaining the cohesion of the dominance of a social class.
Political society is characterized by the exercise of “direct dominance”, through
government and all its instances. Civil society is characterized by the exercise of
“hegemony”, the leadership with which a dominant class obtains the active or passive
consent of the subaltern groups. Organic intellectuals are the ones in charge of
cementing a particular ensemble of social relations, and thus of maintaining the stability
of a power relation, and they especially act in the realms of political and civil society.
Gramsci states:
The intellectuals are the “assistants” of the dominant group for the exercise of the
subaltern functions of social hegemony and of political government, that is: 1 ) of
the “spontaneous” consent given by the large masses of the population to the
direction impressed to social life by the dominant fundamental group, consent that
is born “historically” of the prestige (and thus of the trust) derived by the
dominant group from its position and by its function in the world of production;
2) of the apparatus of state coercion that assures “legally” the discipline of those
groups that do not “consent” actively nor passively, but is constituted through all
of society in expectation of the moments of crisis in the command and in the
direction in which the spontaneous consent is less (1975: 1519).
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Examples, then, of organic intellectuals are government administrators, civil
servants, army or police officers, judges, etc., in the realm of political society, and in the
realm of civil society potential organic intellectuals are newspaper editors, prominent
intellectuals in the usual sense, school teachers, heads of churches, labor union
administrators, party officials, etc. We clearly have, as Gramsci (1975: 1519) notes, “a
very large extension of the concept of intellectual, but only like this is it possible to reach
a concrete approximation of reality”. The key defining aspect of the role of an organic
intellectual is its connecting, cementing, function of social classes into a stable ensemble
of social relations or a historic bloc. This role, Gramsci (1975: 1519) acknowledges, is
qualitatively gradated, but the importance lies in its organizational aspect.
Traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, are for Gramsci a category that is
dialectically and historically related to that of organic intellectuals and not in any way
unrelated. Traditional intellectuals were, according to Gramsci, the organic intellectuals
of the dominant classes in previous modes of productions that the organic intellectuals of
a new social class in ascendancy find already established in the social spectrum. He
states:
But every “essential” social group emerging into history from the preceding
economic structure and as expression of its development (of this structure), has
found, at least in the history developed until now, pre-existent social categories
and that even appeared as representatives of a historical continuity uninterrupted
even by the most complicated and radical changes of the social and political
forms. The most typical of these intellectual categories is that of the ecclesiastics,
monopolists for a long time (for an entire historical phase that in addition is in
part characterized by this monopoly) of some important services: the religious
ideology, that is, the philosophy and science of the epoch, with the school,
instruction, morality. Justice, beneficence, assistance, etc. The category of the
ecclesiastics can he considered to he the intellectual category organically tied to
the land aristocracy ( 1975: 1514; our emphasis).
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This insight is important in that it confirms, first, what we advanced to the effect that the
tiaditional intellectuals ot the present were the organic intellectuals of the past. Second,
this same reasoning explains that the typical conception of intellectuals as an
autonomous, neutral, group is just an appearance based on the fact that their social
tunction has changed or at least has moved back to make space for the new type of
organic intellectuals, making them somewhat more autonomous ( 1975: 1515). Third,
something extremely important, is that even the traditional intellectuals can -and for
Gramsci this is a necessity for an ascendant social class- and often do play an ‘organic’,
though subordinate role, with regards to the new dominant class.
As we already said, the relationship between the traditional and organic
intellectuals is both dialectical and historical. It is dialectical in that it implies a
confrontation between the two types, and usually ends up with the new type overcoming
-though incorporating- the older type. It is historical in that the balance between the two
types can only be precised according to the concrete historical and social struggle
between two social classes. For example, Gramsci expresses this dialectical and
historical approach to the problem in what follows:
One of the most relevant characteristics of every group that develops towards
dominance is its struggle for the assimilation and the “ideological” conquest of
the traditional intellectuals, assimilation and conquest that is quicker and more
effective the more the given group elaborates simultaneously its own organic
intellectuals ( 1975: 1517).
In terms of an alternative, revolutionary, movement the task in terms of the
function and role of the intellectuals is similar. A radical movement needs a combination
of both creating its own organic intellectuals based on the realm of the essential social
relations of production -and this brings Gramsci to propose a possible new type of
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intellectual- while maintaining a relatively autonomous space that provides an ideological
and political coherence prior to and throughout the stmggle. The political party fills the
relatively autonomous space in Gramsci’s conception. Though variedly gradated, for
Gramsci (1975: 1523) the importance of the political party is its directive, organizational,
and educative function. Moreover, for both the dominant group and the dominated group
the political party supplies the organism that gives cohesion and stability to the relation
between the organic intellectuals and the traditional intellectuals (Gramsci 1975; 1522).
Now, as we mentioned, Gramsci saw the need of a new type of intellectual given
the new conditions provided by the capitalist social relations of production, especially
with the rapid development of new productive technologies and strategies. He states:
The problem of the creation of a new intellectual strata consists then in
elaborating critically the intellectual activity that exists in everyone to a certain
degree of development, modifying its relation with the muscular-nervous effort
towards a new equilibrium and obtaining that the muscular-nervous effort itself,
as element of a general practical activity, that perpetually innovates the physical
and social world becomes the base of a new and integral conception of the world.
The traditional and vulgarized type of the intellectual is given by the literary
figure, the philosopher, the artist. [...] In the modern world the technical
education, strictly tied to the industrial labor, even the most primitive and
unqualified, should form the base of the new type of intellectual. On this base the
weekly '"Online Nuovo" has worked to develop certain forms of new
intellectualism and to determine the new concepts, and this has not been one of
the minor reasons of its success, because such work coiTesponded to the latent
aspirations and conformed to the development of the real forms of life. The mode
of being of the new intellectual cannot consist any longer in eloquence, exterior
and momentary motor of the affects and of the passions, but on the mixing
actively with practical life, as constructor, organizer, “permanent persuader”
because no longer pure orator - and also superior to the abstract mathematical
spirit; from the labor-technique gets to the science-technique and to the humanist
historical conception, without which one remains “specialist” and does not
become “leader” [dirigente] (specialist -i- politician) (1975: 1551).
For Gramsci, the new type of intellectual should be closer to the productive and practical
life of the majority. It needs to be closer, attuned, ‘mixed’, with the practical life ol the
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people. The new intellectual is an echo of what in the third notebook Gramsci called the
“grand politician”:
Because of that the giand politician cannot but be coltissimo [‘very cultured’],
that IS, should “know” the maximum of elements of the actual life; know them not
in a “bookish” way [“lihrescamente"], as “erudition” but in a “lively” way
[“vive?ite”], as concrete substance of political “intuition” (still in order that in him
become lively substance of “intuition” it also needs to be learned “bookishlv”
(1975:311).
In addition, in this sense the self-reference made by Gramsci in regards to the experience
ol L’Online Nhovo^^ is enlightening because it can help us better clarify some possible
misinterpretations. The main political line ot the L’Online Nuovo during the peak of the
worker movement which it helped to actively organize and support was that of promoting
worker control ol the factories through the transformation of the already existing
organizations (the internal commissions) into effective bodies of decision-making and
coordination on the part of the workers. This would have ultimately constituted one of
the basic cells of a socialist state. The self-reference also dispels any possible accusation
of anti-intellectualism since L’Online Nuovo was not only a political journal but also a
general cultural review that touched upon different intellectual matters and themes. What
Gramsci wants to completely dispel is the false pretension of neutrality and the false
autonomy of intellectuals as a group. Moreover the self-reference brings light to the
effect that it does not imply a struggle limited only to the factory floor, as it where, and
constituting a pure movement of ‘workerism’ close to that professed by anarcho-
syndicalists, but instead concerns a complex struggle that should be addressed on every
front, while emphasizing the productive, practical, element of society. This is so if we
On Gramsci’s participation on the worker struggles in the automobile industries ol the
north of Italy during 1919-1920 especially around the journal L’Online Nuovo, see the
first part of the first chapter.
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remember that L’Ordine Nuovo was ascribed to the Italian Socialist Party, and never
minimized the importance of the Party and of the struggle for leadership within labor
unions. It is to Gramsci’s strategy for political struggle under the concrete historical
conditions when he wrote the Quaderni to what we now turn.
=1= * * * :|: * :{: *
As we have seen, Gramsci’s emphasis in his analysis of the state is in its capacity
to co-opt antagonistic social forces, in its activity of transforming the dominated into led,
in overcoming naked coercion and obtaining the active or passive consent of the majority
of the subordinated groups. This hegemonic activity which defines for Gramsci the
essence of the modern liberal state is achieved both through material economic means as
well as through ideological inlluence; as such, many institutions and instances of what is
usually understood as civil society complete the ‘integral state’ in the Gramscian sense of
‘political society
-i- civil society’. Ultimately, even the material economic means get
transformed or translated into certain additional production of social prestige. In his
conception of the contemporary state and society, given the importance of the element of
hegemony in maintaining stable the relationship between leaders and led, intellectuals -
especially organic intellectuals, understood in the particular Gramscian sense that we saw
above- play a most important role. Intellectuals, as a varied type of social organizers of a
particular social class, work on the cementing of the relation between leaders and led.
This labor of providing stability takes place throughout the whole of the social terrain,
though especially for Gramsci in those places pertaining to what is usually known as the
private realm of civil society. In a sense, for Gramsci the modernity of a society is
measured in terms of the extent to which power is exercised ‘softly’, through hegemony.
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which inherently means to the extent that a society has its realm of civil society
developed.
For Gramsci, the way that power is exercised determines the strategy of action to
follow for a radical movement. As Walter L. Adamson ( 1980: 222) argues, Gramsci’s
strategic conception is based on a number of coupled notions such as state and civil
society, coercion and consent. East and West, and others. The distinction between how
power is exercised, if mostly through coercion or mostly through hegemony, also defines
in great measure what Gramsci means by East and West. So, in the end, the richness or
misery of civil society in a society determines East or West, determines how power is
exercised, and determines the political strategy to follow. On how the political
composition defines East and West, in notebook 7 Gramsci states:
In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous;
in the West between State and civil society there was a just relation and in the
trembling of the State one immediately notices a robust structure of civil society.
The State was only an advanced trench, behind which was a robust chain of forts
and of casements (1975: 866).
The strategic theorizing in the Quaderni in the part of Gramsci is intimately
related not only to his conception of power, the enlarged notion of the state, and
hegemony, but also simultaneously with the debates within Russian communism,
especially with Trotsky’s argument for ‘permanent revolution’, and Lenin’s politics of
the united fronts. Gramsci probably takes up the importance of the dichotomy of
EastAVest from Trotsky’s (1962) analysis of both the politics of permanent revolution
and of socialism in one country. Gramsci’s reference to Trotsky is explicit and as early
as in notebook 6, in an important fragment, he states:
Past and present. Passage from the war ofmaneuver (and of the frontal attaek) to
the war ofposition even in the political camp. This seems to be the most
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important question of political theory, put after the postwar period and the most
difficult to be resolved fairly. It is tied to the questions raised by Bronstein^^, who
in one form or another, can be said to be the political theorist of the frontal attack
in a period in which it is only a cause of defeat. (1975; 801-802).
Thus, Gramsci identifies Trotsky’s call to permanent revolution with what he calls a
frontal war or a war of maneuver in opposition to a war of position. A war of maneuver.
a frontal attack striving for a full and quick takeover of the state through open and armed
revolution, through general strikes, takeovers, etc., is identified with the formula of
permanent revolution and was considered by Gramsci to be out of synch with the
concrete international situation. As he expresses in notebook 13,
The political concept of the so-called “permanent revolution” sprung before 1848,
as an expression scientifically elaborated from the Jacobin experiences from 1789
to the Thermidor. The formula is proper to a historical period in which the large
mass political parties and the large mass economic labor unions did not yet exist
and society was still, in a manner of speaking, in a fluid state on many aspects:
more backwardness of the country and an almost complete monopoly of the
politico-state efficiency in a few cities or downright in only one (Paris for
France), state apparatus relatively little developed and more autonomy of civil
society from state activity, a determined system of the military forces of the
national armament, more autonomy of the national economies from the economic
relations of the world market, etc. (1975: 1566).
In other words, for Gramsci the formula of permanent revolution or that of war of
movement/maneuver was created in and for a period when modern capitalism was only
beginning to see the light of day. As an inherent correlate, it was created for a period in
which the people and what existed of a civil society were not fully integrated into the life
of the state. The modern capitalist states were just being born.
The situation changed drastically in late in the 19'*’ Century. As Gramsci
continues:
15
Trotsky.
In the period alter 1870, with the European colonial expansion, all of these
elements change, the international organizational relations of the State become
more complex and massive and the formula quanmtottesca [of 18481 of
permanent revolution” is elaborated and overcome in political science in the
formula “civil hegemony”. In political art happens as in military art: the war of
movement becomes always more a war of position and it can be said that a State
wins a war in so far as it prepares minutely and technically in the time of peace.
The massive stmcture of the modern democracies, be it as state organizations that
as an ensemble of associations in civil life constitute for the political art the
“trenches” and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position” it
renders as only “partial” the element that was previously “all” the war, etc.
The question puts itself for the modern States, not for the backward
countries and the colonies, where the forms that elsewhere are still valid are
overcome and become anachronistic (1975: 1566-1567).
The coming into being of modern liberal-democratic systems with their different forms of
direct or indirect participation, with the emerging of a number of institutions pertaining to
civil society, etc., creates a different situation in which the war of movement is no longer
pertinent. In a period as the one described by Gramsci in which the political scene is
relatively stable, in which there exists real concessions to the subaltern groups combined
with an ideological and moral persuasion (“civil hegemony”) making possible a real
alliance maintaining a specific power relation, the pertinent political strategy is the war of
position. A comprehensively radical movement needs to address power now primarily
through the ‘trenches’ of civil society. Since power is now maintain mainly through
hegemony, the main task is to build a counter-hegemony.
It has been said that Gramsci ’s political theory is based on the reflection of
political and historical defeat (Williams 1974: 1 1). We fully agree in the sense that
Gramsci realized that the left at the moment was on the defensive. This is why in prison
he rejected the line of social fascism imposed after the VI Congress of the Communist
International and adopted by the Italian party for being unrealistic. This political strategy
(as already discussed in the second chapter) rejected any alliances with sectors such as
the Social Democrats denouncing Social Democracy to be an ally of fascism. Gramsci,
being in this a good Leninist, could see the infantile and extremist leftist position and
upheld for the concrete Italian situation of a prevailing Fascist regime the strategy of the
constituent assembly. We know because of his friend and messenger to the Party while
imprisoned, the economist Piero Sraffa, that for Gramsci the constituent assembly was
the concrete Italian translation of the Leninist tactic of the popular fronts (Natoli 1997:
Iv). And the war of position, as was already also noted by Perry Anderson (1977) among
others, is in a sense an elaboration situated within and very much in tune with the tactic
of the popular fiont. Gramsci is explicit in situating himself within the Leninist tradition.
In a fragment from notebook 7, after criticizing Trotsky’s position, Gramsci states:
I think that Ilici^^ comprehended that a change occurred from the war of
maneuver, applied victoriously in the Orient in ’ 17, to the war of position that was
the only possible one in the West, where as Krasnov observes, in a brief space the
armies could accumulate immense quantities of ammunition, where the social
spheres where by themselves capable of becoming very minute trenches. This I
think means the formula of the “united front” [...]. Only that Hid did not have
the time to elaborate his formula, recognizing however that he could elaborate it
further only theoretically, while the fundamental task was national, that is, asked
for a recognition of the terrain and fixation on the trench and fort elements
represented by the elements of civil society, etc. (1975: 866).
For Gramsci, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was to be the last successful attempt of a
social revolution through a war of movement/maneuver. In his interpretation, Lenin
realized this and thus proposed in the early twenties with the defeat of the revolutionary
movements in Europe the politics of the united popular fronts that asked for the
communist parties to form alliances with other groups against the most conservative
elements in society. Although we do not reduce Gramsci’s contribution ol the notion ol
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Lenin.
war ot position and hegemony to the Leninist conception/^ as others do (Gruppi 198L
Anderson 1977), we think it is unquestionable that his theorizing situates itself within the
communist debates of the epoch.
In a war of position, the working class needed to win over the other subaltern
groups, in Italy this meant mainly the various types of agricultural workers of the south.
This was already advanced in Gramsci’s writing of 1926 on the Southern question. The
working class needed to form and cement an alliance with other groups, constitute a
counter-hegemony before gaining state power. For this, the radical movement has to
move and win over social elements in the ‘trenches’ of civil society, gaining their respect,
their consent.- For this, a full fledged ideological and educational activity had to be
undertaken. This meant winning them over through cultural and moral leadership.
According to Gramsci (1975: 802), “in politics the “war of position”, once won, is
definitively decisive”. It is decisive because it only pretends to take over government
once it is already leading, hegemonic. That is, in modern societies, where power is
The reductively Leninist interpretation of Antonio Gramsci was advanced by no less
than probably the second best known communist figure in Italian political history,
Palmiro Togliatti. Togliatti provided this inteipretation not only explicitly through
numerous essays, but also through his work on the first editions of Gramsci’s posthumous
work. See Palmiro Togliatti (2001; 213-262). For a recent critique of Togliatti’s
editorial work on Gramsci, see Aldo Natoli (1997; vii-xviii). For a rigorous and detailed
survey of Gramsci’s many inteipretations and editorial luck, see Guido Liguori (1996), as
well as Flobsbawm, et al (1995). The importance of the critical edition of the Quaderni
del carcere edited by Gerratana and published originally in 1975 is that it provides
readers with a first hand look at a much richer body of work than the first thematic
edition. This happens as well with the original edition of his letters (Natoli, 1997).
This is in part the reason why Gramsci uses the notion of subaltern groups to describe
the diverse popular element. It has been said that Gramsci was using the notion of
subaltern groups as a way to refer to the working class without being noticed by the
prison censors. We do not think so, since the real demographic composition ol and the
social and economic disparity between regions in Italy at the time point to the tact that
Gramsci was fully acknowledging the fact that the industrial working class was but one,
and not the most numerous, of the subordinated groups in the system.
according to Gramsci based on the constant organization of consent throughout the
terrain of civil society, the hardest part in politics is to win ascendancy, to win the
allegiance of the majority. Once you have that stable base, the overtaking of the
government apparatus is seen as almost secondary, since presumably the consent given
by the majority of the subaltern classes will have shifted away from the dominant group,
provoking what Gramsci calls an organic crisis, a rupture between leaders and led. Even
the totalitarian regime of Mussolini worked strongly in the constant incorporation of the
popular element through numerous leisure and cultural spaces, in addition to the
settlements with the Catholic Church.
In the process of being hegemonic in civil society towards becoming fully
dominant and acquiring the government apparatus there has to be a transformation from
the multiplicity of particularly interested elements into a body that represents the general
interests. In this complex process of constructing a counter-hegemony the galvanizing
element within civil society is the political party. For Gramsci, in terms of politics, the
most important organization of civil society is the political party. The ‘modern Prince’,
he called the political party (1975: 1558), making a parallel with the figure of the prince
in Machiavelli’s short treaty. It is the political party in which the particular interests of
the diverse groups allied are subsumed under a general perspective (1975: 1523). This is
what Gramsci refers to as the shift from the economic-corporative moment to the
hegemonic moment (Gerratana 1997: 125).
For a full account on Gramsci’s interpretation and engagement with Machiavelli, see
Benedetto Fontana ( 1993).
Now, Gramsci has no problem in stating that the political party, especially for the
working class, is the way for it to develop or have its own category of organic
intellectuals:
for some social groups the political party is none other than their own way of
elaborating their own category of organic intellectuals, that are thus formed and
cannot but be formed, given the general characteristics and conditions of
formation, of life and development of the given social group, directly in the
political and philosophical camp and not yet in the camp of the productive
technique (in the camp of the productive technique are formed those strata that
can be said to correspond to the “troop ranks” in the army, that is the qualified
and specialized workers in the city and in a more complex form the metayers and
tenants in the country) (1975: 1522).
This might sound somewhat disturbing to some in that it may echo the notion of the party
as external possessor of class consciousness. This echo comes from the notion
paradigmatically contained in the much abused notion of the party as vanguard of the
working class as elaborated by Lenin ( 1974a) in What is to be done?. In his classic
pamphlet, Lenin stated the need for the construction of a political party constituted by
“professional revolutionaries”. These full-time party organizers and revolutionaries had
the task of developing the class-consciousness of the working class, imparting it from an
external position. We should at least mention in terms of Lenin’s proposition that at the
moment in which he made it, political parties were illegal and what actually existed of
urban working class elements was minimum and disorganized because of the
illegalization of labor unions and political parties by the czarist regimen in Russia at the
time.
In any case, Gramsci ’s notion of the party, contrary to what might seem at first
glance in the quote above, is not the notion of the vanguard party as an external and
superimposed organization. In his conception, the political party has as the fundamental
task to enable the working class to develop organic intellectuals out of their own cadre:
its lundamental function which is that of elaborating its own components,
elements of a social group born and developed as “economic”, towards making
them become qualified political intellectuals, leaders, organizers of all the
activities and functions inherent to the organic development of an integral society,
civil and political (1975: 1522).
In tact, in a sense, as Gramsci (1975: 1523) continues, every member of a political party
can be considered an intellectual, although with the acknowledgement that there is
always going to be a necessary “distinction of gradations”. Even the political party is
organized around the same dynamic as society in terms of the relationship between
leaders and led. In a very general sense, he describes the three basic components of the
political party as follows, and we quote extensively due to the importance of the text:
1 ) A diftused element, of common, medium, men, whose participation is offered
by the discipline and by faith, not by the creative and highly organizational.
Without them, it is true, the party would not exist, but it is also true that party
would neither exist “only” with them. They are a force in so far as there is
someone who centralizes, organizes, disciplines them, but in absence of this
cohesive lorce they would disperse and cancel themselves in an impotent dust.
VTe do not deny that each one of these elements can become a cohesive force, but
we speak of them precisely at the moment that they are not and are not in the
conditions to be, or if they are, they are only in a restricted circle, politically
inefficient and without consequence. 2) The principal cohesive element, that
centralizes in the national camp, that makes efficient and potent an ensemble of
forces that left to themselves would count as zero or much else, this element has a
highly cohesive, centralizing, and disciplining force [...]: it is also tme that of
only this element the party would be formed, though they would form it more
than the first element considered. One speaks of captains without armies, but in
reality it is easier to form an army to form captains. This is so true that an army
[already existing] is destroyed if it lacks captains, while the existence of a group
of captains, harmonized, in agreement among themselves, with common goals,
does not delay in forming an army even where it does not exist. 3) A middle
element, that articulates the first with the third element, that puts them in contact,
not only “physical” but also moral and intellectual (1975: 1733-1734; our
emphasis).
There are three basic components, the leaders, the led, and a middle sector that cements
the whole of the political party. It is, in abstract terms, the same composition that holds a
specific society together for Gramsci. It is a realist conception in that he acknowledges
the necessary distinction of elements, including the fact that in the effective conditions of
the capitalist mode of production the working class is realistically not in the best possible
position to provide for the leadership, for the “cohesive force”. On the other hand, it is
not a vanguard-type conception of the political party in that he acknowledges the fact that
the lower element can become part of the upper level. Moreover, if we refer ourselves to
Gramsci’s expansion of the notion of the intellectual and especially his notes on the new
types of intellectuals needed which we commented on earlier, we see that in the process
towards a new society the working class not only can provide out of its own elements for
the leadership role but should and must. The new intellectual, as we saw earlier, needed
to be closer to the word of the ‘productive technique’. This political party, when acting
in coherent unison, where every member is an intellectual in their own capacity and in
their own way, is what Gramsci (1975: 1430) refers to as the “collective man”, so distant
from the party as a club of professional revolutionaries.
Thus we see that the dynamic between leaders and led and the ways it is
maintained lies at the core of Gramsci’s political thinking. If on the one hand Marx
emphasized that a concrete social formation is fundamentally defined by the ensemble of
the productive forces (labor power and raw materials) and a specific set of social relations
of production (relations of ownership, division of labor, juridical and ideological
apparatuses), Gramsci emphasized more the political aspect at least in terms of the
vocabulary used by stressing the relationship between leaders and led and how it is
configured and reconfigured. For Gramsci, the hegemony exercised by a dominant class
uses the same dynamic as the one that is needed to follow by an alternative movement or
project in order to construct a counter hegemony. It is explicit in the Qiuiderni that for
Gramsci (1975: 1752) the first and fundamental principle for political science and
political art is the existence of “governed and governing, leaders and led”; it is a
primordial, irreducible, fact . As we shall see in the next two chapters, this basic
principle also lies underneath his main preoccupations contained in his notes on
philosophy, literary criticism, and language.
CHAPTER V
PHILOSOPHY AND MARXISM IN THE QUADERNl
Gramsci views Marxism
-or the philosophy of praxis, in his favorite coinage- as a
comprehensive, total, and autonomous conception of the world (Salamini 1981: 27). As
such, it addresses all the fields of the social terrain. This includes, and in a very
important respect, the camp of philosophy. In this respect, there are two main
interlocutors present in the reflection contained in the Quadenii: Bukharin and his
positivist and vulgar materialism, and Croce and his idealist historicism (Capucci 1978:
117).
Many of the most important notes concerning his critique of Bukharin are
reworked and reorganized within his notes on philosophy in general in notebook 1 1 (one
ot the special notebooks), though they are advanced in previous notebooks. Most of the
notes containing Gramsci’s engagement with Croce’s work are contained in notebook 10.
In our treatment of this subject, though going back and forth through the various
notebooks as we did in the previous chapter, we will focus on these two notebooks.
Gramsci’s critique of Bukharin and Croce is a twofold battle towards a radical
“reformulation of Marxism” (Jardon Arango 1995: 204). While by different means and
with opposed intentions, both Bukharin and Croce reduce Marxism to a stick figure easy
to dispatch. Gramsci’s engagement with both is ultimately intended towards a re-
appropriation and reevaluation of Marxism as a philosophical and political project.
Eor Eabio Frosini (2003), notebook 10, and the theme of philosophy in general, is the
central element of Gramsci’s Quadenii.
But, concrete history will not be
encompassed with the simplified and
super schematic formula of
Bukharin.
G. Lukacs, Technology and Social
Relations
In the letter to his sister-in-law Tatiana of March 25, 1929, Gramsci (1996: 248)
asks for the French edition of Bukharin’s Historical Materialism. A System of
Sociology.^^ As Ignacio Jardon Arango (1995: 204) comments, Gramsci had probably
already read this text, in a translation or in the original Russian, in 1923 during his stay in
the Soviet Union. Nicolai Bukharin was an important leader during and after the
Bolshevik revolution that lost influence once the Party was firmly in the hands of Stalin.
He was eventually condemned to death and killed in 1937, based on the charge of being
the head of the “rightwing deviationists”. His thought showed a positivist inspiration,
among other things reducing “the dialectic to purely external necessity” (Capucci 1978:
117).
Gramsci’s (1975: 136) first mention of Bukharin’s manual is present in the first
notebook, although the proper development of his critique of Bukharin takes place in
193 1, in notebooks 4, 7, and 8, and finally in the second part of notebook 1 1. Many of
the notes on Bukharin in the former notebooks are reworked and reorganized in the
second part of the latter notebook. The driving force of Gramsci’s interest lies in the fact
that he thinks that the “popular essay” constitutes a great impoverishment of Marxism
and, as he states early on in notebook 4, in that it is a.
In its original Russian edition, the book was subtitled A Popular Te.xthook of Marxist
Sociology, and Gramsci refers to it as the Saggio popolare, ‘popular essay’ or ‘popular
manual’.
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Wrong interpretation of historical materialism that is dogmatized and whose
research is identified with the search of the final or sole cause, etc. [. .
. ] the
problem of the final causes was precisely nullified by the dialectic. Engels had
put us on guard against this dogmatism in some texts of his last years (1975; 445).
The explicit reference Gramsci makes is to two letters of Engels in which he states that
the economy is only in the last instance the driving force of history, against those critics
who, as Croce himself does later on, reduce historical materialism to a metaphysics
where the economy plays the role of god.
The first problem that Gramsci has with Bukharin’s text is one of methodological
approach. We say of methodological approach but we have to immediately add that it is
as equally a problem of direct political importance. Moreover, it confirms our contention
that Gramsci’s perspective throughout the Qiiaderni is his concern over the relationship
between leaders and led, in that this methodological error has to do with the way
Bukharin approaches the subject while at the same time pretending for the work to be a
popular manual. For Gramsci, the investigation of the type that Bukharin wanted to do,
and especially with the concern to present historical materialism in a popular and
pedagogic form, was flawed from the first element of the approach. In notebook 1 1, in a
reworking of notes already present in notebook 8, he states and we quote extensively;
A work like the Popular Essay, essentially destined to a community ot
readers that are not intellectuals of profession, should have taken as a starting
point the critical analysis of the philosophy of common sense, that is the
philosophy of the non-philosophers, that is, the conception of the world
uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the
moral individuality of the common man is developed. [...] The Popular Essay
errs in beginning (implicitly) from the presupposition that to this elaboration of an
original philosophy of the popular masses are opposed the large systems of the
traditional philosophies and the religion ot the high cleric, that is, the conceptions
of the world of the intellectuals and of high culture. In reality, these systems are
unknown to the multitude and do not have direct efficacy in its mode of thinking
and operating. [...] What has been said above concerning the Popular Essay that
it criticizes the systemic philosophies instead ot parting Irom the critique of
121
common sense, should be understood as a methodological comment (1975: 1396-
1396).
We see here that the first error is as important in terms of methodology as of polities
since it addresses the proper way to promote Marxism to the ‘common man’, to those
who “are not intellectuals of profession”, to those whom the Party needs to convince and
to lead. This first critique, thus, leads to the central problem of the communieation
between leaders and led. For Gramsci, a proper manual of the type intended by Bukharin
needs to begin from the critique of common sense, of the ideological components of the
woildview of the people, not of the grand philosophical systems that do not immediately
intluence the real, everyday, ideological perspective of the people. If it does not begin
with the critique of popular ideologies or beliefs, according to Gramsci, then it will be
difficult to have much influence over the common people.
This critique presupposes Gramsci’s own notions of common sense and its
relation with philosophy, so important to his conception of Marxism. For Gramsci
common sense is:
the “folklore” of philosophy and like folklore it presents itself in numerous forms:
its fundamental and most characteristic trait is that of being a scattered,
incoherent, inconsequent, conception (even in the individual brains) conformed to
the social and cultural position of the multitudes of which it is the philosophy.
[...] The main elements of common sense are provided by the religions and thus
the relationship between common sense and religion is much more intimate than
between common sense and the philosophical systems of the intellectuals (1975:
1396).
Rather than beginning with the critique of the traditional philosophical systems, the
philosophy of praxis (Marxism) needs to introduce itself in the conception of the people
through the debasement of common sense, which is the folklore of philosophy, that
“spontaneously is the philosophy of the multitudes” (1975: 1397-1398).
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It common sense is itself a chaotic, fragmented, and spontaneous philosophy, its
ditference from the grand philosophical systems is one of degrees, not of essence.
According to Gramsci, what distinguishes the traditional grand philosophies are their
high level of abstraction and systematization. And they do not influence
-at least not
directly- the everyday life conception of people. In this sense, since religion influences
common sense more (Gramsci 1975: 1397), a critique of religion is much more
immediately important for the philosophy of praxis. In fact, for Gramsci, the philosophy
of praxis, it it is to really impregnate the consciousness of the subaltern groups, must
itself become a new common sense, not it in its characteristic of fragmentation and
incoherence but in the sense of the firmness, strength, and stability of common sense
beliefs. Referring to a comment made by Marx in the first volume to Capital, Gramsci
states:
In his references is indeed implicit the affirmation of the necessity of new popular
beliefs, that is, of a new common sense and thus of a new culture and of a new
philosophy that roots itself in the popular consciousness with the same firmness
and imperativeness of the traditional beliefs (1975: 1400).
Since a popular dissemination of Marxism should begin by criticizing the
common sense of the people, it can only appear at least initially as critically negative and
polemical. Gramsci states: “A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself initially in a
polemical and critical relation, as an overcoming of the previous mode of thinking and of
the concrete existing thought (or existing cultural world)” (1975: 1383). That initial
critical and polemical stance of the philosophy of praxis, while necessary, is not
sufficient. The point for Gramsci is not that Marxists should conduct a critique from high
above with the pretension to enlighten while leaving intact and fixed the position of the
educators. We had already said in the previous chapter that for Gramsci the relationship
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between leaders and led should not be one of the vanguard type of the first Leninist
conception of the party. Gramsci’s position in terms of the ideological and cultural
struggle is analogous to his conception of the party in that it did not strive to make a
finished and fixed distinction within the hierarchical structure of the party. So, in the
realm of ideological and philosophical battle, he states:
The position of the philosophy of praxis is antithetical to the catholic one: the
philosophy of praxis does not tend to maintain the '^simple” in their primitive
philosophy of common sense, but instead to lead them towards a superior
conception of life. It affirms the requirement of the contact between intellectuals
and the simple is not to limit the scientific activity and to maintain an unity in the
low level of the masses, but precisely to construct an intellectual-moral bloc that
makes politically possible a mass intellectual progress and not only of scarce
intellectual groups (1975: 1384-1385).
This statement, which in this case is made in contradistinction to Catholicism and the
clerical hierarchy, can be made in contrast to any type of political elitism. This is also the
reason why Gramsci constantly refers to Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach which states
that educator needs to be educated.*^ For Gram.sci the different social elements that
compose a grand political movement represent all of them in their specificity a necessary
ingredient, as expressed in one of the last fragments of notebook 11:
Passage from knowing [sapere] to comprehending [compremlere], to
feeling [sentire], and vice versa, from feeling to comprehending, to knowing. The
popular element “feels”, but does not always comprehend or know; the
intellectual element “knows”, but not always comprehend nor especially “feels”.
The two extremes are thus pedantry and philistinism on one side and blind
passion and factionalism on the other. Not that the pedant cannot become
89
The third thesis on Feuerbach read as follows:
“The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing
forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the
educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one ol
which is superior to society.
“The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and ol human activity or sell-
changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary" (Marx
1992d: 422).
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passionate, on the contrary; the passionate pedantry is even more ridiculous and
dangerous than the factionalism and the most uncontrolled demagogy. The error
of the intellectual consists <in believing> that one can know without
comprehending and especially without feeling and being passionate (not only of
knowledge in itself, but also for the object of knowledge), that is, that the
intellectual could be such (and not a pure pedant) if distinct and separated from
the people-nation [popolo-nazione], that is, without feeling the elementary
passions of the people, comprehending them and thus explaining and justifying
them in the determined historical situation, and combining them dialectically with
the laws of history, towards a superior conception of the world, scientifically and
coherently elaborated, “knowledge”; one does not make politics-history without
this passion, that is, without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and
people-nation. In absence of such nexus the relations of the intellectual with the
people-nation are or are reduced to relations of a pure bureaucratic order, formal;
the intellectuals become a caste or a clergy (the so called organic centralism). If
the relation between intellectuals and people-nation, between leaders and led,
between governing and governed, is given by an organic adhesion in which the
sentiment-passion becomes comprehension and thus knowledge (not
mechanically, but in a lively mode [modo vivente], only then is the relation one of
representation, and the exchange of individual elements between governed and
governing, between led and leaders, happens, that is, the life of the collective is
realized which is the only social force, the “historical bloc” is created (1975:
1505-1506).
This important fragment not only criticizes what was beginning to happen in the Soviet
regime (the critical reference to organic centralism) and thus also pertains to the
appropriate conception of the party in his opinion. It also criticizes the attitude that
Gramsci later attribute to many of the important Italian literary figures, ‘ who distanced
themselves from the popular element, and incurring in what he called cosmopolitanism.
In addition, this fragment again demonstrates the importance of the centrality of the
relations between leaders and led in Gramsci ’s work.
All of this emphasis in Gramsci ’s first critique of Bukharin has an underlying
base in Gramsci ’s notion of philosophy and common sense. On the one hand, tor
Gramsci ( 1975: 893-894) every philosophy in the traditional sense is an expression of a
As will be commented on in the next chapter.
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determined social and historical moment. On the other, as we saw above, common sense
is a chaotic, incoherent, and varied collection or aggregate of notions, philosophies,
folklores, and religious elements. Common sense is the ‘spontaneous’ philosophy of the
common man. The key element is that the distinction between one and the other is not of
an essential nature. The distinction is one of training, education, and thus of
systematicity, uniformity, and coherence. Gramsci (1975: 1376) argues that even
traditional philosophies leave their mark in the popular philosophy contained in common
sense.
The situation stated like that, the key cultural and political issue for Gramsci is if
the distinction between intellectuals and people is wished to be maintained intact or if the
philosophy of praxis should promote the closing of the gap. As we saw in the quotation
above, for Gramsci the latter is the proper way to go if we want a real intellectual and
moral reform. To overstress the point, let us quote extensively:
We have to destroy the widespread prejudice that philosophy is something
very difficult due to the fact that it is the intellectual activity pertaining to a
determined category of specialized scientists or of professional and systematic
philosophers. Thus, we have to demonstrate preliminarily that all men are
“philosophers”, defining the limits and the characteristics of this “spontaneous
philosophy”, pertaining to “everybody”, and, that is, of the philosophy that is
contained: 1 ) in language itself, which is an ensemble of notions and concepts
determined and not only of words grammatically empty of content; 2) in common
sense and good sense; 3) in popular religion and also thus in every system of
beliefs, superstitions, opinions, modes of seeing and operating that show in that
which is generally called “folklore” (1975: 1375).
Having stated this premise, he thinks that the people should constitute the “guide of
themselves and not passively and subordinately accept from the outside the imprint to
one’s own personality” (1975: 1376). He goes on to conclude on this matter:
Creating a new culture does not only mean making individually “original”
discoveries, it also means spreading critically the truths already discovered, to
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socialize them in a sense and thus make them the basis of vital actions, an
element of coordination and intellectual and moral order. That a mass of men is
led to think coherently and in an unitary mode the real present is a “philosophical”
fact much more important and “original” than the findings in the part of a
philosophical “genius” of a new truth that remains as patrimony of small
intellectual groups (1975: 1377-1378).
We have then that in his conception of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis, a great
philosophical advance is not an original discovery by a single individual, by a
‘philosophical genius’, but a real and effective collective intellectual progression. This is
the kind of thinking that leads Gramsci to construct the equation:
philosophy=ideology=politics (Jardon 1995: 194). Thus, as early as in notebook 3,
Gramsci stated that Marxism should not be opposed to the “spontaneous” sentiments of
the masses: “To neglect or worse to despise the so called “spontaneous” movements, that
is, to renounce giving them a conscious direction, to elevate them to a superior plane
inserting them in politics, can often have very serious and grave consequences” (1975:
331). It is not difficult to see that what also lies at bottom of Gramsci’ s conception of the
philosophy of praxis is the crucial question of the relationship between theory and praxis.
Now, Gramsci’s critique of Bukharin does not limit itself to this methodological
and political aspect. There are also other criticisms of substance, which continue to help
Gramsci construct his own notion of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis. One of the main
critiques of substance he makes against Bukharin is his reduction of Marxism to a
positivistic sociology. In fact, in his Saggio popolare, Bukharin does reduce the Marxism
to sociology. Bukharin first defines sociology:
Since sociology explains the general laws of human evolution, it serves as a
method for history. [...] Sociology in its turn formulates a definite point ot view,
a means of investigation, or, as we now say, a method for history (1969: 14).
To which he then adds:
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For the theory of historical materialism has a definite place, it is not political
economy, nor is it history; it is the general theory of society and the laws of its
evolution, i.e., sociology {1969: 15; om emphash).
For Gramsci, an immanent historicist as we shall later see in his critique of Croce,
this is unacceptable. Bukharin’s position is that Marxism is an objective method
autonomous of the constant flow of history; it is “a method for history”. Gramsci thinks
that this conception reduces Marxism to a stale, fixed, and dogmatic formula. In
Iragment 25 of notebook 1 1 he states:
Reduction of the philosophy ofpraxis to a sociology. This reduction has
represented the crystallization of the deteriorated tendency already criticized by
Engels (in the letters to two students published in the Sozialistische Akademiker)
and consisting in reducing a conception of the world to a mechanic formulary that
gives the impression of having all of history in the pocket (1975: 1428).
The historicity of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis, for Gramsci, is not that of a
schematic and almost resolved beforehand historical conception, but that of “history itself
in its infinite variety and multiplicity”. In Bukharin’s deterministic view, this history
evolves according to causal laws of the type used in the natural sciences (Bukharin 1969:
29, 31, 33, 44, 46; Salamini 1981: 31-32; Frosini 2003: 106). Moreover, this schematic
conception presupposes the passivity of the people (Gramsci 1975: 1429), since history
can be analyzed, calculated, and predicted with the precision of the natural sciences.
Gramsci is here making a reference to Bukharin’s (1969: 29) identification of the social
sciences with the natural sciences. And he is not exaggerating. Bukharin states:
Everything in nature, therefore, from the movements of planets down to the little
grain or mushroom, is subject to a certain uniformity or, as it is generally put, to a
certain natural lawn
We observe the same condition in social life also, i.e., in the life of human
society. However complicated and varied this society may be, we nevertheless
observe and discover in it a certain natural law (1969: 19).
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And he continues:
Everyone has observed that in nature and society there is a definite regularity, a
fixed natural law.
This causality in nature and society is objective; it exists whether men are
aware ot it or not. The first step of science is to reveal this causality and free it
from the surrounding chaos of phenomena (1969: 20).
The error of employing the procedures of the natural sciences in social and
political analysis —as Bukharin does- can also have harmful effects in political practice.
It is not something that concerns only theoretical inquiry. Thus, Gramsci states:
If in the natural sciences the law [statistical] can only determine mistakes and
enormous errors, that can be easily corrected by new investigations and in any
case puts in ridicule only the individual scientist who has used it, in the science
and the art ol politics it can have as a result real catastrophes, whose “raw”
damage can never be repaired (1975: 1429).
This critique of Bukharin’s mechanic and deterministic conception of Marxism has been
a constant of Gramsci ’s outlook even from his early years as an militant, where he
criticized the determinism of Bernstein, Kautsky, the Second International, and the ultra-
leftist group of the Italian Socialist Party and then of the Communist Party of Italy.^”^
Ultimately, in his early years as a militant as well as in his critique of Bukharin, this
theoretical conception in Gramsci ’s mind provides only for a passive position of the
movement and of the people. ‘
Another error of substance that Gramsci finds in Bukharin’s perspective is that by
reducing Marxism to a positivistic sociology he posits it outside of the realm of
See the second chapter.
Also, as Frosini (2003: 105-108) argues, Gramsci’s critique of Bukharin is also an
attack of the Stalinized communist movement, of which he knew not only in his
conversations with Tatiana and Srafta, but also had the foresight to see coming in the
famous letter to the central committee of the Russian party that we quoted towards the
end of the second chapter.
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philosophy. Hence, for Bukharin Marxism is not philosophic in itself, but has
materialism as a philosophic component (Gramsci 1975: 1435). According to Gramsci,
the problem with this position is that Marxism is seen as an incomplete conception that
lacks a philosophy and has to look for one outside of itself. It misses, for Gramsci, the
point that Marxism is a philosophy of praxis that should be conceived as a philosophical
critique of and overcoming of every traditional philosophical system previously existing.
As a matter of fact, in accordance with this, Gramsci’s coinage of Marxism as a
philosophy of praxis’ is not due to mere evasion of the prison censors, but emphasizes
the importance given by him to Marx’s theses on Feuerbach, that conclude with the
eleventh stating: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
point is to change it” ( 1992d: 423). Marx’s theses on Feuerbach were among the
translations made by Gramsci in his exercises to ‘loosen the hand’ once he was given
permission to write in prison at the beginning of 1929. For Gramsci, Marxism as a
philosophy of praxis is complete in itself, and what it lacks in its realization can only be
realized in practice. Thus, when defining his notion of orthodoxy, he states:
Orthodoxy should be looked for not in this or that adherent of the philosophy of
praxis, in this or that tendency tied to currents extraneous to the original doctrine,
but in the fundamental concept that the philosophy of praxis ‘‘is sufficient in
itself’ [basta a se contains in itself all the fundamental elements to
construct a total and integral conception of the world, a total philosophy and
theory of the natural sciences, not only, but also to vivify an integral practical
organization of society, that is, to become a total, integral, civilization. [...] The
philosophy of praxis does not need heterogeneous supports, it is itself robust like
that and fertile of new truths such that the old world recurs to them to supply its
most modern and efficient arsenal of arms (1975: 1434).
Yet another error of substance that Gramsci finds in the saggio popolare is its
economic reductionism. For Gramsci, Bukharin does not have a proper analysis ot the
dynamic and reciprocal interaction between structure and superstructure. Let us
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remember that for Gramsci, as stated in notebook 8, strueture and superstructure form an
integral whole, constituting a historic bloc whose dynamic is dialectical, with a
necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure (reciprocity that is precisely
the real dialectical process) (1975: 1052). On the other hand: “In the one cannot
exactly understand what is the structure, the superstructure, the technical instrument: all
of the general concepts are nebulous and vague” (1975: 1441). Moreover, Bukharin
gives an extreme and unilateral importance not only to the economic aspect of society,
but more specifically to the ‘technical instruments’, to the productive technologies and
raw materials. This is for Bukharin the most important variable determining a specific
society. We should remember that this was the same position assumed by Achilles Loria
and that Gramsci, following Croce, harshly criticized it up to the point of coining the
expression Lorianismo to describe diverse superficial tendencies within the realm of
social and human sciences. Loria had given a bogus interpretation of Marx by stating
that the key defining aspect of a mode of production was the ‘technical instrument’.
Gramsci ( 1975: 1441 ) criticizes Bukharin for doing the same thing and is explicit in
connecting Bukharin with Loria. There are numerous instances in which this is expressed
in Bukharin’s Saggio popolare, for example:
We may therefore definitely state that the system of social instruments of labor,
i.e., the technology of a certain society, is a precise material indicator of the
relation between the society and nature. The material productive forces of society
and the productivity of social labor will find their expression in this technical
system (1969: 115-116).
any investigation of society, of the conditions of its growth, its forms, its content,
etc., must begin with an analysis of the productive forces, or ot the technical
bases, of society ( 1969: 120).
On Gramsci’s and Croce’s critique of Loria, see the third chapter.
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Technology is a varying quantity, and precisely its variations produce the changes
in the relations between society and nature; technology therefore must constitute a
point of departure in an analysis of social changes (1969: 121).
the combinations of the instruments of labor (the social technology) are the
deciding factor in the combinations and relations ofmen, i.e., in the economy
(1969:143).
After stating clearly what he thinks is the driving and determining force of “social
changes”, Bukharin goes on to express the non-dialectical and mechanic conception that
Gramsci accuses him of in regards to the relationship between structure and
superstructure: “The further evolution of thought and language proceeds along the lines
followed by other forms of the ideological superstructure; namely, they follow the
evolution of the productive forces” (1969: 204). According to Gramsci, there is no
dynamism or dialectical relationship between social spheres in Bukharin’s deterministic
conception of reality. In a conception such as Bukharin’s, ideologies and ideological
conceptions can only be seen as accessory. On the other hand, ideologies for Gramsci are
anything but accessory. They help maintain power relations and have not only
epistemological effects, but may constitute a real material force. They are not only a
necessary moment, but are moreover central when it comes to politics. In notebook 10,
he states:
For the philosophy of praxis ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they are real
historical facts, that one has to combat and unveil in their nature of instruments of
dominance not for reasons of morality, etc., but precisely for reasons of political
struggle: to intellectually render independent the governed from the governing, to
destroy a hegemony and create another, as a necessary moment of the upheaval of
praxis. [...] For the philosophy of praxis the superstructures are an objective and
Gramsci was not alone in his critique ot Bukharin. None other than Lukacs made a
similar critique of the book. In his Technology and Social Relations, Lukacs ( 1978: 1 13-
121) attacks Bukharin for a number of things, among them: for simplitying complex
problems, for his “superschematic” formula of history, for exaggerating the role of
technology, his application ot the natural sciences to the social realm, etc.
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operating reality (or become one, when they are not mere individual lucubration);
it attirms explicitly that men become conscious of their social position and thus of
their tasks in the terrain of ideologies, which is not a small affirmation of reality;
the philosophy of praxis itself is a superstructure, it is the terrain in which
determined social groups gain consciousness of their own social being, of their
own strength, of their own tasks, of their own becoming (1975; 1319).
And in contrast to the position of passivity implicit in Bukharin’s conception, he ends up
claiming that the philosophy of praxis is not a tool of government to be used over people.
but on the contrary:
it is the expression of these subaltern classes that wish to educate themselves in
the art of government and that have interest in knowing all the truths, even the
unpleasant ones and to avoid the (impossible) deceptions of the upper class and
even more so of themselves (1975; 1320).
In this last line about avoiding the deceptions of subaltern classes it is not difficult to see
a further critique on Gramsci’s part of what was happening in the Soviet regime. At the
same time, in his mind Bukharin’s conception, ideologically speaking, could only
contribute to such a state of affairs where the leaders distance themselves from the led.
Let us not forget that by the time Gramsci is writing this note Stalin had achieved
autocratic rule of the Soviet government and had shifted away from the Leninist plan of
the NEP and had started to implement the plan of forced industrialization and forced
collectivization of the land in the countryside. In this context, in the Quaderui, as has
been stated in the previous chapters, Gramsci sides with -and in a sense develops upon-
the later writings of Lenin, who proposed the New Economic Policy and who called for
the task of cultural revolution in order to gain the moral and political leadership over the
peasantry.
Ultimately, in his typical fashion, Gramsci sees in the reductionist materialist
conception proposed by Bukharin an underlying social and practical problem being
133
expressed. On the one hand, it expresses the eorruption of the Soviet communist
movement in that already possessing the government apparatus it does not develop the
appropriate superstructures (Frosini 2003: 107). On the other hand, the deterministic
conceptions of Marxism reflect an ideological self-consolation for militants in times of
defeat (Gramsci 1975: 1394-1395).
**** + ^>1: 4:**
Gramsci ’s engagement with Benedetto Croce is somewhat more complex than his
with Bukharin. This is so for a number of reasons. Among them lies the
fact that Gramsci is very conscious of Croce’s importance in terms of his influence on
public opinion and upon Italian intellectual life. Because of the influence he exercised
Gramsci (1975: 1 307) goes so far as to say that Croce is “a sort of laic pope”. Moreover,
Croce’s influence was not only limited to the strictly Italian context and Gramsci knew
this very well.
In one of those ironies of history, even in his open and public liberal opposition to
Mussolini’s Totalitarian regime and especially to its incompatibility with cultural values,
he contributed to the possible prestige of the government by making it appear as a
go
tolerant regime that permits free intellectual exchange and critique. His periodical La
Critica was even permitted to continue to be published. As historian John Whittam
comments: “Croce was allowed to continue to publish his periodical La Critica, perhaps
because it posed no threat, perhaps because it enabled the Duce to show the outside world
Among other things, it is important to note Croce’s early opposition expressed in the
Manifesto degli intellettnali autifascisti (Pugliese 2001: 122-125).
134
that he tolerated intellectual treedom” ( 1995; 83).^^ Perhaps Croce posed no threat in that
isolated intellectual opposition was easily managed, while explicit political militants or
intellectuals who were political militants were not so easily tolerated, of whom Gramsci
himself IS a good example. It is important to take note of this appreciation of Croce as an
influential figure within the Italian context since it shows that no matter how abstract or
philosophical the discussion gets, ultimately one of the main reasons for this engagement
is due to Croce’s potential influential role within the general social relations. Whether
correct or not, Gramsci ( 1975: 128) explicitly speculates on Croce’s possible conscious
or unconscious contribution to the stability of fascism with his historiography.
Another reason tor his engagement with Croce being more complex is the fact
that Gramsci ’s own early Marxism was very much influenced by Croce’s idealism as we
saw in the second chapter. This idealism and emphasis on the will helped Gramsci early
on in his political career to evade the pitfalls of the evolutionistic and vulgar economist
inteipretations of the Second International intellectually led by Kautsky and Bernstein.
Moreover, in his critique of Croce and throughout the notebooks in general he uses
certain notions with the meaning given to them by Croce. Such is the case with the
notion of religion, which Gramsci uses with the Crocean meaning of a conception of the
world with a conforming ethic or practical conduct (Gramsci 1975: 1269, 1308). In other
cases he takes over Crocean concepts but re-signifies them with fundamental differences
such as is the case with the concept of ‘absolute historicism’, which Gramsci takes out of
Is important to note that many intellectuals, even antifascist ones and not only Croce,
continued to operate with more or less freedom depending on the situation within Fascist
Italy. The regime was successful at least to a certain degree in co-opting many
intellectuals through the elaboration of diverse cultural mediums. The situation worsened
significantly towards the mid-I930’s onward, with ever-growing censorship and later on
with the implementation of racial laws and the promotion ol racist science.
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Croce’s speculative immanentism. It is because of Croce’s influence
-both positive and
negative- that some have talked about Gramsci’s Crocean Marxism (Finoechiaro 2002; 8-
27), expression that we find an interpretative exaggeration.^® In any case, and with
varying degrees of appreciation and interpretation, Croce’s influence is generally
accepted (Frosini 2003: 123; Cappuci 1978; 124; Jardon 1995: 216; Finoechiaro 2002).
Gramsci’s engagement with Croce, as happens with his critique of Bukharin, lets
us have a better picture of his own philosophical conception. Although we admit Croce’s
influence on Gramsci, we agree with Frosini (2003) in the qualitative difference between
Croce’s influence on Gramsci earlier (a more positive influence) and his influence while
already more politically mature and in prison (a more negative influence). Frosini states;
in fact, while towards 1920-21 the concept of “Spirit” entered in Gramsci’s
discourse as a category eminently ethical, thus strictly functional for a theory of
action, now his main interest lies in an analysis of its logico-epistenwiogical
structure, in the Crocean conception in particular. This is the sense of the
investigation on the “theory of history”: a retaking of the analysis of the
hegemonic function of Croce in Italian society and his integration in an broader
optic that also comprehends (and here lies the decisive novelty) a project of
Finocchario (2002; 8) talks about a Crocean Marxism in Gramsci due to the latter’s use
of Crocean concepts, due to the fact that some of Gramsci’s critiques of Crocean
elements are done with other Crocean elements, due to the fact that Gramsci accepts
Croce’s identity between philosophy and history, etc. Some problems with this argument
are: 1 ) Gramsci explicitly re-signifies some of the concepts inherited transcending the
Crocean meaning; 2) what Finoechiaro calls Crocean techniques of criticism can be read
plainly as dialectical methodology which makes possible an immanent critique (such as
Adorno’s, for example); and 3), the identity between philosophy and history is much
more Hegelian than Crocean, and moreover Gramsci is explicit in his different
understanding of the identity between history and philosophy with the introduction of
politics as mediation, politics being an element excluded by Croce simply valuing it as
passion. Because of this, although we agree on Croce’s important influence on Gramsci,
we think it is unsolicited to call Gramsci’s Marxism Crocean. Following this logic, we
would have to call Marx’s Marxism Hegelian, or more absurd, we would have to call
Spinoza a god-fearing believer due to the fact the he maintains the notion ot God in his
Ethics, notwithstanding the complete re-signification of it. It was not in vain that Spinoza
was ousted from the Jewish community and pointed by the Inquisition; or that Gramsci
was imprisoned until his death.
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rebiith ot historical materialism as a philosophy of praxis not anymore subaltern
to the “philosophy of the Spirit” (2003: 123).
We tully agree with Frosini while at the same time it is important to note how, if we take
this last quotation into consideration, Croce’s critique is intimately tied to Bukharin’s in
that both serve for Gramsci as opportunities to disentangle his conception of Marxism as
a total, self-sufficient, and autonomous conception, “not anymore subaltern to the
“philosophy of the Spirit” Gramsci himself comments on his positive earlier approach
to Croce, because at that time [early 1917] the concept of the unity of theory and
practice, ot philosophy and politics, was not clear for me and I was rather tendentiously
Crocean” (1975: 1 233). After expressing his distance from his own previous position
Gramsci clearly states his ultimate intention behind his engagement with Croce,
consisting in constructing Marxism as a total, integrating, synthetic, conception which
galvanizes all previous important philosophies and movements. He argues, and we quote
extensively due to its worth:
we have to do again with the philosophical conception of Croce the same
reduction that the first theorists of the philosophy of praxis had done for the
Hegelian conception. This is the only historically fecund mode of determining an
adequate reappraisal of the philosophy of praxis, of lifting this conception that has
become, because of the necessity of the immediate practical life, “vulgarized”, to
the height that it should reach for the solution of the most complex tasks that the
actual development of the struggle proposes, that is, to the creation of a new
integral culture, that has the mass character of the Protestant Reformation and of
the French enlightenment and that has the classic characteristics of the Greek
culture and of the Italian Renaissance, a culture that reassuming the words of
Carducci synthesizes Maximilian Robespierre and Immanuel Kant, politics and
philosophy in a dialectical unity intrinsic to a social group, not only French or
German, hut European and global. We need to not only make inventory of the
inheritance of the classic German philosophy, but to make it become operating
life, and for that we need to settle the account [fare i conti] with the philosophy of
Croce, that is, for us Italians being inheritors of the classic German philosophy
means being inheritors of the Crocean philosophy, which represents the
contemporary world moment of the classic German philosophy. [...] We have to
instead come to this settling of the account, in the broadest and most protound
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way possible. A work of such kind, nn Anti-Croce (1975: 1233-1234; our
emphasis).
We have then that according to Gramsci what needs to be done is an Anti-Croce, in
explicit reference to Engels ( 1939) classic, the Anti-Diihring. This represents a fare i
conti with Croce because for Gramsci he represents the one serious intellectual challenge
within Italian culture, much more than Gentile’s actualist philosophy. Again, as we saw
above, Croce is for Gramsci a kind of “laic pope”. As we shall see, this/arc / conti is
complex in that Gramsci takes over Crocean elements but first disentangling them from
what he argues is an idealist and speculative casing in Croce’s conception.
Gramsci ’s critique of Croce lies mostly in the latter’s offensive against Marxism
in various capacities. Croce’s relation to Marxism itself is somewhat interesting or at
least pertinent to the subject at hand. During his early days and at least until 1910 or
1911 he had no problem with being associated with Marxism and socialism. As we saw
in the first chapter, in his Materialismo storico ed econornia marxistica, whose first
edition date of 1900, Croce defended historical materialism from those, like Achilles
Loria who degraded it to various kinds of economicisms or technologisms. No doubt, in
Croce’s early positive approach to Marxism the influence of his teacher and Marxist
philosopher Antonio Labriola^' weighed heavily. It is later, beginning in 191 1, that
Croce’s attitude towards Marxism changes drastically. In the process, he himself
vulgarizes Marxism as being a new metaphysics, and establishing that it was a
mechanical conception in which the economy plays the role of god while everything that
has to do with ideas, philosophy, morality, culture, etc., was superficial, accessory, and
Labriola’s ( 1976) Saggi snila conzecione materialistica della storia is particularly
important in terms of his conception of Marxism, and it also a work that influenced
Gramsci’s conception.
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secondary. In addition, Croce now claimed that Marxism had no philosophical content
and that it was only a pure political ideology. In this regard, Croce argues:
a philosophy that both embodies an ideal and plans a political action is not a
genuine philosophy. Upon closer examination it proves to be nothing but a
practical action dressed up in pseudo-philosophical clothes.
How it succeeds in its disguise and in passing itself off as a philosophy, as
exemplified not only by Marxian disciples but also by its founder, is explained by
the contusion between philosophy and metaphysics; between philosophy, which is
the critical judgment of reality, and metaphysics, the assertion of the truly real
world which transcends and governs it from above or from below (1966: 8-9).
It is not difficult to note in this quotation something that Gramsci himself points out
regarding Croce s historicism. And it is that although Croce critiques metaphysical
thinking in favor of an absolute historicism, he argues that philosophy is the critical
judgment of reality while disconnecting philosophy as a pure reflective activity with no
connection to the practical element inherent to that reality. Even though Croce (1963: 7,
9-10) argues that philosophy is ultimately an expression of the development of history,
Gramsci will argue that he still sees it in a speculative and idealistic way in that he stays
away from the ugly and mundane world of political-practical life. This is unacceptable
for Gramsci, since as we saw in the first part of the present chapter, he follows Marx in
believing that every philosophy has its origin, is an expression of all of concrete socio-
historical reality.
This reaction against Marxism on the part of Croce will also contain a questioning
of historical materialism even as a canon for historical investigation. This proceeds also
from his interpretation of the economic element in Marxism as being the equivalent ol a
god, or as the unilateral mover of reality:
Marx [...] denied the autonomous value of those manifestations |of
spiritual life, religion, philosophy, science, poetry], theorizing that they were
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nothing but masks or “superstructures” of the class struggle, leaving for him only
one true manifestation: economics (1966: 89).
He continued in his attack, against the supposed materialism of Marx as being: “a
materialism in which religion, philosophy, art, science, morality, and their correlative
histories were unthinkable” ( 1966: 89). Now, that Marx “denied the autonomous value
ot those manifestations” is true, since as we saw in a quotation from Marx provided in the
fourth chapter, reality is a structured totality of instances that have reciprocal influence
upon each other. But to say that for Marx the only true manifestation is economics is
plain wrong and is so obviously wrong that what is really expressed clearly is Croce’s
polemical and arbitrary engagement with Marxism, representing a position taken more
tor practical and arbitrary ideological reasons than of rigorous critique as Gramsci also
notes. Moreover, Croce himself provides elements from his early interpretation of
Marxism that could be used to defend his own later attacks.
In his typical nature, Gramsci sees a practical origin explaining Croce’s virulent
and intellectually irresponsible turn against Marxism:
One could find the practical origin of his actual error remembering the fact that
before 1900 he felt honored in passing even politically for an adherent of the
philosophy of praxis, because the historical situation then made this movement an
ally of liberalism, while today things are very changed and certain pranks would
be dangerous ( 1975: 1301).
The reference to the fascist regime of Mussolini is clear, as we note Gramsci’s accusation
of the superficial and fashionable adherence of Croce in his early days as well as his
cowardice towards the present regime shown in his irresponsible and un-rigorous
engagement with Marxism. Gramsci was more than well aware that because ot his
stature and influence, Croce’s attacks against Marxism played, wanting or not, into the
hands of the regime.
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Notebook 10 has a heading that Gramsci himself wrote, ‘The philosophy of
Benedetto Croce’. It begins with a broad list or summary of the different topics regarding
Croce that Gramsci wanted to work on. Among them, arguably the most important were
the following: Croce as a revisionist of the likes of Bernstein in Germany and Sorel in
France, his determination to ‘liquidate’ historical materialism, his good and popular
literary style of writing, his formula of “ethico-political history” for modern
historiography, his conception of history as speculative historicism in contrast to
Marxism’s realist historicism, and on the possible traces of Marxism left in Croce’s
conception (Gramsci 1975: 1207-1211 ). Although he treats all of these separately and to
varying degrees of extension (though in most cases in brief notes), he will at some point
claim that all of these concerns are intimately connected one with the other and all
ultimately revolve around Croce’s notion of ‘‘ethico-political history”:
The essay [on Croce] could have as a central nucleus the examination of the
concept of ethico-political historiography, which really crowns all the
philosophical work of Croce. One could thus examine all of Croce’s work as
leading to this outlet, in his various attitudes towards the philosophy of praxis, get
to the conclusion that precisely Croce’s work itself was being accomplished in
parallel by the best theorists of the philosophy of praxis so that the affirmation of
‘‘definitive overcoming” is simply critical bragging, that is, together with the
analytical demonstration that that which is “sane” and progressive in Croce’s
thought is none other than the philosophy of praxis presented in speculative
language (1975: 1267-1268).
Gramsci’s reference in the second half of the quotation regarding the “best theorists of
the philosophy of praxis” is to Lenin and his political thinking during his last years in
which he worked on the notion of cultural revolution, the theory of the united fronts, and
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his self-criticism of the Soviet bureaucracy.^^ All of this shall become clearer in what
follows.
One of the first criticisms Gramsci (1975: 1212-1213) makes is that by Croce
devaluing ideologies as passions in comparison with the pristine stature of philosophy he
IS making a call to intellectuals to remain distant from politics and from the common
people. In a position that is constant in Gramsci engagement with Croce, he will always
criticize the latter’s one-sidedness, meaning that there are positive elements in Croce’s
conception but only after taking them out from the idealist or speculative casing. This
first criticism is a very good example because prior to making it Gramsci explicitly
recognized Croce s influence in his own thinking towards appreciating the importance of
intellectuals and the cultural front in social and historical analysis. He states:
The thought of Croce should thus be appreciated as of instrumental value and so it
could be said it has strongly drawn attention to the study of cultural facts and of
thought as elements of political dominion, to the function of the grand
intellectuals in the life of States, to the moment of hegemony and consent as a
necessary form of the concrete historical bloc. Ethico-political history is thus one
of the canons of historical interpretation to always have present in the
examination and in the deepening of historical development, if one wishes to do
integral history and not partial or extrinsic histories (1975: 1211).
Here we see clearly Gramsci’s more than positive valuation of Croce’s influence. The
problem, though, is that for Gramsci, Croce ends up doing “partial” histories, by
undervaluing political struggles and focusing excessively in the intellectual and cultural
moments of history. Thus, we continue to see the relationship between the Anti-Croce
and the Anti-Bukharin. While Bukharin mechanically over-stressed the economic and
technological determination upon historical development, Croce overstressed the
For some brief remarks on these last theoretical positions of Lenin, see the second
chapter.
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ideational and cultural component in the development of history. At the same time, it is
important to note that it was works like Bukharin’s Saggio popolare that gave certain
credence to Croce’s attacks against historical materialism as proposing the economic
component as a god-like element. Gramsci position, again following Marx and
distancing himself from both Bukharin and Croce, was to conceive history as an integral
process, as “integral history”.
For Gramsci, Croce’s formula of “ethico-political” history showed itself one-
sided and unilateral in various ways. First, he mentions how Croce fears the active
intervention by the popular and massive element as a factor of historical progress and
leaves it out of his historical works (1975: 1220). This conception of history, of history
as the history of liberty (Croce 1963: 21), sees historical development as a gradual and
reformist evolution ot events. For Gramsci, this error in part lies in an imposition of
abstract logic over real and concrete historical element. He comments:
The philosophical error (of practical origin!) of such conception consists in that it
“mechanically” presupposes that in a dialectical process the thesis should be
“conserved” by the antithesis in order not to destroy the process itself, thus, that it
is “predicted”, like an infinite repetition, mechanic, arbitrarily prefixed (1975:
1221 ).
Gramsci’s response to Croce’s dialectical conception of history is important in that it also
dispels the criticisms -such as Buci-Glucksman’s (1979: 415)- that Gramsci is still
prisoner of a Hegelian reading of Marx. For Gramsci, distant from the Hegelian
dialectical conception that is destined to a prefigured synthesis and that is harshly
criticized by Adorno (1995), the dialectical process is more concretely determined:
In real history the antithesis tends to destroy the thesis, the synthesis will be an
overcoming, but without it being possible to establish a priori that which will be
“conserved” of the thesis in the synthesis, without it being possible a priori to
“measure” the hits as if in a “ring” conventionally regulated (1975: 1221).
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Gramsci’s realistic perspective can only make him conclude that the only real dialectic is
a dialectic of the concrete, where the logical contradiction is always embodied by real
antagonism. To contrast this dialectic
-or Marx’s for that matter- with the Hegelian we
just need to remember how in the Phenomenology of the Spirit when in the famous
section on the master and slave dialectic Hegel argues that the master is not doing
anything to the slave that the slave would not do to himself, which is to say that the slave
supports or strives for his own subordination. This is the key idealist detour that
Marxism cannot follow.^^
The fundamental error in Croce’s historiographic formula of “ethico-political
history” is that it over-emphasizes and imposes arbitrarily “the moment of hegemony, of
political direction, of consent, in the life and development of the activity of the State and
of civil society” (Gramsci 1975: 1222). For Gramsci this means that in Croce’s historical
works he elaborates greatly the periods of the positive elaborations of new systems,
regimes, and reforms while leaving out the grand political struggles that give birth to
these. Croce’s thinking on this matter -in a terminology that reminds us of Gramsci’s
reference to Bukharin- “even though speculative, is not any less of an abstract and
mechanic sociology” (1975: 1222-1223). It is this one-sidedness, this “solipsism”, which
accounts for Croce’s “subjective-speculative conception of reality” (1975: 1223),
regardless of its importance as a contribution. Gramsci (1975: 1226-1227) gives as an
It has been convincingly argued by Marx scholar Georg H. Fromm (2004) that Marx
himself as early as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts ol 1844 found the
fundamental idealistic flaw in Hegel’s logic in that passage, and that realizing it while
using the same logical scheme towards the latter part ol the lamous section on estranged
labor that was the reason why he left that manuscript unconcluded and broken oil.
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example ot this Croce’s History ofEurope in the Nineteenth Century" and his History of
Italy. The former begins in 1815, which for Gramsci is inconceivable since it evades
completely the treatment of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the
moments of most political struggle. On the other hand, Croce’s History of Italy begins in
187 1 without a treatment of the struggles of the Risorgimento.
But it is not only a matter of historical writing for Gramsci. He believes that
Croce s unilaterally subjective formula is the positive response to his attacks towards
Marxism for undervaluing the superstructural elements of society (1975; 1224). We saw
that for Gramsci, Marxism views reality as a concrete and integral whole, where the
development of structure and superstructures is “intimately connected and necessarily
inter-relational and reciprocal” (1975: 1300). In the words of Marx, reality is embodied
or articulated in concrete socio-economic formations; in Gramsci’s terminology, reality is
always embodied in a concrete historical bloc. Gramsci is also conscious, though, of the
proliferation of fatalistic and economistic versions of Marxism such as that of Bordiga in
Italy, or of Bukharin in Russia, and in the unfortunate popular and vulgar version of
Marxism even amongst intellectuals. For Croce, Marxism reduces everything to the
economy as a single lever of history. Thus, he argues for the ethico-political moment of
history. In Gramsci’s thought, Marxism does not only include the ethico-political
moment, but appreciates it without the need to indulge in theoretical fetishism by putting
it above the rest of reality:
It can be said that not only does the philosophy of praxis exclude ethico-political
history, but moreover its most recent phase of development consists precisely in
the re-vindication of the moment of hegemony as essential in its conception ol the
state and in the “valorization” of the cultural fact, of cultural activity, ol a cultural
There is an English translation (Croce 1963).
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front as necessary beside the merely economic and the merely political (1975-
1224).
V -
.
Gramsci s leference here regarding the latest development of Marxism in the
direction of the moment of hegemony is to Lenin and to his proposition of the New
Economic Policy, to his campaign for a cultural revolution in the countryside, and to his
strategy of the united front, which Gramsci will believe politically pertinent until the end
of his life. With the reference to Lenin, Gramsci is saying that, although he was
influenced by Croce’s conception and is conscious that Croce is certainly one of the
central intellectual influences in the Italian context, Marxism even within its own camp
was developing itself in the same direction but in a non-speculative way. In this regard, it
is not surprising to find Gramsci ’s common reference in the Quadenii to Lenin as the
‘theorist of hegemony’. In a passage in which Gramsci makes another parallel between
Croce and Lenin, he clearly expresses that:
the theoretico-practical principle of hegemony itself also has a gnoseological
scope and thus in this camp we have to look for Ilici’s^'^ maximum theoretical
contribution to the philosophy of praxis. Ilici would have made philosophy [as
philosophy] progress [effectively] in so far as he would make the political
doctrine and practice progress. The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so
far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of the consciences
and of the methods of knowledge, is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact
(1975: 1250).
Because of Gramsci ’s celebrated posthumously published work in the Quadenii, we
know that much more than Lenin, he himself was the grand theorist of hegemony. This
notwithstanding, the quotation above clearly signals that Gramsci’s thinking even in its
most original, situated itself consciously within the collective enterprise of a rethinking of
Marxism towards a full appreciation of the ideological, moral, and cultural components
Lenin.
146
of reality, political struggle, and control. The quotation above also unquestionably shows
that, against the opinion of Finocchiaro (2002), Gramsci’s Marxism cannot be called a
Crocean Marxism’ since that would undermine all of the other equally important
influences on his political theory. Gramsci’s dialectically synthetic theoretical position
regarding Croce s ethico-political history recognizes both the positive elements to retain
and the negative elements to discard:
The philosophy of praxis will thus critique as undeserved and arbitrary the
reduction of history to a sole ethico-political history, but will not exclude it. The
opposition between Croceanism and the philosophy of praxis is to be looked for
in the speculative character of Croceanism (1975: 1224).
This quotation also provides the key to an important difference between Croce and
Gramsci and it lies in what the latter reads as speculative in the historicism of the former.
For Croce, philosophy expresses the development of history, and in that point,
expressed superficially like that, Gramsci has no problem. For Gramsci, the problem lies
in Croce’s unilateral understanding of that history. Gramsci (1975: 1272) argues that if
philosophy is to be historicized properly as Croce supposedly proposes one has to pay
attention the concrete, practical, social, and especially political elements that give rise to
each philosophy. But this political and practical component lies outside of Croce’s
understanding of philosophy because in his mind once a theory or philosophy incarnates
into a practical and political movement that intends to change reality it stops being a
philosophy. We should add that this interpretation of Croce is not Gramsci’s invention;
Croce him.self repeatedly made this claim. For example, Croce stated: “a philosophy that
both embodies an ideal and plans a political action is not a genuine philosophy. Upon
closer examination it proves to be nothing but a practical action dressed up in pseudo-
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philosophical clothes” (1966: 8-9).'^ Thus, for Croce any theory that had any import on
practical reality could not be considered philosophy, but only pure ideology. For Croce
the difference between philosophy and ideology was of an essential nature. For Gramsci,
for whom philosophy’s difference from ideologies is one of degrees (1975; 1231, 1269-
1270, 1273), this complete separation of philosophy from ideology, of philosophy from
practical life, is what still makes Croce’s historicism speculative. On the other hand,
Marxism as Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis is a concrete and absolute historicism: “The
philosophy of praxis is the absolute historicism”, the worldliness [nionclanizazzione] and
absolute earthliness [terrestrita] of thought, and absolute humanism of history” (1975:
1437).
As a conclusion, we see that Gramsci’s engagement with Bukharin and Croce,
both in their differences and in their ironic similarities, serve not only as an excuse to
clarify his own conception of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis but also serve to provide
the arguments for their necessary critique. This critique, in Gramsci’s mind, was never
only theoretical since both of them, although in different contexts, represented two
influential currents that had or could have political and practical effects.
Croce’s position is also amazing from our contemporary perspective due to the lact that
some of his philosophical contemporaries were none other than intellectuals of the like of
Karl Korsch, Ernest Bloch, Theodor Adorno, Lukacs, etc.
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CHAPTER VI
LITERARY CRITICISM, LITERATURE, AND LANGUAGE IN THE QUADERNI
Although Gramsci is well known for putting culture in its various capacities at the
center of the political, of the many notes contained in his Quaderni del carcere the ones
that have been less examined by the Gramscian scholarship are those concerning his
thoughts on literature, literary criticism, and language.^^ We think this is at least partly
just in that no matter how one looks at it, the central node in Gramsci’s Quaderni is the
political question. This notwithstanding, a global look at the Quaderni tracing the basic
cell of the relationship between leaders and led helps us include even those notes on
language and literature within his integral and comprehensive conception of a
revolutionary intellectual and moral reform.
When we approach those fragments and notebooks that mostly deal with these
matters we see the parallel concern that we see in his notes concerning the immediately
political and philosophy. As we will see, Gramsci’s proposition for a new literary
criticism is close to that of 19'*’ Century Italian critic and liberal politician Francesco De
Sanctis looking for a criticism with a certain commitment or attachment with practical
concerns. In terms of the creation of literature, while criticizing the paternalism of some
This is not to say that there have not been some fruitful and excellent works on the
subject matter. N. Stipcevic’s (1968) work on Gramsci’s literary criticism in the
Quaderni is one of these, as well as the classic work of Franco Lo Piparo (1979)
concerning the influence of the linguistic formation on Gramsci political thought. More
recently, we have had a number of works illuminating some of these areas. One of these
is the excellent anthology of Gramsci’s cultural writings edited by David Forgacs, whose
brief introductions to the different sections are very informative. Other recent examples
include Renate Holub ( 1992), Peter Ives (2004), and Derek Boothman’s (2004); the last
two focusing on Gramsci’s reflection on language.
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Italian writers, he rejects any propagandistic enslavement of literature under politics but
on the contrary thinks that a new literature will be produced as an effect of a structural
change and general reform. Similar to the position towards a new literary writing is his
position concerning the unification of the Italian language, which he thinks is something
that should spring out of a profound real and structural unification of the peninsula and
not as an effect of normative measures imposed from above without any real and concrete
correspondence with practical reality.
We have been arguing that Gramsci’s political conception and project is a
comprehensive one in that is addresses all of the spheres of social reality, and that thus in
this conception literature, literary criticism, and language policies, among other things,
are also political matters. Nonetheless, Gramsci was not innovating so much in making
all of these things political in that cultural concerns in Italy were already very much
political, especially in the first part of the 20“’ Century. Literary and other cultural
personalities took active part in Italian politics, committed themselves to one cause of the
other, etc.
Even Fascism, with its cult of action and heroism, included many cultural
personalities as supporters or proponents. Thus for example, writer Gabriele D’Annunzio
was among the intellectual and political founders of what would become Fascism,
someone like literary figure Curzio Malaparte was a Florentine squadrista, philosopher
As the similar position Gramsci takes on the unification of the Italian language, the
underlying theme is the same as in Gramsci’s notes on hegemony and the war of position.
The same theme is that the consent of the allied groups or classes is not one that is
obtained through a mechanic and coercive imposition but through a fierce cultural and
political struggle in which the ascendant group needs to win them over because of the
respect it demands, because of its prestige. That is, changes in literary writing and
language policy must come ‘spontaneously’ as effects of more profound struggle and
cannot be normatively imposed from ‘above’ as external and mechanic impositions.
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Giovanni Gentile became Minister of Education and adviser to Mussolini, and the fascist
movement in general had as many intellectuals as supporters as anti-fascism. Fascist
culture, on the other hand, equally to fascist politics in general was all but monolithic
(Eco 2001 ; 231). Fascist culture was full of contradictions. Thus, these contradictions
were also present in the literary field. For example, you would have that while the
regime insisted in the classicist style and tashion of Roman times, and being in this sense
anti-modem, it had the support of the artistic movements such as Futurism, who were all
lor the cult ol technology and ultra-modernization. Another example consisted of the
different regional components of Fascism that also played a part in the literary field.
Such was the case of the two fascist politico-cultural movements Strapaese (Super
Country) and Stracitta (Super City), whose periodicals were among the ones Gramsci had
access to in prison. On the one hand Strapaese was born around the periodical 11
Selvaggio, founded by Mino Maccari, and around Feo Fonganesi’s L’italiano, and it
represented a regional and provincial fascist literary base arguing for a more rural and
populist aesthetic. On the other hand Stracitta emphasized the need for rapid
urbanization, argued for urban and modern values, and had a cosmopolitan idea of
culture, as for example in the periodical Novecento of Massimo Bontempelli.
While suppressing that media which was openly opposed to the politics of the
regime, the fascist regime permitted a relative space for cultural work and creation even
for some of the non-active supporters of the regime. After the consolidation of power,
and after the suppression of the most radical elements of the political and cultural
opposition, the regime attempted to gain the consent of many within the intellectual
community through a number of institutions created for that purpose. Perhaps no project
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of this kind was as successful as the toleration of the editorial endeavor of the
Enciclopedia italiana, conceived by the industrialist Giovanni Treeeani in 1925 whieh
had the contribution ot over two thousand Italian and foreign intellectuals, including
eighty-five of the ones who signed Croce’s Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti
(Whittam 1995: 83). As Whittam argues, the toleration of a relative freedom of
expression as in the case of the Enciclopedia italiana -in which Mussolini and Gentile
finally committed themselves to a definition of fascism- helped portray the strength and
stability of the regime. This spaee for eulture, though, closed progressively and
consideiably towards the second halt of the 1930’s and the approximation of the regime
with Nazi Germany and the institution ot racial laws. Let us be elear about something,
when we speak ot this relative spaee tor cultural creation we are not stating any great
toleration on the part ot the regime. Many renowned literary figures who were also
political opponents of fascism were treated with great ruthlessness (Woodhouse 2002:
221). Measures against these were the same as with any other type of political opponent.
Some had to exile themselves to another country, others were sent into ‘internal exile’
{confino) -such was the case of famous writers like Cesare Pavese and Carlo Levi-, and
still others were imprisoned or eliminated. In any case, all of this goes to show how the
fields of culture and literature were very much political prior to and during the fascist
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regime.
In retrospective, Gramsci’s particular and individual relationship with other anti-fascist
elements results tragic in that now we have evidenee that the liberation attempt of
Gramsci in 1933 through a prisoner exehange between the Fascist and Soviet regime was
frustrated paradoxieally enough by the unauthorized publication of Gramsci’s health
certificate in France in the anti-fascist journal L’Hnnianite wilh the original intention to
contribute to the campaign of liberation of anti-fascist political prisoners. The bad image
and bad press this publication (due to Gramsci’s seriously bad health) brought the Fascist
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It is in this context of the politicization ot cultural and literary matters under
fascism that we have to contextualize Gramsci’s notes on literature and language.
Underlying those concerns is the same political impulse as the one m his notes on politics
and philosophy. The political sensibility towards a proper relationship between leaders
and led is also at the core of his thinking on these matters. We will deal with his notes on
literary criticism and literature first and then with his notes on language.
Gramsci’s notes on literary criticism -as well as those on language- are not
isolated from the rest of his work in the Quadenii in that in their understanding one has to
incorporate them in Gramsci’s overall conception of a revolutionary politics and
intellectual and moral reform (Stipcevic 1968: 19; Salamini 1981: 206). On the other
hand, this is not to say that they cannot exercise a relative autonomy in influencing a
Marxist aesthetic theory. In any case, the important point is to emphasize the intimate
relation with his political thought in general. In Gramsci’s conception of hegemony and
counter-hegemony, we must remember, a battle is spread throughout all the social
spheres including the cultural and literary ones in which the ascendant group must win
over at least parts of the intellectuals of the group already in power or of other sectors in
general.
regime made it cancel the negotiations on the prisoner exchange as retaliation. As a
result of this, Gramsci was not only frustrated but also infuriated with everybody since he
himself was overly conscious of the political stupidity and imprudence in this type of
action. Gramsci, as shown in his letters, was always conscious of the need tor the
maximum secrecy in any sort of liberation attempt because ol the sensitivity ol the
situation. For more on this, see Aldo Natoli ( 1997: XXXV-XXXVI) and Paolo Spriano
(1979).
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But not everything on this matter comes from practical life. Gramsci’s tentative
notes towards a revolutionary literary criticism are in constant interlocution with the work
ot Francesco De Sanctis and especially of Benedetto Croce. We must say for now that
Gramsci sees in De Sanctis a perfect example of a politically committed literary critic
who combined his criticism with practical intervention in the political life of the
peninsula. Being a strong defender of national unification and having participated in
various revolts, De Sanctis formed part of Parliament from 1861 until his death and
.served three times as Minister of Public Instruction. There is no doubt that Gramsci
sympathized with the commitment and the writing style of De Sanctis since as we saw in
the third chapter, he coins the tag of hrescianesimo and that of ‘The little grandchildren
of father Bresciani’ from De Sanctis’ brutal critique of the work of Jesuit writer Antonio
Bresciani and his work Ehreo di Verona. This general name of hrescianesimo is used by
Gramsci to regroup many literary figures of his time that he considered either as
reactionary, revisionists, paternalists, etc.
Intellectually speaking, Croce’s influence appears more explicitly and his work
appears many times as the opponent in the notes. It is not suiprising since Croceanism
dominated the critical literary and philosophical atmo.sphere (Stipcevic 1968: 8). Due to
its importance in the understanding of Graimsci’s position let us go over brieOy Croce’s
aesthetic conception. For Croce (1955: 1 ), there are two types of knowledge, logical and
intuitive. Of the two, logical knowledge is superior in that it produces concepts and puts
individual things in relation. This is not to say that intuitive knowledge is mere
appearance or transcended knowledge. We have to remember that Croce’s dialectic
differs from that of Hegel in that it is a dialectic of ‘distincts’ and not ot opposites. Thus
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while for the Hegelian dialectic art is an interior type of knowledge that is superseded by
philosophy, in Croce’s dialectic a synthesis occurs but its constitutive elements retain
their respective autonomy (Salamini 1981; 203). As a result of this understanding of the
dialectic, for Croce intuitive knowledge remains pertinent.
Art, for Croce, is a product of intuitive knowledge. But it is true intuition in that
it finds expression (1955; 8). That is, for Croce an intuition, an impression, is true only if
it expresses itself externally. Art is one of such true intuitions since it expresses itself in a
work of art. This relation between intuition or impression and expression is
correspondent to that of content and form in aesthetics. For Croce, aesthetic criticism
must not tall into the distinction between content and form since once an artistic
impression (the content) is expressed -given form- it is this that gives it true
phenomenological reality. Content by itself means nothing for Croce since as something
that can be potentially unrealized it is of no importance. It gains importance only in its
expression in form, and once in expressive form content is impossible to evaluate
separately. Thus for Croce (1955; 16) the “aesthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing
but form”. This indivisibility of content and form present in Croce is key in his partial
influence on Gramsci’s conception. In the Crocean aesthetic scheme artistic and literary
criticism must not judge art in terms of better or worse but must simply look for the
existence or nonexistence of art; thus he rejects the searching for an artistic genius (1955;
14-15).
Gramsci’s position towards literary and aesthetic criticism is close to Croce’s in a
number of points but quite different in others. First we have that for Gramsci as well as
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for Croce literature does not emerge out of itself through parthenogenesis, but is a
product of general human history. Croce states:
Poetry does not generate poetry; parthenogenesis does not take place; it asks for
the intervention of the masculine element, of what is real, passionate, practical,
moral. [...] Man remade, the spirit refreshed, a new life of affects having
emerged, of that will emerge, if it will emerge, a new poetry (Stipcevic 1968: 20).
In his Quadenii Gramsci paraphrases closely this thought of Croce:
This observation could be appropriate to historical materialism. Literature does
not generate literature, etc., that is, ideologies do not create ideologies,
superstructures do not generate superstRictures beyond the inheritance of inertia
and of passivity: those are generated, not by “parthenogenesis” but by the
intervention of the ‘masculine” element —history- the revolutionary activity that
creates the “new man”, that is, new social relations ( 1975: 733).
At once by comparing the two quotations we see both the affinities and the
differences between Croce’s conception and that of Gramsci. As with their conception of
philosophy,'®^ one of the essential elements in common between Croce’s conception of
art and Gramsci’s is their historicism. Now, how they both view this historicity is quite
different. For Croce, the historicity behind art pertains only to that which helps the
development of individual thought, disconnected from what is practical and immediate.
Thus, in his Aesthetic Croce will claim that:
we must condemn as erroneous every theory that annexes the aesthetic activity to
the practical, or introduces the laws of the second into the first, [...j
The aesthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration of
impressions. When we have achieved the word within us, conceived definitely
and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive, expression is born and
is complete; there is no need for anything else (1955: 50).
So while for Croce literature and art is the sole creation of mental spirit, for Gramsci on
the other hand, as seen clearly in his re-inteipretation of Croce’s thought, the historicity
'®® See the chapter five.
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ot art does not reside only in its individual creator but on its development in relation to
the general historical state of social relations. Thus we have to agree with Salamini
(1981: 203) when he argues that Croce’s reduction of content to form leads him in part to
assert that art as an end product is independent from anything having to do with what is
‘useful’ or moral and thus excluding everything practical from aesthetics. For Croce, the
development of a new artistic expression is thus a recreation of man and spirit while for
Gramsci it expresses an underlying change in the social relations.
Another affinity between Croce and Gramsci is that both emphasize the unity of
form and content (Stipcevic 1968: 26). Gramsci, though, distinguishes analytically
between them through the practical and political element that is precisely missing in
Croce’s conception. In notebook 14 he states:
Admitting that content and form are the same thing, etc., etc., does not yet mean
that the distinction between content and form cannot be made. It can be said that
he who insists on the “content” in reality struggles for a determined culture, for a
determined conception of the world against other cultures and other conceptions
of the world; it could even be said that historically, until now, the so called
cofitemitisti have been “more democratic” than their Parnassian adversaries, for
example, that is, they wanted a literature that was not for the “intellectuals”, etc.
Can we talk about a priority of content over form? It could be talked about in this
sense, that the work of art is a process and that the changes of content are also
changes of form, but it is “easier” to talk about content than of form, because the
content can be “summed up” logically. When it is said that the content precedes
the form what is meant is simply that, in the elaboration, the successive attempts
are presented with the name of content, nothing else. The first content that did
not satisfy was also form and in reality when the satisfying “form” is arrived at
the content has also changed. It is true that often those who chatter of form, etc.,
against the content, are completely empty, amass words that are not even always
maintained according to grammar (for example Ungaretti); by technique, form,
etc., they understand slanted emptiness from secret meetings of empty heads
(1975: 1737-1738).
For Gramsci, although changes of content modifies the form and vice versa, the
distinction between the two is necessary for a properly complete understanding ol a work
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ot art. It is through this distinction that one can appreciate, sympathize, or critique the
implications of the conception of the world implied in a work of art. For example, one
can appreciate the stylistic form of a particular piece of literature and even understand the
worldview (if any) behind it, but one does not have to identify with it. It is this to which
Gramsci is referring in a letter to his wife Giulia dated September 5‘^ 1932 probably
around the time he was writing the note from which we quoted above:'®'
Perhaps I have distinguished between aesthetic enjoyment and positive Judgment
ot artistic beauty, that is, between enthusiasm for the work of art as such, and
moral enthusiasm, that is, the co-participation in the ideological world of the
artist, a distinction that seems critically just and necessary. I can admire
aesthetically War and Peace of Tolstoy and not share the ideological substance of
the book; if the two facts coincided Tolstoy would be my vade mecum, “/c livre
de chevet" (1996: 613).
Two things follow from this. The first thing, which we will comment on again further
below, is that for Gramsci aesthetic facts have a relative autonomy (“I can admire
aesthetically”) so much so that their value can transcend the specificity of its original
time and space. In this sense Gramsci follows the few comments made by Marx on
aesthetics and especially on Balzac, and also follows De Sanctis. '®“ The second thing -
which is absent from Croce’s conception- is that an integral and comprehensive literary
criticism should not lose touch with the political and practical reality that conditions it,
and especially if one is striving for a new culture. This proposition of Gramsci of
including the realm of culture in a vaster social and political struggle is unacceptable in
Croce’s conception. Ultimately, what Gramsci is arguing for is a dialectical literary
"" Notebook 14 is a notebook about different and mixed miscellaneous notes, and was
written at different moments between 1932 and 1935.
In The History of Italian Literature even though his underlying theme is that of a
progressive formation of a new literature that is both national and universal, De Sanctis
( 1959: 840) believes in a certain “absolute value” in a work ot art that can transcend the
“passing moment”.
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criticism that appreciates the reciprocal conditioning and modification of form and
content, and that this dynamic is not only individual in nature (as in Croce) but is
conditioned by the history of the social relations in general. This dialectical and
historical understanding of the relationship between form and content in the work of art
leads him to condemn as empty any variant of formalism without falling, as we shall see
again later, into any pretension to subdue literary creation to politics or propaganda and
without falling prey to the socialist realism that was being established in Russia.
What is missing in Croce’s aesthetic conception is the concrete and
comprehensive historicity behind a work of art. Gramsci, for his part, is consciously
influenced by Croce but manages to transcend him while retaining what he finds
useful. Thus, Niksa Stipcevic states:
In Gramsci the Crocean aesthetic equation sees its essence transformed. He takes
the lesson of Croce on the reciprocal dependency of form and content, such that
the form becomes also the content of the work of art and its content also its form.
In Gramsci, though, these two concepts have a value completely different. While
for Croce, putting aside the successive modifications of this relation, the content
is in the first place “impression” (or later “sentiment”), and the form “expression”,
Gramsci liberates these two unitary concepts from the abstract yoke of intuitionist
aesthetic, he unties them from the a priori synthesis and impresses on them a real
materialist meaning. For Gramsci the content of the work of art will consist in a
“mass of sentiments”, in a “relation towards the life that revolves in the work of
art...”. Also, for Gramsci the content cannot be abstractly imagined, untied from
the form, but does not consist anymore of a content^impression, but of a content
= worldview, = relation to life, = area of life that the work of art delimits. In him
the demonstration of the identity of content and of form is free from idealist
premises and of the idealist conceptual content. “Identity of terms does not mean
identity of concepts.” (1968: 28).
It is not difficult to see that Gramsci’s dialectical and non-unilateral view of the
relationship between form and content runs parallel to his integral and dialectical view
that superstructures and structures are mutually conditioning.
In this chapter we have limited our comparison of Croce and Gramsci to their
aesthetic conceptions. For a broader analysis of the complex relationship between the
work of Croce and that of Gramsci, especially concerning philosophy and history, see
chapter five.
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Besides Croce, another important element in Gramsci’s conception of literary
criticism IS that of the influence of the work of Francesco De Sanctis. This influence is
called upon especially when Gramsci writes about the literary criticism needed in the
political struggle for a moral and intellectual reform. Against the formalism underlying
Cioce s idealist conception, Gramsci retains a dose of appreciation for the content in the
works of art. In this sense he is closer to Francesco De Sanctis, who in his classic work
on Italian literature denounces the empty formalism and rhetoric of previous literatures.
Gramsci (1975: 2185) takes up Gentile’s call to a return to De Sanctis in an article
published in August of 1933 and remarks that this return, though, should not be
mechanical and constituted by a mere repetition of his concepts and arguments, but one
of assuming a “similar attitude” to the one De Sanctis assumed towards the “art and life”
of his time. For Gramsci, this attitude of De Sanctis consisted in advocating a
dissemination ot culture trom the top down. In a sense, Gramsci is reading in De Sanctis
a sort of longing for a democratization of national culture. He states:
A judgment of De Sanctis: “The fiber is lacking because faith is lacking. And
faith is lacking because culture is lacking”. But what does “culture” mean in this
case? It undoubtedly means a coherent, unitary, and nationally diffused
“conception of life and of man”, a “laic religion”, a philosophy that has precisely
become “culture”, that is, that has generated an ethics, a way of life, a civil and
individual conduct. That required first of all the unification of the “cultured
class” [classe colta], and in that sense De Sanctis worked with the founding of the
“Philologic Circle” that should have determined “the union of all the cultured and
intelligent men” of Naples, but required especially a new attitude towards the
popular classes, a new concept of what is “national”, differentfrom that of the
historic right, wider, less exclusionist, less “policing” in a manner of speaking. It
is this aspect of the activity ofDe Sanctis that should he highlighted ( 1975: 2185-
2186; our emphasis).
We clearly see in this quotation that De Sanctis is a central figure in Gramsci’s
development of the concept of the national-popular. It is not diflicult to see “this aspect
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ot the activity ot De Sanctis” in The History of Italian Literature where he is constantly
attacking the detached and isolated national pretensions of previous Italian literary
manifestations, or what he calls at some point “the gap between real and ideal” (De
Sanctis 1959: 7 14). Against the empty rhetoric and formalism of previous forms, De
Sanctis defends simplicity:
None can deny that simplicity is the form of greatness - but of true, of
unconscious, greatness, of greatness become natural. But the eighteenth century
was incapable of this greatness, pretentious and mannered as it was without and
empty within (1959: 833).
The theme of the nazionale-popolare in the work of Gramsci is very important. It
should be noted that it implies others of Gramsci’s key concepts such as the notion of
hegemony (in its conception of leadership in a class alliance). As happens with almost
every key concept or important argument present in the Prison Notebooks, one has to
reconstruct them out of a collection of writings that is fragmentary in nature. This not
withstanding, there are numerous leitmotivs which continue to appear throughout the
whole body of work. The national-popular is one of them.
Although the notion of national-popular emerged within the realm of Russian
culture at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Durante 2004, 151), Gramsci explicitly
states in a fragment that he takes up this notion from Piedmontese priest and political
leader Gioberti, who argued for a contribution of Catholicism towards the national cause
of unification (Grew 2000: 217-218), and usually associates it with his general discussion
of the Italian /?A6»rg;7nenro (Gramsci 1975: 1914-1915). Gramsci, moreover, mostly uses
the notion, when he is writing on Italian literature in comparison with other national
literatures, especially in contrast to the French. It is in the realm of his notes on Italian
literary figures that the notion of the national-popular most seems to partake in almost the
same concerns as those expressed by De Sanctis in work on Italian literature. This is also
in part the reason behind the currency it first gained in Italy as a normative concept
strictly pertaining to the field of literary criticism, mainly degraded to a version of
populism in literature (Durante 2004; 150). This unfair accusation of populism towards
Gramsci was made by Alberto Asor Rosa ( 1965: 257-274) and rightly critiqued by N.
Stipcevic (1968: 67-69).
When Gramsci writes on the sympathy that Gioberti had for historical Jacobinism,
he states how he (Gioberti) possessed the concept of ‘popular-national’, or, “of the
political hegemony, that is, of the alliance between bourgeoisie
-intellectuals [ingenious],
and the people; the same in the economy [...] and in literature (culture)’’ (1975: 1914-15).
Shortly after Gramsci quotes Gioberti, in a sentiment that is close to both Gramsci and to
De Sanctis, he states: “A literature cannot be national if it is not popular’’ (1975: 1915).
These initial citations from Gramsci give us a clue not only towards the origins of
the concept in Gramsci’s usage of it, but also shows us how the notion is not only
associated with literary currents. It can also be used when discussing “political
hegemony’’, and “the same in the economy”.
In Italy, writes Gramsci, “the term “national” has a meaning very ideologically
restrictive and in any case does not coincide with “popular” ” (Gramsci 1975: 2116).
This is a running theme in Gramsci and is described by him as an effect of the
cosmopolitan nature and role of Italian intellectuals throughout history. This separation
between intellectuals and people (jjopolo) -and by people Gramsci understands the
complex of subaltern classes (1975: 2312)- is expressed for example in the fact that in the
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Italian language national and popular do not coincide, in contrast to other foreign
languages:
Observe the fact that in many languages “national” and “popular” are almost
synonymous (in Russian, in German “volkisch” has almost a meaning [still] more
intimate, of lace, in the Slavic languages in general; in French it has the same
meaning, but already more politically elaborated, attached, that is, to the concept
of sovereignty”; national sovereignty and popular sovereignty have equal value
or had it). In Italy the intellectuals are far from the people, that is from the
“nation” and are attached to a tradition of caste, a “bookish” and abstract
tradition, that has never been broken by a strong popular or national political
movement (1975: 343).
That the Gramscian notion of the national-popular is as critically literary as
political is seen akso in Gramsci’s work when he writes on French politics, on
Machiavelli, and when he talks ol the moderno Principe, or the modern Prince, with
which Gramsci refers to the modern communist party. For example, he states: “Really,
the modern Prince should limit itsell to two fundamental points: the formation of a
national popular collective will of which the modern Prince is precisely an active and
operative expression, and a moral and intellectual reform” ( 1975: 953).
For Gramsci a “national popular collective will” means the necessity of
constructing and maintaining an alliance between progressive intellectual groups, wage
laborers, and peasants and other rural workers (which were the majority at the time). For
Gramscian scholar Lea Durante (20(34: 158-159), the proper or profound Gramscian
sense of national-popular is the coupling together of this formation of a collective will
with moral and intellectual reform.
We should at this moment point to the fact, recently articulated by Giorgio Baratta
(2()()(): 61-62), that for Gramsci the nation -and so too the national- is not only an
“imagined community”, in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1991), but is something
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materialized in a territory and lived through concrete state, economic, and ideological
institutions and mediations (Gramsci 1975: 333, 744, 1935-36). A national-popular
movement should attempt a new construction” ot the national configuration, a
movement that emerges from below,
such that a complete national strata, the lowest economically and culturally,
participates in a historical fact that invests all the life of the people and puts every
one, brutally, at the front of their own responsibilities that cannot be derogated
(1975; 816).
The national-popular, then, has as its aim a new national construction. This new
national construction implies the participation and creation of the subaltern groups, of the
popolo (people). Only in such a setting can the national and the popular coincide. The
product would be, in Gramsci ’s terms, an “organic adhesion of the popular-national
masses to the State” (1975: 1980), and not a state that claims itself to be national but rests
on the isolation and subordination of the popular classes. In the historical case of
Gramsci, one should have in mind when reading his reflections on the national-popular
that he is also concerned with the ‘southern question’, or the exploitation of the south by
the north under the guise of a unified Italian nation.
The fact that for Gramsci the notion of the national-popular is both a literary-
cultural and political concern is the reason why in his reflection on De Sanctis artistic
criticism is compared and paralleled to political criticism without erasing their important
distinction. Political criticism is one thing, Gramsci argues, and artistic criticism is
another. To reduce artistic or literary criticism to a search for what it expresses socially
is useful for political criticism, Gramsci claims, but does not “even graze the artistic
problem” (1975: 2187). Thus we see again in Gramsci a space for the relative autonomy
of artistic value. And although in the Gramscian conception art and culture are also
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spheres in which political struggle takes place it should not be assumed with the same
perspective as one would assume a critique of political ideologies.
According to Gramsci, Marxism needs a combination of both political criticism
and artistic/literary Criticism. For him, De Sanctis embodies precisely that, he represents
a key element for a radical literary criticism, both because of his insight and to his
commitment for a new order, forming part of the parliamentary left and opposing ultra-
conservative monarchical elements. Gramsci goes so far as to claim the work of De
Sanctis as a central inspiration for a Marxist literary criticism;
In short, the type of literary criticism appropriate to the philosophy of
praxis was offered by De Sanctis, not by Croce or anybody else (even less by
Carducci): in it should fuse the struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new
humanism, the critique of customs, of the sentiments and of the conceptions of the
world with the aesthetic or purely artistic critique in an impassioned fervor, even
if only in the form of sarcasm (1975: 2188).
The literary and artistic criticism of De Sanctis represents for Gramsci a committed
criticism that consciously situates itself in a cultural struggle. Gramsci thinks that the
mass popular readership, the non-highly cultured readership, is one that prefers content
over form, making De Sanctis’ position much more appreciated not only because of his
commitment but also because of the content of his criticism;
The criticism of De Sanctis is militant, not “frigidly” aesthetic, it is the criticism
of a period of cultural struggles, of conflicts between antagonistic conceptions of
life. The analyses of content, the criticism of the “structure” ot the works; that is,
of the logical and historico-actual coherence of the mass of sentiments artistically
represented are tied to this cultural struggle: precisely in that seems to reside the
profound humanity and humanism of De Sanctis, which makes the critic
sympathetic even today. It is satisfying to feel in him the impassioned fervor of
the man of the party that has solid moral and political convictions and does not
hide them and does not even attempt to hide them (1975; 2188).
Central to Gramsci’s notion of the national-popular and to his positive valuation
of De Sanctis is the constitutive social cell of the relations between leaders and led. At
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the core ot the concept ot the national-popular lies this problematic, since for Gramsci
national unitication has been flawed in Italy because it has not been popular, that is, it as
not been built on a strong popular base. In his own time, De Sanctis’ literary criticism
emphasized precisely that, the emptiness and isolation of the Italian national discourse
and its manifestations in literature. This lack of attention to the popular elements in
literature for Gramsci ( 1975: 1739-1940) was also a product of the relatively small
impact that Romanticism had in 19*'’ Century Italian literature. Historian Raymond Grew
(2000: 211-212) argues how in contrast to the impact it had in Germany and England,
Romanticism in Italy was held back due to the concessions and compromises to classical
forms.
According to Gramsci, a national-popular literature had not existed in Italy
because “in its content and its form it is cut off from the masses” (Salamini 1981: 212).
Gramsci rejects putting the responsibility on the mass readership for the lack of mass
popularity in Italian literature. On the contrary, he blames the intellectuals:
but there does not exist, in fact, neither a popularity of artistic literature, nor an
indigenous production of “popular” literature because an identity of the
conception of the world between “writers” and “people” is missing, that is, the
popular sentiments are not seen as the writers’ own, nor the writers have a
“nationally educating” function, that is, they have not put and are not putting to
themselves the problem of elaborating the popular sentiments after having relived
them and made them their own (1975: 21 14; our emphasis).
The keyword in this quotation is “elaborating”, because the national-popular question
poses a dialectical relationship between intellectuals and people and not a reduction of
Gramsci will argue that it is not accidental that there is massive readership even of the
popular literature like the serialized novels, just not of that produced by Italian writeis.
Instead, the serialized novels, especially of French origin, were very popular in Italy, for
example those of Alexander Dumas. The underlying problem, Gramsci will maintain, is
not the massive Italian readership but the particular development of national writers.
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the intellectuals to the people. There is a process of identification of worldview, of
perspective, but the point is to elaborate upon the popular sentiments. That is, there is a
need to identify with the popular elements but to bring higher, to elaborate, their
conception. This is why it is untair to attribute to Gramsci a populist conception in terms
of the popular literature he wants as Asor Rosa ( 1965) does, since he is not intending for
the intellectual element to reduce itself to the popular mentality to remain there or even to
justify or glorify it. On the contrary, in his criticism Gramsci attacks the superficial,
populist, and paternalistic conception behind the expression of the umili (‘the simple’)
much abused in 19“’ Century literature (1975: 2112). He reads a relationship of hierarchy
and power in the expression:
In the Italian intellectual the expression of “the simple” indicates a relationship of
fatherly and paternal protection, the “sufficient” sentiment of an unquestioned
superiority of one’s own, the relationship as if between two races, one held as
superior and the other as inferior, the relationship as if between an adult and a
child in the old pedagogy or worse still a relationship of the type of “animal
protection society”, or of the Anglo-Saxon salvation army towards the cannibals
of the Papuasia (1975: 21 12).
It is of this hierarchical and paternalistic approximation towards the popular element that
Gramsci thinks many Italian writers fall prey. For example, in reaction to an article of
Adolfo Faggi in the Marzocco of November of 1931 regarding the expression vox populi
vox Dei in the novel Promessi Sposi of A. Manzoni, he concludes:
Between Manzoni and the “simple” there a sentimental distance; the simple are to
Manzoni a “problem of historiography”, a theoretical problem that he believes he
can resolve with the historical novel, with the “likelihood” of the historical novel.
Because of that the simple are often presented as popular “dolts”, with ironic good
faith, but ironic. And Manzoni is too Catholic to think that the voice of the people
is the voice of God: between the people and God lies the church, and God does
not incarnate in the people, but in the church. That God incarnates in the people
can be believed by Tolstoy, but not Manzoni.
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It is certain that this attitude of Manzoni is felt by the people and thus the
Promessi Sposi has never been popular: sentimentally the people felt Manzoni
distant from them and his book as a book of devotion and not as a popular epic
(1975: 1703).
Gramsci (1975: 1692) holds a similar view of those writers he calls the little
grandchildren offather Bresciani, whom he identifies as series of writers in which art is
distant from life.’'^^ We must add that this is consistent with his conception of philosophy
and its relation to common sense. In chapter five we saw how Gramsci proposes a moral
and intellectual reform in the part of the philosophy of praxis that should ‘go down’ to the
common sense of the popular elements, and to bring up the potential progressive
elements already possibly contained in a chaotic form in common sense. Neither in his
literary criticism nor in his philosophical or political outlook is there ever a reduction in
the part of the leaders or of the intellectuals to the level of the really existing popular
outlook. What is important in all of these instances is the necessary close, dialectical, and
reconfiguring relationship between leaders and led or between intellectuals and people.
In addition, for Gramsci, to reduce oneself completely to the local outlook of the
popular elements means to incur an act of folklorism or one-sided provincialism. It is
important to stress that for Gramsci the notion of national is not a localist or narrow
nationalist notion. He clarifies on this point in an important passage in notebook 14,
where he distinguishes between what is national and what is folklore. He argues that:
the folkloric comes close to the “provincial” in all senses, that is, whether in the
sense of “particularistic”, or in the sense of anachronistic, or in the sense
appropriate to a class lacking of universal (at least European) characteristics
(1975: 1660).
On the contrary:
See also chapter three.
168
It can be said that a style is “national” when it is contemporaneous to a
deteimined world (or European) level of culture and has reached (it is understood)
this level ( 1975: 1660).
For Gramsci, tor something to be properly national it must have achieved the point of
cultural progress arrived at by the most modern nations. In his conception, national
cannot be separated tiom international or it becomes folkloric, anachronistic, and
provincial. It is not surprising, then, that as early on as in notebook 3 he claimed that
national is distinct Irom nationalism (1975: 285). If we follow his logic, the creation of
nationalisms is a product of a separation ot the ruling elites from the popular elements in
order to defend their individual position of power.
An additional comment must be made regarding Gramsci’s position on the
relationship between literary creation and political struggle. In contrast to socialist
realism (Salamani 1981: 200-201), and consistent with his notes on literary criticism,
Gramsci rejects the subordination of ail and literature to a political ideology or party line.
Gramsci (1975: 1820-1821) accepts that the political militant will always be unsatisfied
with the literary writer due to the different nature of their objectives. For Gramsci, the
political militant is striving for what should be, while the writer is dealing with what is.
Now, Gramsci disagrees with what is the Leninist (and later Stalinist and Soviet)
conception of artistic creation, which calls for a full submission of art to the party cause.
Historically this conception meant the rejection of forms and formalisms and the
promotion of realism, expressed for example in the work of Gorky. Gramsci preserves in
his conception of art and literature a notion of autonomy, albeit relative. For him, an
attempt to impose from above a specific content and form to artistic expression means
political weakness and not dominance. A new artistic expression in accordance to a
169
revolutionary political movement should emerge spontaneously out of the changed social
situation. Thus, in notebook 15 Gramsci states:
That the political man exercises pressure so that the art of his time expresses a
determined cultural world is a political action, not one of artistic criticism: if the
cultural world for which one is fighting is a live and necessary fact, its expansion
will be irresistible, it will tind its artists. But if the pressure notwithstanding, this
irresistibility is not seen or does not operate, this means that it was all a fictional
and artificial world ( 1975: 1794).
As will be seen, this position towards literary creation is similar to the one held by
Gramsci regarding the question of language.
As happens with Gramsci’s notes on philosophy and literary criticism, his notes
concerning language situate themselves in his integral and comprehensive political theory
and project. This interest in language was not only imposed by the political problem of
the questione della lingua in post-unified Italy. It also represented Gramsci’s personal
intellectual interests. We will first deal with Gramsci’s interest in linguistics and his
conception of language in general, and then its importance in regards with the ‘language
question’ in Italy and with his politics in general.
In his years as a student at the University of Turin, Gramsci was influenced and
befriended by known Italian linguist Matteo Bartoli, founder of what was first known as
the neo-linguistic school, and later spatial linguistics. Lo Piparo (1979), Ives (2004), and
Boothman (2004) agree that Gramsci’s interests in linguistics carry over to the Qiiaderni.
Lo Piparo (1979: 103-108) has argued for the central influence of Gramsci’s linguistics
studies on his notion of hegemony. Moreover, as will be seen, within the concrete
situation of the ‘language question’ in Italy, tor Gramsci the relationship between his
notion of hegemony and national language is strong (Boothman 2004: 27, 83).
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During his years at the University of Turin he was enrolled in the Faculty of
Letters, and his interests mostly lied in the study of glottology and in linguistics in
general. Although by 1915 Gramsci abandoned the university, we know through an
article of 1918 that until that year at least he had the intention of graduating with a
dissertation on “the history of language, attempting to apply also to these investigations
the critical methods of historical materialism” (1982! 612). At the university he was a
student of and was very much influenced by linguist Matteo Giulio Bartoli. At the time,
the linguistic field of study was divided mainly between two schools of thought, the neo-
grammarians and the neo-linguists. The neo-grammarians argued that the changes in the
development of language were not to be looked for in the complex historical events in
which the people who speak it find themselves but in the physiologic mechanism of the
human glottis (Lo Piparo 1979: 74). In this physiological and naturalistic conception, the
emergence of new words and idioms happens due to internal and spontaneous evolution,
due to ‘parthenogenesis’, in the words of Bartoli and later Gramsci (Bartoli and Bertoni
1928: 120; Lo Piparo: 1979: 67). For Bartoli and the school of neo-linguistics language
was historical, and it had to strive to make a chronology of languages according to
contacts between different cultures and speech communities. Geography plays an
important role in determining the chronology and the tracing of contacts between
different speech communities. For them language changed by a process through which a
confrontation occurs between different speech communities and one speech community
exercises prestige over the other making itself dominant and the others subordinate.
From this follows, for example, that the languages that are most conservative “are those
that have suffered less the influence of foreign languages” (Bartoli and Bertoni 1928: 94).
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Gramsci sympathized completely with the neo-linguistic school. It represented
within the realm of linguistics a historicist position, in contrast to the naturalistic
conception of the neo-grammarians. As such, Bartoli’s position in linguistics is in
Gramsci’s eyes analogous to that of historical materialism within the realm of politics
and philosophy. In notebook 3, Gramsci expresses what he finds particularly important
in Bartoli’s conception;
The innovation of Bartoli is precisely this: that from linguistics conceived
narrowly as a natural science, has made a historical science, whose roots are to be
looked for “in space and in time” and not in the vocal apparatus physiologically
understood (1975: 352).
For Gramsci too, beyond the physiological component that makes speech possible, the
development of language is historical and cultural.
As Ives (2004; 33) argues, for Gramsci language cannot be separated from all
other aspects of social life. This complete historicity of language makes language
impossible to be conceived as something autonomous or purely natural;
It seems that it could be said that “language” is essentially a collective name that
does not presuppose a “unique” thing neither in time nor in space. Language
means also culture and philosophy (be it even of the kind of common sense) and
thus the “linguistic” fact is in reality a multiplicity of facts more or less
organically coherent and coordinated (Gramsci 1975: 1330).
This historicity of language is the reason why Gramsci puts at the center of his linguistic
conception the element of metaphor. He states that language:
is always metaphorical. If maybe it cannot be exactly said that every discourse is
metaphorical for respect to the thing or material and sensible object indicated (or
the abstract concept) so that not to widen too much the concept of metaphor, it
can be said that the present language is metaphoric in respect to the meanings and
the ideological content that the words have had in previous periods of civilization
(1975: 1427).
And consonant with this social and historical conception ol language, he states:
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Language is transformed with the transformation of all civilization, due to the
emergence ot new classes onto culture, due the hegemony exercised by a national
language over others, etc. and precisely assumes metaphorically the words of
previous civilizations and cultures (1975; 1428).
This expresses the influence of Bartoli, although in this particular fragment Gramsci uses
the expression of hegemony instead of Bartoli’s prestige. In fact, Lo Piparo (1979; 104-
105) and Ives (2004; 27-28) have convincingly argued that Bartoli’s notion of prestige
(of one speech community over others) is behind Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and that
at times he uses both words interchangeably. Moreover, to make more explicit what
Gramsci means by the historically metaphorical nature of language, let us quote the
example he himself gives in notebook 11; “Nobody today thinks that the word “dis-aster”
is tied to astrology or is induced to error on the opinion of who uses it; thus, even an
atheist can talk about “dis-grace” without being taken for a believer of predestination,
etc.” (1975; 1428). The last example of “dis-grace” is good because it shows how a word
can still be used, emptied of its original meaning of ‘being without the grace of God’, in a
modern and secular world without any relation to its religious origin. Underlying the
change in use is the iriuption of modernity in history, the emergence of secular nation-
states, etc.
Language for Gramsci (1975; 1374), in addition to being socially and historically
determined, contains traces of the “spontaneous philosophy” of the common man. For
him, the language a person uses, its complexity, can reveal the greater or lesser
complexity of his or her conception of the world (1975; 1 377). It is in part due to the
inherence of a conception of the world implicit in the use of a language that Gramsci
( 1975; 1375) is able to claim that all men are philosophers. In fact, for Gramsci language
is intimately tied to knowledge.
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As has been seen in the quotations provided so far regarding Gramsci’s notes on
language they run throughout the Qiiaderni. His concern for these matters is even shown
very early on alter being arrested in a letter to his sister-in-law Tatiana dated March 19,
1927. Theie he provided a tentative plan of study for prison included as the second
point a study of comparative linguistics “from the new point of view of the neolinguists
against the neogrammarians” (1996: 55-56). As if coming full circle, the very last
notebook which he worked on, notebook 29, before finally stopping due to health
problems, is dedicated to the ‘study of grammar’. Although a brief notebook, it contains
important insight regarding Gramsci’s conception of language.
As with language in general, Gramsci (1975: 2341) believes that grammar is
historical, “the “photography” of a determined stage of a national (collective) language”.
It can serve for two things, according to him, to trace part of the history of a civilization,
or it can serve a political end and be intended to modify social reality. In Gramsci’s
conception there are two main types of grammars, an “immanent” grammar and a
“normative” grammar ( 1975: 2342). The first is contained in the ‘spontaneous’ use of
language itself and expresses the set of rules and conventions that are inherited and
internalized through the common social interaction of people. The second is the grammar
that is consciously imposed on language. Within normative grammar Gramsci identifies
two, an unwritten one and a written. The unwritten one is at work when the speaker
modifies his speech due to a necessity given by a particular situation within a concrete
oral social interaction. The written ones are particularly political in that they “tend to
cover all of a national territory and all of the “linguistic volume” in order to create a
For a closer analysis of this important letter see the second chapter.
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national Unitarian linguistic conformism” ( 1975: 2343). That is, a written normative
grammar is intended to unity linguistically a territory. It is at this point that the creation
ot a grammar becomes a politico-cultural act: “The written normative grammar is thus
always a “choice”, a cultural direction, that is, it is always an act of cultural-national
politics” (1975: 2344). Here the discussion turns explicitly to the political and more to
the concrete. We see that the discussion of language in the Quaderni reveals Gramsci’s
concern with the concrete and pressing problem ot the ‘language question’ in Italy. It is
also in relation to this that the connection of language with Gramsci’s concern for the
relationship between leaders and led is more explicit.
The ‘language question’ was a central problem in post-unified Italy due to the
great variety and strength of the various regional dialects throughout the Italian
peninsula; something Gramsci knew very well coming from the island of Sardinia which
had a strong local dialect. There were numerous attempts and educational reforms to
try to deal with the problem of unifying the territory under a ‘standard Italian”.
According to Tullio De Mauro ( 1970: 43), at the time of unification only around 2.5
percent of the Italian population spoke anything that could be considered ‘standard’
Italian. After various state-sponsored attempts at language unification and literacy
campaigns, still in 1911 the non-literacy rate for the whole peninsula was around 40 per
cent. More specifically, in the poorest southern regions by 1911 the non-literacy rate
surpassed the 50 per cent while in regions like the Piedmont the non-literacy rate was
around 1
1
per cent. The economic asymmetries ran parallel to the literacy asymmetries.
For brief take on the development of Gramsci’s own usage of Italian, see Pier Paolo
Pasolini (1982: 180-185).
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In fact, Gramsci believes that every time the ‘language question’ emerges it
means that something politieal underneath is happening. He states:
Every time that in one way or another the question of language emerges means
that a series of other problems is being imposed; the formation or extension of the
leading [dirigente^ class, the necessity of establishing more intimate and seeure
relations between leading groups and the popular-national mass, that is, of
reorganizing the cultural hegemony (1975: 2346).
Thus, the question of hegemony, of the stability of a particular relationship between
leaders and led, is at the heart of his concerns over language. For Gramsci, the fact that a
unitary ‘standard’ Italian had scarcely and unequally extended over the whole peninsula,
more than expressing an issue of language, reveals the faulty proeess of real and integral
political unitication. Gramsci believes that if the ‘language question’ is not assumed
from this comprehensive and integral conception, then any approximation will be
equivocal or unilateral. It is mainly because of this that he tackles the issue of
‘normative’ grammars, especially written ones, since for him “the normative grammar is
apolitical act” (1975: 2347).
Gramsci believes that without a really integral and more equal unifieation, written
normative grammars are problematic because they are seen as mechanie, external, and
superficial forms imposed from above without any proper correspondence with reality.
This problematic and Gramsci’s position were not entirely new in his time. He is in part
retaking a debate over the question of language in the 19’*’ Century that began with
Manzoni’s propositions regarding the unification of language. For Manzoni, the
formation of a unitary language is not the product or effect of the emergence of a new
national culture but will be the cause for better communieation in a culture that already
exists (Lo Piparo 1979; 30). In his conception, the way for the unification of an Italian
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language is through the “diffusion of an already beautiful andformed language" (Lo
Piparo 1979. 31). The unitication ot language is seen in Manzoni’s eyes as a cause and
not as product of unification. The practical result of this was the endorsement of the
Novo Vocaholario della lingua italiana secondo I’liso di Firenze (‘New Vocabulary of
the Italian Language According to the Use in Florence’).
Gramsci’s response to Manzoni’s conception is seen for example in notebook 21,
when he states: “But the unity of language is one of the external modes and not
exclusively necessary for national unity: in any case it is an effect and not a cause"
( 1975: 2118; our emphasis). Gramsci believes Manzoni’s position and the promotion of
written normative grammars reveal an equivocal underlying conception. Unification of
language, in his eyes, is something that should emerge out of real social necessities from
below, out of an integral social and political unification of the territory. In addition,
Manzoni’s position posits an independence of language from effective culture, as if it
were something that you can mechanically change from above. Nothing is more distant
from Gramsci’s position, for which as he states in notebook 5, “every tongue is an
integral conception of the world, and not only a dress that indifferently acts as a form to
every content” (1975: 644-645). Gramsci’s position towards Manzoni is not entirely
original, though. He is consciously retaking the critique of Manzoni advanced by linguist
G. I. Ascoli (1967: 3-73) in 1873 against Manzoni’s position. Ascoli, as later for
Gramsci, believes that the specific determination of a language is a result, a product, of
the cultural and social changes of a territory. For him, the lack of linguistic unitication of
Italy was thus an effect of the “sad divorce between the educated and the public” (Lo
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Piparo 1979: 36). Gramsci had already positively recognized Ascoli’s position in an
earlier article of 1918:
It happened that a scholar of the history of language, Graziadio Isaia Ascoli, to the
hundreds of pages of Manzoni had opposed some thirty pages to demonstrate: that
not even a national language can be artificially aroused, by imposition of the
State; that the Italian language is forming by itself, and will be formed only in as
much as the national cohabitation arouses numerous and stable connections
between the various parts of the nation; that the proliferation of a particular
language is due to the productive activity of writings, of traffics, of commerce, of
the men who speak that particular language (1982: 670).
In a similar vein, he states in notebook 29, seventeen years later: “A unitary language
will be obtained if it is a necessity, and the organized intervention will accelerate the
times of this process already existent” (1975: 2345).
This rejection of an imposition from above towards linguistic unification in his
critique of normative grammars runs parallel to his conception of politics and to his
conception of philosophy. In chapter 3 we saw that power in his conception should be
exercised with the consent of the subordinated allies and not compelled nor imposed
through coercive means. In chapter 4 we saw that in his conception the philosophy of
praxis should not pose itself as contrary to or isolated above from the common sense of
the people but should engage in a dialectical relation of immersion and transcendence.
Now we see a similar position concerning the language question in Italy. Gramsci wants
to say that without a true and equal .social integration linguistic unification will be
difficult. Having said this, we must clarify that Gramsci continues to be a reali.st. And as
such, since reality cannot be confused for what is wished for, he did not completely reject
The rejection of artificial means imposed from above is constant in Gramsci’s,
including his pre-prison writings. This is basically the same position he assumes in the
debate over Esperanto as an alternative lor an international language that began in the
pages o\ IhQ Avanti! in 1917. See Gramsci (1982: 612-613, 668-669).
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the actual use of normative grammars nor did he reject the teaching of ‘standard’ Italian
in the school curriculum. Although having clear that traditional normative grammars are
insufficient, Gramsci rejects Gentile s educational proposition for the elimination of the
teaching ot grammar with the reason that language is something that is learned in
everyday life and in the social environment in general. Gramsci (1975; 2348-2349) reads
it as a reactionary liberal position that only benefits the upper classes, leaving the popular
elements without any organized immersion in the cultured language;
it excludes only the organized [unitary] intervention in the learning of language
and, in reality, it excludes the popular national mass from learning the cultured
tongue, because the upper leading sector, that traditionally speaks in “tongue”,
transmits it from generation to generation, through a slow process that begins with
the first babblings of the child under the guidance of the parents, and continues in
conversation (1975; 2349).
Rejecting the teaching of grammar in the public school curriculum would mean for
Gramsci to close up the only organized way left to the popular elements to have access to
‘standard’ Italian. And we say ‘organized way’ because Gramsci (1975; 2345)
acknowledges various other forms of linguistic irradiation like popular journals,
newspapers, theaters and cinema, the radio, and other such forms. Moreover, since for
Gramsci language reflects a conception of the world, this would make it harder for
popular elements to transcend their regional and local cultures and conceptions. To use
the distinction mentioned above, this would make it harder for the popular element to
transcend the regional folkloric and provincial culture and to arrive towards a national
consciousness. This, for its part, is not a small thing, since as we have seen for Gramsci a
properly national consciousness implies a necessary connection to internationalism and to
world history. Although extremely sensible to the regional dialects and cultures (he
himself continued to cultivate his Sardinian dialect) he saw the need to tran.scend
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regionalisms. At the same time, for him the striving of the people for a national
consciousness is not meant as a nationalistic claim but on the contrary as the doorway to
other cultures and other languages, as the entry point towards an international future. It is
this connection between national and international that lies in his political impetus
towards language unification. For Gramsci, the importance of a unitary modern language
is its communicability with other such languages of other modern cultures:
If it tiLie that every language contains the elements of a conception of the world
and of a culture, it will also be true that from the language of everyone can be
judged the greater or lesser complexity of their conception of the world. He who
speaks only the dialect or comprehends the national tongue in diverse degrees,
participates necessarily in an intuition of the world more or less limited and
provincial, fossilized, anachronistic, in contrast to the grand currents of thought
that dominate world history. Their interests will be limited, more or less
corporative and economistic, not universal. If it is not always possible to learn
more foreign tongues to put one in contact with different cultural lives, one should
at least learn well the national tongue. A grand culture can he translated into the
tongue of another grand culture, that is, a grand national tongue, historically rich
and complex, can translate whichever other grand culture, that is, to he a worldly
expression. But a dialect cannot do the same ( 1975: 1377; our emphasis).
In this chapter we saw that Gramsci’s political conception is broadened to include
such fields as those of literary criticism and language matters. At various points we
traced lines ot thought in his notes on these matters very similar if not parallel to those
contained in his reflections on more immediately political phenomena and on philosophy.
The running concern under his notes on language and literature is also the political
impulse towards a reconfiguration of the relationship between leaders and led for the
realization of a radical moral and intellectual reform.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
As should have come clear throughout the present work, a close reading of the
text of Quaderni del carcere was the central element of our approach towards the
understanding of Gramsci’s thought. As was elaborated in the second chapter, the
fragmentary nature of the Quaderni makes for an active and cautious reading of this
material still in preparation.
What the careful leader should have also noticed was the disparate page numbers
of the numerous quotations put together to clarify any particular topic. That is, for some
concepts or topics a sound and consistent interpretation required the combination of
insight expressed in notes that could have been far away one from the other. Thus, for
example, for the rendering of the concept of hegemony the reader can see that we used
notes from notebooks 1, 3, 6, 12, 13, and so on. And such was the case with almost every
important topic we touched upon from the Quaderni. So on the one hand we have to
conclude with Fernandez Buey (2001; 163) when he argues that Gramsci’s writing
follows a transversal logic. This is, he argues, what gives the Quaderni its peculiar
structure.
On the other hand, it is safe to say that this transversal logic would have not
probably been the intention of Gramsci if something of what he produced in prison could
have seen the light of day during his lifetime and under his care. There are numerous
indications to this effect in the Quaderni', among them Gramsci’s expressed intention to
produce a number of relatively short essays or monographs treating a particular topic.
Nothing could have been farther from his pedagogic and political mind than to produce a
theoretical zihaldone, a melange, nor was he particularly fond of the grand theoretical
treatises that pretended to resolve all the problems of a particular matter in a closed and
systematic way. This is precisely one of the critiques he directs against Bukharin’s
popular manual. Instead, he preferred the short monograph, the short essay. In this sense
he would have probably endorsed Adorno’s (2003) claim for the essay form as the anti-
systemic writing mode, although not only because of the philosophical concerns of
Adorno but also due to pragmatic political concerns. This is .so because Gramsci’s
thought expressed in the Quaderni, even though intended in a way to last fiir ewig, is
transparently meant to form part of a radical critique of everything existing and towards a
total intellectual and moral reform. More than a political theory, the Quaderni contain
the groundwork of a political project.
His possible intentions aside, the Quaderni del carcere are what they are, a
fragmentary collection of writings whose underlying totalizing impulse needs to be
rendered carefully throughout the whole work. This transversal logic of the Quaderni is
in part a product of the immediate concrete impositions of the prison regulations, which
only permitted Gramsci to have a certain number of notebooks at a time. In addition,
sometimes Gramsci writes in different notebooks within the same timeframe making it
impossible to chronologically date every single note.
Our proposition, that the underlying matrix of his prison writings is the concern
on the relation between leaders and led, can be seen as ever present throughout the
entirety of the notebooks but emerging strongly in different nodal points. These nodal
points, the different topics treated, are for their part variously connected and intersected
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by each other. Probably in spite of Gramsci, the Qiiadenii reveal a transversal logic
which in any case more than anything else expresses what we often repeat and maintain
throughout the work: that Gramsci’ s conception of a political project is a comprehensive
and integral one that values the different spheres of social reality as political battle fronts.
The insight contained in his Qiiaderni is extremely valuable. Gramsci was one of
those political thinkers who lived in a transitional historical period in which “the old dies
and the new cannot be born” (1975: 31 1). As such, he was confronted with the necessity
to rethink new social and political realities in great part with the concepts inherited from
the past and working them through towards the articulation of a political project for the
future. Past, pre.sent, and future, Gramsci’s Qiiaderni del carcere is one of those key
works in the history of political thought that continues to provide enrichment and insight
with which to confront critically our own social and political reality. His mature
intellectual and political development took place amidst the rise of the Fascist threat and
within the defensive position left to those who have to face the reality of political defeat.
One had to accustom oneself to being stereo della storia he said in the Qiiaderni, to
acknowledge the reality of defeat while rejecting to renounce to fertilize the terrain for a
better future. Those who wish for a better present recognize the realistic yet unyielding
melancholy contained in that expression, and in Gramsci’s defeat they see their own.
We would be more than pleased if the present work invites the reader to approach
the Qiiaderni del carcere itself. If done so, we wish our work to be seen as a road map,
as a companion, in that effort, and not as a straightjacket.
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